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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM ~ 
7,.~ ~~~ ~ 4:--
September 26, l983~cohte?"ence~~~ ..,I'O.L_~~ ·--~~---
Summer List 5, Sheet l ~f!!Cbr 1 <J~ _ , ~~ 
~· ~~ 47'~~~ 
No. 82-{ 721-CSX ~/.L~~  ~ 
Seattle T1mes Co. @~ • ~o<'.o~~ 
a 1. . ~ . ~ ........:;;_~~.-!/2.~.J-1!!!...,A 
v. "':'L) 4' ../-.1721 .. ~s-f . •. 




S"8 ~ ~~ o/~.-i _. 
~'ll~~"tin art @ · Af~~sh. Sup. Ct. ~ (Rosellini, Brachtenbach, f~~~ Stafford, Williams, Dore; 
J~ Ill' v. //'1 Dolliver, concurring, Brach-
~· I 1 -; tenbach, Dimmick; Utter, ~ 6-j ~ dissenting, Pearson) 
I ..;c....L ~ ~ Affirming Wash. Super. Ct. 
~ ~·~ · ~ - -,. (Scholfield) 
b eattle Times Co 
~ al. State/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: A religious organization and its leader sued 
the Seattle Times for defamation and invasion of privacy. 
r _,,,..~ - DtM'l .r, ..... t~ 1 \ _ -· ,t._ ,~ ,_k fr'lln.-to. 
~2..- //Q/- bOVJ i ~n~ J/1 Fiv t~f Y!.~wl-1.S s-fr.k.J · 
-~ c£ Co;VIMiJVI.J ~ 
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Issues: 1) does a protective order barring publication of 
material obtained during discovery violate the First Amendment? 
and 2) must the religious organization reveal its list of members 
and donors? 
2. THE FACTS: Keith Rhinehart founded the Aquarian 
Foundation in 1950. The Foundation is a spiritualist church, 
whose religious views are in some respects unpopular. Beginning 
in 1973, the Seattle Times published a series of articles about 
the Foundation and Rhinehart that accused Rhinehart of being a 
' 
~ <:..harlat~ and the Foundation of conducting religious ceremonies 
~~involving nudity and extolling homosexuality. 
~ 3. PROCEEDINGS BELOW: In February 1980, Rhinehart, the 
Foundation, and several of its members sued the Seattle Times and 
several of its employees for defamation and invasion of privacy. 
The plaintiffs alleged that the Times articles caused a reduction 
in both membership and donations in addition to other injuries. 
On June 27, 1980, the~attle Times served interrogatories on the 
plaintiffs that requested financial information and address lists 
/ 
of members and donors. The plaintiffs objected on grounds of the 
--------~~~-----
constitutional right to associate. 
Judge Scholfield of the King County Superior Court initially 
directed the plaintiffs to respond to the interrogatories. The 
plaintiffs, however, submitted five affidavits, and Judge 
Scholfield reconsidered. On June 26, 1981, he issued two orders. 
The first directed plaintiffs to respond to the interrogatories; 
v the second granted plaintiffs a p rotective orner under Wash. R. 
Civ. P. 26(c), which is modeled on Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The 
ffl~~~~ 
latter order prohibited the Times from using the in format ion 
obtained through discovery for any purpose other than preparing 
for trial. He held that the rule applied to the press and that 
there was a reasonable basis for the order. He distinguished In 
re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (CADC 1979), as involving a request for a 
protective order after discovery had already occurred. In the 
first paragraph of the order, Judge Scholfield referred to the 
five affi~its submitted by plaintiffs, which alleged that they 
had been threatened and physically abused by unknown persons 
after the publication of the Seattle Times articles. 
4. DECISION BELOW: The Washington Supreme Court granted 
discretionary review of both orders and affirmed. Justice 
/ osellini, writing f rl( a majority of five, held that the order 
compelling discovery was not an abuse of discretion because the 
plaintiffs sought to withhold the very information upon which 
their damages claims were based. 
/ As to the {P!Otecti~ the press is entitled to no 
greater First Amendment protection than other persons. Although 
disinclined to view the order as prior restraint, it held that 
even under that doctrine the order is valid. Nebraska Press 
Assn. v. Stuart, 427 u.s. 539 (1976). There are no less 
intrusive measures, and th~rder protects the integrity of the --------- --~----------------
judicial process. The rule provides the trial judge discretion 
to manage the discovery process so that full disclosure of 
relevant information will occur and so that the participants will 
be protected from the harmful side effects of full disclosure. 
Of course, once the material has been introduced in a public 
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trial, there is a right to publish. 
Many statutes prevent the disclosure of information 
collected by the government for specific purposes. In re Halkin 
is not relevant because the party seeking the protective order 
there was the government and the matters involved were of public 
importance. Moreover, the documents the government sought to 
suppress from publication were already purged of sensitive 
information, and the protective order was not sought until after 
they had been produced. In In re San Juan Star, 662 F. 2d 108 
(CAl 1981) , the media intervened to gain information discovered 
by an attorney subject to a protective order. The CAl relied on 
a good cause standard with heightened sensitivity to First 
Amendment concerns to find that the order was valid as against 
the press. 
The rule imposed by the In re Halkin and by the In re San 
Juan Star courts is unduly burdensome on trial courts and is not 
required by the Court's decisions. Landmark Communications, Inc. 
v. Virginia, 435 u.s. 829 (1978), while invalidating a criminal 
sanction imposed on a nonparty who obtained secret information 
concerning the proceedings of a state judicial review commission, 
stated that careful internal procedures and controls could 
protect the secrecy interest. The Seattle Times has described no 
public interest in the publication of this information: it simply 
wants to exploit the fruits of the judicial system. The interest 
in the integrity of the judicial process is sufficient to meet 
the heavy burden required by prior restraint doctrine. 
Justice Dolliver, joined by two others, concurred. First 
- 5 -
Amendment analysis does not apply to discovery protective orders, 
as Judge Wilkey's dissent in In re Halkin notes. The Seattle 
Times does not have a First Amendment right to receive the 
information: it cannot object to restrictions on its reception. 
/ 
Justice Utter, joined by Justice Pearson, dissented and 
would remand. The majority misapplies the prior restraint 
doctrine: in ef feet, it exempts pretrial orders from the First 
Amendment. The prior restraint doctrine is inappropriate in this 
context because the mode by which the information is acquired is 
relevant. The In re Halkin court adopted a two-part test of 
first ascertaining the significance of the First Amendment 
interests restrained, and then of determining the appropriateness 
of the restraint in light of the harm prevented, the narrowness 
of the order, and the availability of alternatives. The In re 
San Juan court adopted a sliding scale test of evaluating the 
interests involved. A trial court in issuing a protective order 
should consider the extent of the First Amendment interest 
restrained, the harm the the order prevents, the status of the 
party seeking the order, and any other specific concerns. Any 
order should be narrow. In this case, the trial judge did not 
attempt to weigh the First Amendment interests, and its 
reasonable basis was too speculative. On remand, it should 




The Seattle Times contends: 1) the decision below does not 
identify a sufficiently specific harm to justify this prior 
- 6 -
v 
restraint and creates a blanket exemption to the Nebraska Press 
Assn. rule. 2) The decision conflicts with In re Halkin and In 
re San Juan Star, and other CA and state court decisions that 
recognize significant First Amendment interests in this context. 
Civil litigation is a major source of newsworthy information. 3) 
The order is vague and overly broad in scope and duration. 
Rhinehart and the ~quar ian Foundation contend: 1) the 
specific harm involved is the physical danger posed to Foundation 
members. 2) The court below properly balanced the plaintiffs' 
right to freedom of religion and privacy against the defendants' 
free press rights. The same test was applied in In re San Juan 
Star. The court below did not hold that the First Amendment does 
not apply to discovery material. The facts of In re Halkin 
indicate it differs only in degree from the opinion below. 
Washington pretrial discovery is not open to the public. 3) 
Prior restraint analysis does not apply to pretrial discovery 
/ 1 L \\ 
rna ter ials. 4) The Seattle T irnes attorney waived any right to 
object by agreeing at a deposition that the plaintiffs should 
have a protective order. 
No. 82-1758 
Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation contend: 1) 
,;identification of donors and members directly impairs the free 
exercise of religion. Producing the information would violate a 
promise given the donors and members. Especially when the 
religion involved is unpopular, such an order subjects a group to 
abuse and threats~ the protective order is an ineffective shield, 
given the Seattle Times prior behavior. The effect of the order 
7 
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will be to force abandonment of the suit. Less intrusive means 
exist for obtaining proof on the damages issue. 2) The decision 
below con~cts with other CA decisions. 
The Seattle Times contends: 1) a plaintiff that seeks 
damages may not refuse to comply with a discovery request 
directed at the damages issue. The plaintiffs waived any 
objection by bringing the suit on that issue. 2) None of the 
cited cases is in conflict: they either involved situations in 
which the need for discovery had evaporated or in which the 
government itself sought the information. 3) The Court lacks 
jurisdiction because there is no final judgment not subject to 
revision and because the challenge is not ripe as discovery has 
not taken place. 
6. DISCUSSION: The issue in No. 82-1758 does not pose any 
v"' 
direct conflict. The plaintiffs chose to raise the issue of loss I 
[
of membership ~d donations and should be subject to discovery 
adequate to elucidate the issue. The trial judge in its 
discretion chose the method of discovery: production of the lists 
with a protective order. There is no reason to review that 
exercise of discretion. 
The issue in § . 82-~ is more substantial. The 
Washington Supreme Court attempted to hedge its position by 
applying a prior restraint test in spite of its claim that the 
publication of discovery material is not amenable to analysis 
under that test. If the prior restraint test does apply, I find 
the Washington court's application of it unconvincing. The In re 
Halkin court seems to have applied a prior restraint test; the In 
J - 8 -
re San Juan Star court, however, applied something less. What 
the Washington court actually did is more consistent with the In 
re San Juan Star decision. 
If a person has possession of information, his publication 
of that information can be restrained only in exceptional 
circumstances. This was the case in In re Halkin, in which the 
plaintiffs sought to publish information obtained through 
discovery from the government. It was only after the information 
was in the plaintiffs' hands that ~ government requested a 
protective order. In this case, the Seattle Times reception of 
the information in the first place is conditioned on the 
protective order. If such an order is invalid, the newspaper 
does not automatically receive the information; instead, the 
trial judge will have to refashion the discovery procedures. I 
would view this as a question of discretion in which the trial 
judge must take cognizance of the First Amendment interests of 
the Seattle Times. ~ 
The issue is <rnportant and i _e grow~ng. All rr~ation 
received by a party in civil litigation is protected in some way 
b h . d h / . . 1' f d y t e F1rst Amen ment. T e const1tut1ona 1ty o the goo cause 
standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) is at issue. Although the 
conflict between this decision and In re Halkin does not exist as 
a matter of form, it is certainly present in substance. 
7. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend granting No. 82-1721 and 
denying No. 82-1758. 
There are responses. 
July 11, 1983 Van Zandt opn in petn 
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January 31, 1984 
SEATLE GINA-POW 
82-1721 Seattle Times, etal. v. Rhinehart, The Aquarium 
Foundation, et al. 
MEMO TO FILE 
This memo, after a preliminary look at the briefs, is 
to refresh my recollection on the issues when I prepare 
for the arguments and Conference. 
Statement of the Case 
The case is here on cert from the Supreme Court of 
washington. It arises out of a state court libel suit 
filed by respondents against petitioners, the primary one 
being the Seattle Times (the Times). The suit is based on 
several news stories that, unless true, undoubtedly were 
libelous and probable maliciously so. They focus 
primarily on 
presentation" 
"baazar performances" at a "religious 
staged for inmates at the State 
Penitentiary. Respondent Rhinehart, the primary plaintiff 
below, is the founder and leader of a small, unpopular 
"spiritualist" church. According to respondent's brief, 
the church - known as the Aquarium Foundation - promotes 
"moral values and ethical conduct", believes in survival 
after death, and ability to communicate with deceased 
~. 
persons through a medium. The articles are said to have 
"falsely implied that the Aquarium Foundation is a Jim 
Jones-like cult, and that Rhinehart defrauds his followers 
and supporters. 
The Protective Order Under Rule 26b(l) 
The case remains at a pretrial stage, and involves 
---~ ---- ..... 
only the validity of a protective order entered by the 
trial court that limits the use of certain information 
obtained by discovery from being published by the Times 
and other media. 
Rule 26b(l), modeled after the federal rule, provides 
in pertinent part as follows: 
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending action, 
whether it relates to the claim or defense of 
the parties seeking discovery or to the claim or 
defense of any other party, including the 
existence, description, nature, custody, 
condition and location of any books, documents, 
or other tangible things and the identity and 
location of persons having knowledge of any 
discoverable matter. It is not ground for 
objection that the information sought will be 
I 
inadmissible at the trial if the information 
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence." 
As is customary under the liberal discovery rules, 
the Times and other defendants went after the plaintiffs!. 
.J. 
According to respondent's brief, they were required to 
produce all documents prepared by Rhinehart within the 
past ten years, including United States income tax 
------~ ~ 




that r "Jrect 
A 
donations from any source, and 
the assets and liabilities of the 
Reverend Rhinehart. Depositions were requested and . 
apparently have been set for deposing Rhinehart and each 
of the plaintiffs, that include four women members of his 
church. Defendants interrogatories sought the names of 
donors to Rhinehart and his church, together with the --
amount of donations and the names and addresses of the 
---------~ ~--------~--~------------------------· 
members of the church over the last ten years. 
Respondent's brief states that the documents produced 
would "fill an entire room" (br. p. 6). 
As this case involves the validity of the protective 
order (a type of order frequently made to limit the use of 
discovered information), I set it forth in full: 
"The defendants and each of them shall make m 
no use of and shall ~ not disseminate the Yl-A-..k)...__ 
i hlorma tion which · is gained through /~'~ ~ 
discovery, other than such use as is necessary 
in order for the discovering party to prepare ....___.; 
and try the case. As a result, information 
gained by a defendant through the discovery 
process may not be published by any of the 
defendants or made available to any news media 
for publication or dissemination. This 
protective order has no application except to 
information gained by the defendants through the 
use of the discovery processes." 
At least on its face, the first sentence of the 
protective order appears to be fully in accord with Rule 
26b(l). Apparently the plaintiffs in the libel suit were 
required to provide all of the information requested by 
the defendants. The protective order, however, limits the 
~~se thereof to the ex~nt tha~ particular information is 
i--19 ~"necessary in order for the discovering party to prepare 
cl.h--'1 
~ 
and try the case". In addition, and what is directly at -----
issue here, is the second sentence that provides that 
information not necessary to prepare and try the case "may 
not be publi§hed by any of the defendants or made 
available to any news media for publication". 
The Supreme Court of Washington, in a long opinion 
that reviewed - perhaps at unnecessary length - a host of 
First Amendment cases - found that the trial court had not 
·" 
abused its discretion by the protective order. 
Arguments of the Parties 
It is not clear to me (and I have not rechecked the 
opinions or the briefs) whether the courts below drew any 
distinction between the several categories of documentry 
5. 
information that was provided. Respondents brief (for 
Rhinehart, the Foundation and the four female members of 
• his church), focuseQ primarily on the request of the Times 
and other media defendants to publish the names and 
addresses of donors and members, and the amounts of 
donations. The petitioners assert a First Amendment right 
to publish everything obtained by discovery under Section 
26 in a law suit, including the most private and 
sensitive information. 
Petitioners, for the media, make arguments along the 
following lines. Litigation is a public matter~ parties 
to litigation are not exempt from First Amendment 
requirements, the order in this case restricts protected 
speech, the right to publish is particularly important in 
a defamation suit, etc. The entire litany of this Court's 
First Amendment cases are cited, with many quotations used 
that have little or no relevance to this particular case. 
None of this Court's prior cases has addressed the 
specifi (' issue presented here. 
'\ . Petitoners rely primarily 
on the CADC case in In Re Halkin, 595 F.2d 176, in which 
Judge Wilkey dissented. CADC ruled that a protective 
order restrainting litigants "from communicating matters 
of public importance for an indefinite period of time ••• 
0. 
constitutes direct governmental action limiting speech 
that must be carefully scrutinized in light of the First 
Amendment." Petitioners cite a number of other cases said 
to recognize a basic First Amendment interest in 
disseminating discovery materials. At other points in 
their brief, petitioners say - and cite some cases - for 
the view that a compelling interest must be shown to 
prevent publication. 
Petitioners argue that we should establish a test 
that recognizes First Amendment interests in 
disseminating. Also "strict scrutiny" must be applied to 
protective orders. A court should weigh the "harm" of 
dissemination against these interests, insure that any 
restrictive order is narrowly drawn, and that the court 
could find no other alternatives less intrusive. 
Petitioners do make a valid point, I think, when they 
say there is no time limit in the court's order, although 
certainly they would have a right to reapply for 
permission to publish at some later date. 
Respondents rely equally strongly on 
Amendment rights of association and religion. 
the First 
They make 
rather persausive arguments that disclosure particularly 
of the names, addresses and donations of members of the 
I • 
religious organization would be a serious infringement of 
both of these rights. 
Although I do not believe respondents discuss In Re 
Halkin, it was discussed at some length and 
distinguished - in the Washington Supreme Court's opinion. 
It noted that in Halkin, the protective order concerned 
documents relating to government surveillance of opponents -
of the Vietnam War and to other political activities. 
Also, the documents had been purged of "all sensitive 
matters before being handed over to the plaintiffs 
pursuant to discovery". Moreover, no protective orders 
had been sought until after the documents were in the 
hands of the plaintiffs and they proposed to release some 
of them to the press. Nor were there any "rights of 
privacy to be protected" in Halkin. Indeed, the 
Washington Supreme Court, while recognizing First 
Amendment associational rights as important, emphasized 
particularly "rights of privacy". See Petition 20-23a. 
*In a concurring opinion filed by Judge Dolliver of the 
Washington Supreme Court, Judge Wilkey's dissent in Halkin 
was quoted at length as explaining why a protective order 
such as in this case is "not an assault on the Bill of 
Rights". Petition 39a. 
0. 
Comments 
Although I am certainly not at rest, and will need to 
read the materials more carefully and have the benefit of 
my clerk's views including a bobtail, conclusory memo, I 
do make these comments. 
The protective order, as I read it, limits use, 
including publication, of all of the discovered material 
"other than such use as is necessary in order for the 
discovering party to prepare and try the case". As some 
of the inforamtion discovered may not affect the First 
Amendment or privacy rights of the respondents, the order 
may be overbroad. If so, we could remand for a more 
... -- .... 
narrowly drawn order. 
With respect to the media's desire to publish the 
names, addresses and donations of members of this 
unorthodox "religious" organization, First Amendment 
rights of association and religion - as well as the more 
nebulous rights of privacy - certainly are directly and 
adversely affected. I find the arguments of the media 
with respect to this type of information to be 
unpersuasive. 
This is a civil suit, not a criminal prosecution. 
There is no claim that the respondents - plaintiffs below 
----------------~-------------------------------------~. 
- had no right to bring this libel suit. As the courts 
below found, if the media may publish this sort of 
information obtained on discovery, there will be a 
"chilling" of libel litigation. 
Nor is there any proof that this religious 
organization, however, "odd-balled" it may be, is in fact 
a sort of criminal conspiracy like the Jim Jones cult. 
It would not be easy to write an opinion, as I view 
it now, that would not apply to a libel suit brought by 
Billy Graham, Oral Roberts, or perhaps a host of other 
religious organizations in which a list of members and 
donors had been "discovered". There are apparently dozens 
of such organizations, unlike the Graham and Roberts 
foundation, that are on the fringes of commonly accepted 
f 
rationality. And what about disclosure of the members and 
contributions of Communist and Nazi parties, both favoring 
revolution and the destruction of freedom? 
LFP, JR. 
rmc 02/21/84 
Robert M. Couch 
Bench Memorandum 
No. 82-1721 
SEATTLE TIMES V. RHINEHART 
February 21, 1984 
Argument scheduled for Tuesday, February 21, 1984. 
Question Presented 
Whether a showing of good cause is sufficient to support a 
protective order where the restricted party is a newspaper. 
Recommendation 
I recommend that the Washington s. Ct. be affirmed, although 
the TC should used a balancing test rather than a good cause de-
termination in its decision to grant the protective order. 
bench memo: SeattlP Times v. Rhinehart page 2 
Discussion 
At the outset, I should address a question you raised in your 
second "file memo." Although resps argue that the TC's produc-
tion order would require them to reveal the membership of the 
Aquarian Foundation, you could not find such a requirement in the 
discovery order that is reprinted in the joint appendix. As I 
understand it, resps theory is that the membershi£ roles can be 
discovered through the donation roles. The TC has ordered resps ~ --------------- ,____.___ ___ _ 
to reveal the names and addresses of all donors for the five i. 
~ 
years preceding the date of the complaint. See Paragraph 17 of ~ 
the Order Compelling Discovery, J.A., at 6la (pertaining to In-~ -;;;} 1,..,. 
terrogatory No. 28) • According to resps, every member of the 
religion/sect/cult/whatever must pay dues. Since there are very 
c. ....... 
~ few contributors other than members (I don't doubt the truth of 
~this argument), discovery of the list of donors is the equivalent 
~ of discovery of the list of members. Thus, the TC has allowed 
"backdoor" discovery of the membership roster. 
~ --Unfortunately, in order to have a memo in your hands before 
you hear argument in this case, I must be fairly conclusory. But 
here goes: I have trouble going along with the newspapers' argu-
ment. Reduced to its essentials the argument is nothing more 
than, "We are newspapers, we can print any fact we come across, 
no matter how we come across it." To make their argument even 
more compelling the newspapers point to the fact that the public 
has a great deal of interest in news stories about cults and oth-
er unusual religions, particularly those that solicit from the 
bench memo: SeattlP Times v. Rhinehart page 3 
public. In the newspapers' view, judicially compelled civil dis-
covery is just another source of information, access to whirih the 
media is entitled. 
I think that the newspapers are wrong, in both a legal sense 
and a practical sense. First, I think it is important to note 
that this is not a "prior restraint" case. As you point out in -- ---------------------
your concurrence in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 u.s. 368, 399 
(1979), a prior restraint occurs only when a reporter is prohib-
i ted from reporting some information regardless of the source. 
Here, as in Gannett, the newpapers could report anything they ~ k:l 
wished (although they seem to argue that they were totally ~f 
- """~ 
"gagged" by the TC) about resps, so long as the information did ~ 
not originate in court ordered discovery. Since this is not ao?/z.M'.c..u/. 
t/)c., ~
prior restraint case, I do not put much faith in the argument~ 
• 
that the case should be controlled by the "heavy burden" test set /~ 
~ 
out in In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (CADC 1979). (As I read the s~ 
Wash. s. Ct. opinion, resps made a sufficient showing to satisfy~ 
even the strict Halkin test.) ~~~ 
In both Gannett and Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virgin-~ 
ia, 435 u.s. 829 (1978), the Court used balancing tests for de-
termining whether the 1st Amendment rights of the news media out-
weighed the particular rights of the litigants. I think a simi-
lar balancing test should be used in this case. As resps point 
out, and you recognize in your file memoranda, publication of the 
information that is the subject of the discovery order in this 
case might affect the resps' privacy rights, rights of associa-
tion, and their right to petition the courts for redress. Resps 
apparently convinced the TC and the Wash. s. Ct. that the adverse 
effect of publication of the discovered information on their 
rights of privacy, association, and access to the courts out-
weighed the adverse inpact on the newspapers' first amendment 
rights. (The Wash. S. Ct. also correctly noted the need to pre-
serve the integrity of pre-trial proceedings.) As a legal mat-
ter, I think this showing should be sufficient, particularly 
where the protected information is not traditionally disclosed to 
the public, unlike actual proceedings in court. (Note that under 
the Wash. s. Ct.'s opinion, once the infromation is admitted into 
evidence at trial, the newspapers are free to publish it. See 
Petition, at 38a.) 
I think this rule makes sense from a practical standpoint as 
well. Reversal of the Wash. s. Ct. would publicize and legiti-
mize a new weapon in the media's fight against libel suits. Any 
libel plaintiff that has any embarrassing infromation in its 
files would be foolish to sue a newspaper. Because of the liber-
al discovery rules in most states, the newspaper could rummage 
freely through the plaintiff's files and publish at will. I can 
think of nothing that would have a greater chilling effect on a 
plaintiff's decision to institute a civil suit. Moreover, un-
scrupulous newsgatherers could use lawsuits offensively. 
Trumped-up allegations and a well-worded complaint coupled with 
an attorney who knows how to write interrogatories might be all 
an investigative journalist needs to write a story about virtual-
ly any subject. I do not believe this is the use to which the 
Rules of Civil Procedure were meant to be put, nor do I think the 
1st Amendment will thrive when used as a shield for such abuses. 
In short, both the law and good sense support the Wash. S. Ct. 
82-1721 SEATTLE TIMES v. RHINEHART Argued 2/21/84 
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TO: Rob DATE: March 7, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart 
After reviewing my Conference notes and thinking 
further about this case, I agree that we should affirm on 
the ground that there is no constitutional right at issue. 
There certainly is no constitutional right to have any dis-
covery. Prior to the adoption of the Civil Rules in 1938, 
there was little or no discovery in most states, and cer-
tainly there was none under the common law. 
Thus, the entitlement of a party to discovery de-
rives here from the Rules of Civil Procedure. We should 
emphasize the purpose of these rules. Perhaps the law li-
brary could help you with some commentary - in the law re-
views or at the time of the initial adoption of the Rules 
as to their purpose, and particularly the purpose of the 
provisions for pretrial discovery through depositions and 
interrogatories. 
It would follow that there is no constitutional 
right under the First Amendment to publish information dis-
covered solely for the purpose of trial preparation. In 
this respect, the Seattle Times is to be viewed as having no 
rights different from those of other litigants. As Justice 
White noted, the Seattle Press could not have obtained the 
information it wishes to publish without the power of the 
2. 
Court under the Rules. Of course, Rule 26 expressly contem-
plates protective orders. 
Justice Stevens expressly said there was no con-
stitutional right to discovery. He did say that there could 
be a rule that all discovered information is presumptively 
open to the public. I would not say this - certainly unless 
it is necessary to obtain a Court. Justice Stevens did 
qualify his comment by noting that the trial court should 
find good cause for denying a request to publish, but that 
this would not require much of a showing. He concluded that 
the order in this case was valid on its face. 
The state interests are quite substantial as I 
believe you noted in your bench memo, and this should be 
made clear. I think I was mistaken in emphasizing that the 
First Amendment rights of the defendant would be violated by 
publishing the names and amounts given by donors. I would 
include, at least in an initial draft, a footnote stating 
that the protective order was particularly appropriate in 
this case. The trial court had entered an extremely broad 
order authorizing discovery. And the particular information 
that the Seattle Times wished to publish, involving the 
names of donors and their contributions,~~~ 
1 
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the ground that there is no constitutional right at issue. 
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right under the First Amendment to publish information dis-
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Court under the Rules. Of course, Rule 26 expressly contem-
plates protective orders. 
Justice Stevens expressly said there was no con-
stitutional right to discovery. He ~i~ say that there could 
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this would not require much of a showinq. He concluded that 
the order in this case was valid on its face. 
The state interests are quite substantial as I 
believe you noted in your. bench memo, and this should be 
made clear. I think I was mistaken in emphasizing that the 
First Amendment rights of the defendant would be vl.olateo by 
pubJishing the names and amounts given hy donors. I would 
include, at least in an initial draft, a footnote stating 
that the protective order \'7as particularly appropriate in 
this case. The trial court had entered an extremely broad 
order authorizing discovery. And the particular information 
that the Seattle Time~ wished to publish, involving the 
names of donors and their contributions, involved rights of 
association and even of religion. 








Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
March 15, 1984 
82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart 
It was a mistake for me to express the hope that 
you could give me a draft before the March arguments 
commenced. The case is not as easy as I had thought, and 
your draft reflects - at least as I read it - the level of 
care and sophistication that this case deserves. But you 
have not had enough time to do it justice. 
I suggest that you put Seattle Times on the 
"back burner" until you have caught up on your certs and 
completed bobtail bench memos for the March arguments. 
Then get back on Seattle Times with the view to giving me 
a draft by March 30. Of course, you will also have some 
bench memos for the April arguments, but your memos can be 
quite brief - assuming that I know a good deal about the 
cases. My primary interest is to know from my clerk his 
or her recommendation, and an outline of the analysis. 
I have not tried to rewrite any of your March 14 
draft. You have followed pretty much my suggested general 
2. 
outline. I now know more about the case, and make the 
following observations and suggestions. 
1. I think the pleadings and the facts need to 
be stated somewhat more fully, using the exact language 
from the critical phrases of the complaint. 
2. Similarly, I think the position of the 
parties - particularly that of petitioners' - should be 
stated more explicitly. It is important in this 
connection, to make clear before commencing Part II the 
scope of petitioner's assertion of First Amendment rights. 
Although neither the brief nor oral argument is crystal 
clear, I think it is clear enough - and I believe the 
courts below so construed the pleadings and arguments -
that petitioner is insisting that whatever is disclosed 
pursuant to discovery is per se public information 
available as much to any member of the public as to the 
media. A secondary, supportive type argument, is that at 
least with respect to the media's claimed right to 
publish, the limitation of a protective order must serve a 
compelling state interest. I think in addressing these 
arguments, we can reply on Pell for the view that with 
respect to "discovered info" the right of the press to 
publish is to be viewed no differently from that of 
3. 
~~ citizens and other businesses. Incidentally, I do not 
~ think your use of Pell is accurate. 
3. I think the first paragraph in your Part II 
is good. Use (at the bot torn of p. 10) the quote from 
Welsh that I have written out at the bottom of that page. 
Also cite other cases illustrating limitations on the 
literal language of the First Amendment. One easy place 
to find these cases is on page 15 of petitioner's brief. 
4. In my brief memo of March 7 (just a week 
ago!), I suggested that we should emphasize the purpose of 
the Rules. I am afraid you were misled by me. Your draft 
devotes some seven or eight pages - a third of the entire 
opinion - to the general importance and purposes of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure and particularly discovery. I do 
not want to repeat all of the language you used that 
praised the Rules, as I think the Discovery Rules have 
been a disaster. You might ask Sally to give you a copy 
of my dissent from the proposed amendment to the Rules 
sent to Congress in 1980 or 81. 
I find Judge Wilkey's dissent in Halkin helpful 
in several ways. He states the relevant purpose of 
discovery quite briefly. The portion of your quote from 
Hickman (p. 15 your draft) is on target. Use only the 
4. 
portion thereof I have indicated. I would preface the 
quotation by saying that although Hickman was written in 
1947, less than a decade after the Federal Rules were 
first adopted, and before abuse of the Discovery Rules had 
become a serious problem, the Court emphasized the "vital 
role [of discovery] in the preparation for trial". 329 
u.s., at 501. You can probably find a similar quotation 
in Prof. Wright's book, and perhaps in other sources. 
The trial court, in its opinion in this case, 
justifying its protective order stating that its purpose 
was to assure that the "discovering party make no use or 
dissemination of the information gained through discovery 
other than such use as is necessary in order for the 
discoverying party to prepare and try the case." (emphasis 
supplied). A 53a. Cit what authority you can find 
emphasizing that this is the purpose - indeed the only 
purpose - of permitting the type of wide-ranging discovery 
authorized by the Rule. The purpose is to facilitate 
preparation and trial of the case. 
If you have not done so, Rob, I suggest that you 
read the notes of the Advisory Committee commencing at the 
bottom of page 75 of West Publishing Company's 1983 
edition of the Federal Rules. I call your attention 
5. 
particularly to what was said about the 1983 amendment on 
p. 84. I would quote in a footnote what I have marked 
from begin to end on pages 384 and 385. 
5. It is important to emphasize (as you have) 
that although there is a constitutional right of access to 
the Court this right does not extend to pretrial 
discovery. It is a matter wholly within the authority of 
the legislative branch to adopt rules, and thereafter for 
the courts - in the exercise of their large discretion in 
conducting trials - to oversee the use of the Rules in the 
interest of justice. To the extent you can find authority 
for the foregoing, it is important to cite it. 
If Judge Wilkey, in Halkin, correctly uses Judge 
Friendly's opinion Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-08, this would 
be a helpful citation. At page 203 of Halkin, Koons is 
cited as saying that no doubt exists as to the 
constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to 
forbid the publicizing, in advance of trial, of 
information obtained by one party from another. Judge 
Wilkey cites two other cases that may not be quite so 
helpful but, as he uses them, seem supportive. 
6. Wilkey makes very well the basic point you 
have made (emphasized by Judge White at Conference) that 
6. 
the information at issue is available to petitioners only 
by virtue of the exercise by the Court of its authority 
under the identical rules that also authorizes the Court 
to impose conditions in a protective order in the interest 
of justice. This is a critical point in our analysis. 
Perhaps you can get some help from Prof. Wright also. I 
recognize, of course, that you already have made the 
point. I merely am emphasizing its importance. 
7. As a relatively minor point, Rob, when 
reading page 18 (near the bottom) you state petitioner's 
position, citing two types of cases: Near v. Minnesota 
(prior restraint) and Gannett (dealing with limitations 
with respect to trials). Richmond Newspapers is another 
case in the latter category. Would it not be better to 
recognize that petitioners rely on both lines of cases, 
neither of which is pertinent for the reasons you and 
Wilkey both have stated? 
8. Petitioners present two questions in their 
petition for cert. Perhaps we should make this somewhat 
clearer in our opinion. Neither question is framed with 
exactitude, and both appear to be a departure from the 
position that all information obtained on discovery is 
public. The first question seems to say that the 
7. 
information is public unless there is a "showing of 
specific harm" or "a particularized" showing of a need for 
restricting publication. 
The second question is whether publication may 
be prohibited "upon a mere showing of 1 good cause 1 ". The 
only requirement in the Rule is a showing of good cause. 
we should hold that this showing is all that is required, 
and reject any need to show "specific harm" caused by 
publication. Read literally, such harm could not be 
proved until after publication. In this case, harm to 
associational and religious rights may be assmed. 
9. we should address specifically the good 
cause requirement of Rule 26(c). You have done this to a 
considerable extent, but I believe it requires somewhat 
more careful consideration and drafting. I do view this 
as an important part of our opinion. ~l:Hi "har.-RI" ..io selfd--
ev.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-a~~~ 
The "harm" is self-evident, and 
apart from other consideration meets any standard of good 
cause. John Stevens referred to this at Conference, 
adding that this could be satisfied without requiring much 
of a showing. Both of the courts below found "good 
cause". The trial court expressly found that 
8. 
respondents had "reasonable grounds" for the issuance of 
the order. (Appendix 52a-53a) There is a good deal of 
language in the trial court's excellent opinion of June 
10, 1981, that should be quoted in our text or in 
footnotes. Wilkey's opinion also may be helpful on the 
good cause on the good cause issue. 
* * * 
Rob: As you will see, I have not undertaken to 
outline a new draft. Rather, I have identified points of , 
importance, and possible sources of help in documenting 
our views. Before I concluded that a fresh start is 
desirable, I had gone over the opinion once hurriedly and 
done some fairly light stylistic editing. You might note 
some of this just to remind you of my eccentricities. But 
you need not consider my changes to be binding on you. I 
will get another shot at those in your second draft. Nor 
have I indicated except in a few instances, language of 
yours to be retained or omitted. I think a "rewrite" of 
the opinion is necessary. 
In the most general sort of way, I think of an 
outline as follows: ( i) a more careful statement of the 
case, including the positions of the parties and the 
9. 
decisions of the courts below; ( i i) a briefer section on 
the Discovery Rules, emphasizing that they are not 
constitutionally required, and that their only purpose is 
to facilitate preparation for trial not to provide 
information to the public or the media; (iii) either 
separately or in the preceding section, establish the 
constitutionality of protective orders (Judge Friendly) , 
and then emphasize - as you have and as Judge Wilkey did -
that the party requesting and obtaining broad discovery 
does so only on such conditions as the Court may impose as 
authorized by Rule 23(c); and (iv) address the "good 
cause" predicate to a protective order, and show that good 
cause was abundantly shown and found to exist in this 
case. 
The foregoing outline is quite general. It 
omits specific reference to the arguments of petitioners 
that I do think we must indentify fairly and reject. One 
of these, as you have noted, is that a compelling state 
interest must be shown to 1 imi t publication of 
information. I believe the answer is that the only 
requirement is that good cause be shown. 
outline above does not 
of your first draft 








constitutional right of access to the courts and the 
purely statutory right to discovery. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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PLEAS E REPLY TO SEATTLE OFFICE 
Re: Seattle Times Company, et al. v. Rhinehart, et al. 
Docket No. 82-1721 
Dear Mr. Stevas: 
In the Reply Brief for the Petitioners, filed on February 2, 
1984, and in Oral Argument on February 21, 1984, reference was 
made to the decision of a panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Tavoulareas v. 
Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984}. That panel 
decision was rendered on January 6, 1984. 
On March 15, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, en bane, granted reheari ng 
en bane and vacated the panel decision:--A copy of the Orde r 
is respectfully enclosed. 
BEHJ/bh 
Enclosure 
Very truly yours, 
DAVIS, WRIGHT, TODD, RIESE & JONES 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
By~ 
~Bruce E. H. Johnson - , 
cc: Malcolm L. Edwards, Esq., w/encl. 
James C. Goodale, Esq., w/encl. 
.,... "'" " • •wo•U•••• 
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Dnit.e~ §taf~s <t!nurf nf l\pp~nls 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIP.CLJIT 
No. 83-1688 September Term, 19 s3 
William P. Tavoulareas, et al. 
v. 
The Washington Post Company, d/b/a/ 
The Washington Post, a Delaware 
Corporation, et al. 
~fubil Corporation, et al. 
Appellants 
Civil Action No. 80-03032 
Unite<~ Str.e1 COUrt t ._ . r.: c . /',..__ •• 
- 1 • ..,. ..,.lfTtct ol Co'·· . , .,....,.., IS 
.;.;~UI C.Wcuif 
nuo .MAR 1 51984 
Gi:ORGZ A fiSW=ro.. CUlts( w.r; 
BEFORE: Robinson, Chief Judge; Wright, Tamm, Wilkey, Wald, Mikva, 
Edwards, Ginsburg, Bork, Scalia and Starr, Circuit Judges 
0 R DE R 
.· 
TheSuggestions for Rehearing en bane of the Washington Post 
Company and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, et al., 
and the Brief Amicus Curiae in support thereof, have been circulated to 
the full Court. A majority of the judges of the Court in regular active 
service have voted in favor of the suggestions. Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED by the Court en ~ that the aforesaid suggestions 
are granted and it is 
FURTHER ORDERED by the Court that the Opinion and Judgment of 
this Court entered on January 6, 1984 be, and the same hereby are, 
vacated. 
Further proceedings in this case will be governed by a future 
Order of the Court. 
~ . 
Per Curiam 
For the Court: 
GEORGE A. FISHER, Clerk 
Robert A. Bonner 
Chief Deputy Clerk 
Circuit Judge Bork did not participate in this Order • 
nne 03/27/84 
~-~M<. ~/-1-JSZ.~ 
~~-~ ~ #'V ~~. 
OUTLINE FOR SECOND DRAFT OF 
SEATTLE TIMES V. RHINEHART 
I. Fairly detailed statement of the case. 
II. Dicussion of Seattle Times' argument 
-1st Amendment protects the right to disseminate 
information learned through litigation processes 
-status as litigant doesn't affect this right 
-before depriving a litigant of his right to 
disseminate information, the TC must specifically 
find that a protective order is the least intrusive 
means of avoiding a substantial and serious threat 
to a compelling state interest .--
III. Seattle Times' argument is b sed on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of 1st ndment doctrine--there is 
no constitutional right to disseminate information 
gained through discovery 
\ 
-terms of 1st Amendment seem to apply in this situation,~~~~ 
but the Court does not give those terms a literal ~
interpretation ~ l~t';l{. ~~~ .. ~ 
-there is no constitutional right to access to in~rmat1on 
-matter of legislative grace ~ 1.4~, ~"'~•'-
-legislature can deny access all to together or ~ke i b~~~-~ i 
\- t \ , access subject to conditions tlt21#~4.t. ----, r...v~ 
~"'t; Q J\~ , . -legislature can make access subject to TC' s protective 
""'~""-' '~.~ · orders 
VVJ' ,'ii J ~ourt has long recognized the unique status of trial 
¥"--~ participants for 1st Amendment purposes 
~~~IV ~ashington State, and other jurisdictions, have~~ 
~ '?~ ~.....t"easana.hl e,...a;gpr.cac·.h to civil EliscouQry ~ ~ 
n ~-~~~-civil rules provide for extensive i~trYBi¥e discovery for 
JVD ~, t~e sole purpose of.~¥~ ef£icienk resolution o~~~~ 
~·t"- cJ.i.spnte-5 ~,/p...tzu-, ~ 
1 LAA( -%~~~es also give TCs broad discretion to control ~---~~LCe~c_. 
~tvv 5f discovery and uses to which discovered ~ 
fV.~ information can be put ~ / ~ a,,_ 4~~ 
: ,1- -protective orders are not ii.t. ilei~ett'I!Pl prior restraints.., ~d4...( 
~ J -only covers info gained through use of the coercive 
powers of the TC 
-parties can disseminate identical info from ~other vr source.:s 
v '~~ } -Rule 26(c) recognizes the inherent powers of a TC to 
~d?'0~ ~~protect the integrity of its own processes 
~~~~ -Rule 26(c) recognizes the need to protect the rights 
c..0 ~ _rcJ- , \ Lf those forced to produce information 
~Q.., \o~· ~ -right of access to the courts 1;-f~ 
~ ,'jj 11LL. -right to a fa1r trial a 
~v- -right to privacy 
page :G. 
V. While not necessary to the disposition of this case, the 
court below required a showing of good cause, the same 
standard provided for in the federal rules and most states 
~ 5/C:/W~~~ 
.1_1- ;~tc;: t> ~ •<:..: ~6,f"!'ctt(. 4<? A:' I"'U-i-4 "'Ji~ 




TO: Rob DATE: April 12, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Seattle Times 
Your analytical approach to this case has my 
approval. It was not suggested by what the Justice said 
at Conference. But I believe this is a sounder approach 
than I had initially thought we should follow. My 
comments on your draft are as follows: 
1. As you anticipated, there is no way we are 
going to circulate in this case a draft that I estimate 
would print out at least 25 pages. I therefore have done 
a fair amount of "scratching up", and for about the last 
one third of your draft, I have substantially rewritten 
it. 
I emphasize, Rob, that my revision is for the 
most part off-the-cuff dictation, and it will require 
careful editing by you and your editor. Nor have I tried 
to coordinate or even include all of your footnotes. 
Likewise, I have not tried to divide it into appropriate 
subparts. 
--~~--------~----------------------------~~------------~. 
I do think that your draft substantially 
"overargues" the application of Procunier v. Martinez. I 
agree that case provides the framework. We simply have to 
omit obvious statements, and some arguably desirable 
statements. It is best, as trial lawyers learn, to "go 
for the jugular" and to do so rather boldly. We are 
clearly on the right and reasonable side of this case. 
As a general observation, I do not think your 
draft - in its concluding portion - takes full advantage 
of the findings of the trial court and the opinion of the 
state Supreme Court. 
One minor opportunity to save some pages, as you 
suggested, may be to reduce the statement of the facts on 
the first three pages of the opinion by about a page or 
two. 
2. Specific points or inquiries are as follows: 
(a) Interrogatories as well as discovery 
depositions are involved in this case. Rule 26 doesn't 
authorize interrogatories. I have not thought about 
whether the Rules specifically authorize protective orders 
for interrogatories available under the Rule (I think it 
is 34) that relates to documents. We should make any 
.:J. 
appropriate changes to recognize that we are not simply 
talking about depositions. 
(b) You state in a couple of places that 
discovery may be made of information in the possession of 
third parties, not involved in the litigation to the same 
extent of parties. The Rule itself draws no distinction, 
but I have thought that there are constraints applicable 
to third party discovery that may exceed those applicable 
to parties. Justice Marshall voted "the other way" in 
this case because he said anybody who institutes a law 
suit accepts the risk of "being undressed" by discovery. 
(c) The opinion says little about Halkin (only 
n. 9), or other cases that have addressed the issue here. 
Do we get any help from Koons other than the quote in n. 
23? Perhaps there is little help beyond Wilkey's dissent 
in Halkin. Can we use any part of this- e.g., his use of 
cases? 
* * * 
Rob, I think you - with a good assist from David 
- have made real progress with this case. It may take you 
a day or two to fit in my changes - and to polish them 
carefully. This will be worth it. 




TO: Rob DATE: April 21, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Seattle Times 
Here is our first Chambers Draft with my light 
stylistic changes, together with a couple of riders. I am 
quite pleased with the draft. 
I have a couple of minor questions. On page 5, 
first full paragraph, we summarize the respondent's 
affidavits. The summary is about as conclusive as 
respondent's initial objection to discovery. Do the 
affidavits elaborate in any way that would be helpful to 
the opinion? On p. 9, I noted, as a question, whether the 
summary there was fair to petitioner's contention. I 
believe it is, particularly in view of what we say on the 
following page. 
The only significant change that I suggest is 
the omission of the first paragraph in Part IV, p. 10. 
I 
The Justices and law clerks here often seem prone to 
repeat principles that are known to every first year law 
\ 
student. ! try to avoid \this. My suggestion is that we 
commence Part IV with the paragraph at the top of page 11, 
2. 
with an appropriate change in the language of the first 
sentence. 
Then, Rob, I would add a footnote - keyed to one 
of the sentences in the first paragraph on p. 11, that 
includes the good statement from American Communications 
Ass'n v. Douds. I would eliminate footnote 18. 
* * * 
As soon as you hear from your co-clerks, and in 
the absence of any substantive changes, proceed with a 
first draft that we will circulate early next week. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss t__ .-r-1. 
,jttprtmt <!Jllltrl ttf tift ~tb .jtatt.e-
~Jringtttn, ~. <If. 21lbiJ!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTI CE BYRON R . WH ITE April 25, 1984 




cc: The Conference 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .... J. BRENNAN, JR. April 25, 1984 
Re: Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, No. 82-1721 
Dear Lewis: 
As you will recall, I agreed at Conference that the 
protective order issued by the Washington courts could be 
upheld on the basis of the privafY and religious rights of 
the respondents. I am pleased to see that your draft 
opinion takes that basic approach, first by noting an 
appropriate standard for review of the First Amendment 
interests implicated by a protective order (at 10-11), and 
then by recognizing that the government may have a 
substantial interest in preventing the abuse of its 
processes that might result from the public release of 
information damaging to reputation and privacy (at 13-14). 
I am concerned, however, that some of the discussion in your 
opinion could be read to depart from th~lySis ~ ~ 
}~ 
In particular, as your opinion suggests at 13-14, the 
governmental interest that should be balanced against the 
pett€1oners' FirstAmendment interests is the substantial 
interest in protecting the privacy and religious rights of 
litigants or other parties from whom confidential 
information is discovered. See generally Herbert v. Lando, 
441 U.S. 153, 178-180 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). As 
now written, however, the holding of your opinion could_be 
understoo~ to su~est that the countervailing governmental -
r_J 
interesT rs simp y in preserving tfie 1nt:e i f its ' 
ju~ E.g., e therefore hold that 
whe~s in this case, a protective order is limited to 
narrow context of pretrial civil discovery and does not 
restrict the dissemination of the information gained from 
other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment."). 
Without further definition, however, that governmental 
interest could justi.._fy y_i~tua_l.q_every_pro~ect~ve order ever 
issued by a court. rn other words, me-government's 
in~smooth functioning of its discovery process 
is present in every case. Yet, if a court issued a 
protective order without any reason, or if a State rule 
provided for protective orders in all cases regardless of 
special circumstances, I think we would agree that there 
might be First Amendment interests that would invalidate 
such an order. In sum, the reason this particular 1 ~ 
protective order is permissible is because it protects the ~~ 
privacy and religious rights of the respondents, and not '~ 
because it serves to protect the State's discovery process 
in the abstract. 
If the case arose in the federal courts, we could 1 
protect First Amendment interests by policing the courts 
under Rule 26's "good cause" requirement, and therefore 
could hold that the Ruie satisfies constitutional . 
requirements. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 
89 (1981). For cases arising in the state courts, however, 
we must accept the State's interpretation of its own rules. 
As a result, our constitutional approval of those 
interpretations should require that the courts do more than 
simply assert the State's interest in the judicial process. 
In this case, the Washington courts satisfied whatever 
specific requirements the Constitution might require by 
finding that the respondents "had a recognized privacy 
interest" and that release of the discovered information 
"would allegedly and understandably result in annoyance, 
embarrassment and even oppression." Upholding the 
protective order because of the presence of such a finding 
would not impose a very heavy burden on the state courts. 
Nor, in my view, would it lead to substantial amounts of 
litigation. 
I wonder if you could see your way to amending your 






~u:puutt <ltllurl O'f tlr.t ~ttit.t~ ~hd.t.&' 
~rurJrittgtlln. ~. <It· 2llbi'At~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 25, 1984 
Re: 82-1721 - Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart 
Dear Lewis: 
You have written a persuasive and important 
opinion with which I am in virtually complete 
agreement. I do, however, have three concerns that I 
hope you will consider: 
1. On page 11 you cite the Chief Justice's 
opinion in Houchins in a way that I am afraid will 
have the effect of elevating it to a Court 
op1n1on. You will recall that you and I dissented 
from the broad position that he took on page 11 of 
his opinion. I wonder if you would either omit 
the citation entirely, or perhaps qualify it with 
some indication that we do not completely endorse 
it. 
2. In footnote 20 on page 12 you quote from 
the Chief's opinion in Gannett. He is quite wrong 
in stating that "it has never occurred to anyone" 
that a deposition might be a public proceeding. 
In 15 u.s.c. § 30, Congress provided that 
depositions in antitrust cases should be public. 
Moreover, this quotation implies that the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public 
trial would never encompass a pretrial proceeding. 
Could you either omit the footnote entirely, or at 
least the quotation? 
3. On page 10 you introduce your statement 
of the critical question by stating that the 
"information" obtained by discovery is protected 
by the First Amendment. This is a new concept 
that I really do not understand and, I am afraid, 
may confuse future analysis. The Amendment does 
not protect information~ it protects the 
communication of information and ideas. In my 
opinion it does not guarantee the right to 
communicate information that a litigant obtains 
only by virtue of a court order that limits its 
use to the litigation. 
I believe we are ultimately holding that the 
First Amendment does not protect a litigant's 
communication of information that is covered by a 
valid protective order. In other words, such 
speech is not a species of "protected speech." I 
therefore wonder if you have properly framed the 
decisive question at the bottom of page 10 as 
? whether an order is an invalid restraint "on 
protected speech." 
May I suggest that you consider a revision of 
the paragraphs at the bottom of page 10 and the 
top of 11 to read something like this: 
"It is, of course, clear that information 
obtained through civil discovery authorized by 
modern RUles of P''ivil Procedure would rarely, if 
ever, {all within the classes of unprotected 
speech identified by decisions of this Court. In 
this case, as petitioners argue, there certainly 
is a public interest in knowing more about 
respondents Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation. 
This interest may well include most--and possibly 
all--of what has been discovered as a result of 
the Court's order under Rule 26(b) (1). It does 
not necessarily follow, however, that a litigant 
has a~ y unrestrained right to disseminate 
information that has been obtained through 
pretrial discovery. For even though the broad 
sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all 
restraints on free expression, this Court has 
observed that "freedom of speech ... does not 
comprehend the right to speak on any subject at 
any time." American Communications Assn. v. 
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394-395 (1950). 
"The critical question that this case 
presents is whether a litigant's freedom 
comprehends the right to disseminate information 
that he has obtained pursuant to a court order 
that both granted him access to that information 
and placed restraints on the way in which the 
information might be used. In addressing that 
question it is necessary to consider whether the 
"practice in question [furthers] an important or 
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the 
suppression of expression" and whether "the 
limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no 
greater than is necessary or essential to the 
protection of the particular governmental interest 
involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 u.s. 396, 
413 (1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444 u.s. 348, 
354-355 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 25 
(1976)." 
This is just a rough attempt at a reformulation of 
the paragraphs that trouble me. I merely propose it 
because it is sometimes easier to consider specific 
language than a general suggestion. 
With these exceptions, I am prepared to join you. 
Indeed, perhaps you can persuade me that I simply join 
the opinion as it is now drafted. 
,Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUJST 
~u:pr~uu <IJGurl Gf t!rt ~tb j;ta.Us 
jtas!ringtcn:, ~. <If. 2llbt'1~ 
April 26, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1721 Seattle Times co. v. Rhineha~t 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely·~ 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
v 
CHAM8ERS OF 
.iuprtmt (!fourt of tlrt ~tb .;\Udtg 
._a~Jringt~ ~. <If. 211.;tJt~ 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR . · 
May 1, 1984 
82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart 
Dear Bill: 
This is my first opportunity to reply to your letter of 
April 25. I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to 
consider your concerns. 
I would be glad to omit the concluding sentence in 
Subpart c on p. 15, and add the following as a final three 
sentences in the opinion on page 16: 
"We hold that the protective order is-
sued in this case does not offend the First 
Amendment. It was entered by the trial court 
upon a showing that constituted good cause as 
required by Rule 26(c). Also, it is limited 
to the context of pretrial civil discovery, 
and does not restrict dissemination if the 
information is obtained from other sources." 
In addition, I would add a footnote, keyed to the 
above, reading substantially as follows: 
"25. It is apparent that substantial 
government interests were implicated. Re-
spondents, in requesting the protective 
order, relied upon the rights of privacy and 
religious association. Both the trial court 
and the Supreme Court of Washington also em-
phasized that the right of persons to resort 
to the courts for redress of grievances would 
have been 'chilled'. See supra n. 23." 
I would be reluctant, Bill, to imply that a state's 
interest in the integrity of its judicial process would not 
in some situations be sufficient to constitute the requisite 
good cause. 
If the foregoing substantially meets your concerns, I 
will see if these changes are acceptable to the Justices who 





THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.jnp:rtut~ <!fonti of 14~ ~b .jtatts-
.as-Jri:ttght~ ~. <If. 2ll~,.~ 
May 2, 1984 





Copies to the Conference 
/ 
May 2 , 1984 
82-1721 Seattle Times v. ~hinehart 
Dear ,John: 
This is a belated thank you note for your comments 
on the first draft of my opinion. 
Your comments are constructive, and I plan to in-




C H A MBERS OF 
..J U STICE WM . ..J. BR ENNAN, ..JR. 
May 3, 1984 
Re: Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, No. 82-1721 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your note of May 1, and for your 
consideration of my suggestions. If you could find your way 
to incorporating them I would be pleased to join your 
opinion. 
I'm bothered by one other matter, and hope you might 
address it, though my join is not conditioned on this 
change. Its about the first full paragraph on page 12, and 
note 20 attached thereto, which discuss rights of access to 
pretrial discovery. Although it is undoubtedly true that 
discovery proceedings "are not public components of a civil 
trial," I am not so sure that the materials generated by 
discovery are not, as a matter of modern practice, open to 
the public. Indeed, recent amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (Rules 5 (d) and 30 (f) (1)) suggest that 
such materials must be filed with a court and therefore, 
absent a court order to the contrary, are open for 
inspection by the public and the press. Because of this I 
would much prefer either omission of the paragraph and its 
footnote entirely, or their severe limitation. And, because 
this is not a public/press access case (i.e., the Seattle 
Times is a litigant who automatically has access to 
discovered materials), I would much prefer the omission. 




wJ£ , Jr. 
Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.itt¥tttttt Ofltltrt of tqt ,nittb .itatt% 
'Jihudtington, ~. <If. 2llgtJ.t~ 
May 3, 1984 
No. 82-1721 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart 
Dear Lewis, 
I have read your opinion with interest. You have 
found a clever way to avoid making every motion for 
protective order a constitutional issue. I expect to be 
able to join it, but I still have a few concerns. 
This case probably does not require us to address 
the broad and difficult question of a 1st Amendment public 
right of access to pretrial discovery material. Petitioners 
acknowledge they have been granted access by statute and 
they simply want to publish the information. 
It is my understanding that some of the material 
to which the protective order was applied had already been 
obtained and filed with the court records as a public 
record. It is typical of the practice in a number of states 
for the rules to provide for the filing in the public record 
of answers to interrogatories and depositions. Your opinion 
draws no distinction between protective orders issued before 
the discovery is obtained and those issued after material 
has been obtained and made a matter of public record. I 
think the distinction may be important and the 1st Amendment 
may well require case-specific particularized findings (as 
in Press-Enterprise) by a court which decides there is good 
cause for restricting publication of material already in the 
record. I am troubled, therefore, by the first paragraph on 
p. 12 and by footnote 20. At least in some jurisdictions 
pretrial discovery material which has been filed in the 
public record is a traditionally accessible source of 
information. -
Perhaps it would help to also add a footnote on 
p. 16 noting that the Washington Supreme Court has 
apparently interpreted the trial court's protective order as 
2. 
terminating once the discovered material is made public by 
the judicial process or by the parties independently of 
discovery. See Joint Appendix at 13la and n. 9. Thus, any 
discovery material which has already been made public by 
being filed in records of the court in compliance with state 
or local rules would not be encompassed by this protective 
order. 
It also seems to me that it would be useful to add 
to the last sentence of Part IV C on p. 15 the requirement 
that the protective order must be issued on a proper showing 
of good cause. The trial court will be exercising its 
discretion which, I assume, is to be on a "good cause" 
standard. 
If you feel these suggestions are not 
inappropriate or "out of line" with your views, perhaps 
these concerns can be easily accommodated. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
May 4, 1984 
82-1721. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart 
Dear Sandra: 
I received your letter yesterrlay after we had 
"gone to press" with some revisions in this case. I believe 
the changes in my second draft (see particularly n. 20, p. 
12) address - at least in part - the concerns you exp~essed. 
As the First Amendment issue was the principal 
issue presented by the case, and I understood we granted 
Seattle Times to address it, I think it is appropriate, and 
may be helpful, to write it subRtantially as I have. 
My new note 20 deals with the variation ln prac-
tice as to the filing of interroqatories and depositions. 
In most of the federal districts, there are local rules on 
the subject. In the Eastern District of Virginia, deposi-
tions and interrogatories usually wer.e left in the hands of 
the lawyers unless one party or the other wished to have the 
intervention of the court. Under Rule 5(c), now mentioned 
in my footnote 20, that practice may well have changed. But 
the important point is that the court controls the situa-
tion, as it should. 
It may be, as you suggest, that in this case some 
of the material had already been filed with the trial court 
before the protective order was issued. I read the protec-
tive order as applying to the information that respondents 
identified as violating their privacy and rights of associa-
tion. This seems entirely appropriate to me. 
In sum, I think the importance of our opinion is 
to make clear that where good cause is shown with respect to 
discovered material, the trial court has authority under the 
Rules to protect it from public disclosure unless and until 
the information is used in the trial. 
I hope the changes made in my second draft will 





May 4, 1984 
82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart 
Dear Bill: 
I appreciate your willingness to join my opinion. 
I have made changes on page 12, ann rewritten note 
20, that I think meets in large part your further sugges-
tion. I prefer to leave the paragraph in the opinion, but I 
do think the footnote substantially clarifies the situation. 




. -. J 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w ... . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.iu:prmtt Qtanri af tlft ~b .itaft.1 
'Jfas~ 10. Qt. 2!1~,.~ 
May 4, 1984 
No. 82-1721 
Seattle Times v. Rhinehart 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§u:pl".ttm Qftturl ttf tlf.t ~ttitt~ .§tattl\' 
••lfin:gftttt, ~. <!f. 211gi'1~ 
May 7, 1984 
J 
Re: 82-1721 - Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.:§uprtm.t (!fou:rt of tqt 'JlUtiftb ~ta:tts 
'Dr as Jrittgtcn. 10. "f. 2.0,?'! ~ 
May 9, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1721-Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart 
Dear Bill: 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
,jn.prt'ltU Q}ltltrl of tlr~ b ,jtattg 
~agfringhtn. !fJ. <q. 20~'1~ 
ay 10, 198 4 
RE: 82-1721 - Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart 
Dear Lewis: 
I have some concern about your most recent draft in 
this case. In the first draft, the holding of the Court 
appeared as follows: 
"We therefore hold that where, as in this 
case, a protective order is limited to the 
narrow context of pretrial civil discovery 
and does not restrict the dissemination of 
the information gained from other sources, 
it does not offend the First Amendment." 
In the most recent draft to circulate, the holding of the 
Court is stated: 
"We hold that the protective order issued 
in this case does not offend the First 
Amendment. It was entered by the trial 
court upon a showing that constituted good 
cause as required by Rule 26(c). Also, it 
is limited to the context of pretrial 
civil discovery, and does not restrict 
dissemination if the information is 
obtained from other sources." (footnote 
omitted). 
The footnote to this latter holding reads: 
"It is apparent that substantial 
government interests were implicated. 
Respondents, in requesting the protective 
order, relied upon the rights of privacy 
and religious association. Both the trial 
court and the Supreme Court of Washington 
also emphasized that the right of persons 
to resort to the courts for redress of 
grievances would have been 'chilled.'" 
The two paragraphs stating the holding of the Court 
are clearly different, significantly because the latter 
adds a requirement that "good cause" be shown under the 
State's rule. As I recall the Conference, we thought this 
added element was essential. However, even aside from the 
addition, I read the latest draft to take on a 
significantly different tone from the first, so that it 
now suggests that a First Amendment balancing is required 
each time a court issues a protective order during 
pretrial discovery. Whereas in the first draft, it was 
clear that if the "good cause" requirement is satisfied, 
if the order is limited to the pretrial discovery context, 
and if the order does not limit dissemination of 
information obtained from other sources, it satisfies the 
First Amendment, the latter draft implies that a different 
balance might be struck if different privacy interests 
were asserted. This plays right into what is implicit in 
the suggestion in the concurrence that the Court is 
deciding no more than that the balance tilts in favor of 
permitting the order in this particular case. 
The tone change I suspect will prove very important, 
and I cannot join that. I could join if you replace the 
holding paragraph on the last page of the latest draft to 
read something like the following: 
"We hold that because the protective order 
issued in this case was entered by the 
trial court upon a showing of good cause 
as required by Rule 26(c), was limited to 
the context of pretrial civil discovery, 
and did not restrict dissemination of the 
information if it was obtained from other 
sources, it does not offend the First 
Amendment. " 
This modification would recapture the holding in the first 
draft, and remove the doubt that I think now exists as to 
whether an order meeting the three specified conditions 




JU STI CE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
j)nprtutt <!f!tltrl of tlrt ~tb ,jtatts 
._asfri:ttghm, J. <If. 20~~$ 
May 10, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart 
Dear Lewis: 
I cheerfully joined your first draft in this opinion, 
and did not pay close attention to the revisions in your 
second draft until Bill Brennan's concurrence came around 
today. The holding of the Court, as I understood it from 
your first draft, appears at page 15: 
"We therefore hold that where, as in this case, a 
protective order is limited to the narrow context 
of pretrial civil discovery and does not restrict 
the dissemination of the information gained from 
other sources, it does not offend the First 
Amendment." 
Now, however, the holding of the case found on page 16 of 
the second draft reads: 
"We hold that the protective order issued in this 
case does not offend the First Amendment. It was 
entered by the trial court upon a showing that 
constituted good cause as required by Rule 26{c). 
Also, it is limited to the context of pretrial 
civil discovery, and does not restrict 
dissemination if the information is obtained from 
other sources." {emphasis supplied) 
It seems to me that the second draft lends support to 
Bill's concurrence in a way that I would prefer it did not, 
suggesting that every pretrial order is subject to First 
Amendment analysis on a case-by-case basis , rather than 
being governed by the more generic statement in your first 
- 2 -
draft. If the second draft remains as it is, I may well 
want to write separately. 
Sincerely,~ 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
'· 
May 11, 1981 
82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart 
Dear Chief and Bill: 
As your letters of May 10 express similar con-
cerns, I reply to you both. 
The Chief's letter does suggest a revision of the 
holding paragraph to read as follows: 
"We hold that because the protective order 
issued in this case was entered by the trial 
court upon a showing of good cause as re-
quired by Rule 26(c), was limited to the con-
text of pretrial civil discovery, and did not 
restrict dissemination of the information if 
it was obtained from other sources, it does 
not offend the First Amendment." 
I can accept the Chief's suggested paragraph, with 
minor language changes as follows: 
"We therefore hold that where, as in this 
case, a protective order is entered on a 
showing of good cause as required by Rule 
26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial 
civil discovery, and does not restrict the 
dissemination of the information if gained 
from other sources, it does not offend the 
First Amendrnent.1!j 
Actually, it does not seem to me that the differ-
ences in the paragraphs we are discussing are really sub-
stantive, particularly in view of the way the opinion itself 
is written. This is a First Amendment case, and accordingly 
its relevance has to be addressed. 







May 11, 1984 
82-17 21 Seattle 'T'i.mes v. Rhinehart 
Dear Bill: 
As you said, I seem to be a bit "in the middle" as 
a result of my making the changes that you suggested. 
You have seen Bill Rehnquist'~ letter circulated 
to the Conference. The Chief has now written a letter, not 
circulated, in which he states he cannot join my revised 
draft. As Bill Rehnquist and the Chief joined the initial 
draft, I owe them a good deal of deference - as I mentioned 
in my letter of May 1, to you. 
In my view, the perceived differences are not 
really great. I suggest changing the final paragraph 
slightly to read as follows: 
"We therefore hold that where, as in this 
case, a protective order is entered on ~ 
showi.ng of good cause as required by Rule 
26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial 
civil discovery, and does not restrict the 
dissemination of the information if gained 
from other sources, it does not offend the 
First Amendment.~ 
I believe this language will address the concern you 
expressed in your letter of April 25, 1984. If you agree, I 




C H AMBE:RS OF" 
..J U STICE HAR R Y A . B LACK MUN 
~tm:t Qfourl of tlt~ 1!;tnthb ~taUs 
-M!titt\lbttt. !IJ. Qf. 2llp"'$ 
May 14, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1721 - Seattle Times Company v. Rhinehart 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
,jltpftmt Qfttttrlttf tqt ~tb ,jtatts 
._asftingtltlt. ~. <!f. 20~~~ 
May 14, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart 
Dear Lewis: 
I am perfectly content with the revised version of the 
final paragraph in your opinion in this case which you suggest 
in your letter of May 11th. It seems to me that the text of 
footnote 24, as it now reads in the second draft, is not entirely 
consistent with the revised language in the text, and perhaps 
should be modified or deleted, but so far as I am concerned 
that is up to you. 
Sincerely, ~ 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Chief Justice 
C HAMBE R S O F 
J U S TI CE H ARRY A . BLACK MU N 
j;up~tnu <q(tlttf: af tlft ~ttittb ~hdte 
Jraslfi:ttghm. ~. <q. 2llgt~~ 
Re: No. 82-1721, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart 
Dear Lewis: 
May 14, 1984 
I thought you might like to have the following trivia 
called to your attention: 
1. Footnote 11 refers to "n. 11." Should this be "6"? 
2. Should the references to petitioners in the fifth 
line of the paragraph beginning on page 4 and the fifth 
line from the top of page 5 be, instead, to respondents? 
Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~nvrttttt <ltltttrt cf t4t 'J'nitth ~taft.G' 
Jia.G'ftittgtctt, !l. <It· 2llbi'*~ 
May 15, 1984 
No. 82-1721 Seattle Times Company v. Rhinehart 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
82-1721 Seattle Times y, Rhinehart 
Respondent Rhinehart is the founder of the 
~~ 
respondent Aquarian Foundationr an ~orthodox religion with 
" a limited membership in the State of Washington. 
Petitionersr~the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union 
Bulletin r/ published several less-than-complimentary stories 
about respondents. They brought this defamation suit in a 
Washington state courtr l seeking damages for allegedly 
libelous statements in these articles. 
In the course of extensive pretrial discoveryr 
petitioner newspapers sought production of various financial 
~J' 
record,;ei ~aapaaieft~Sr including lists o~ members and 
donors. The trial court ordered respondents to turn over 
the requested information. 
Arguing that information as to members and donors 
1'\ 
would violate First Amendment rights of privacy and 
association~respondents requested the court to issue a 
protective order enjoining the newspapers from disseminating 
-/1.-6.-/- LP-d--t...J 
this information ~gained only through pretrial discovery. 
The trial courtr acting pursuant to its rules of 
~
civil proceduresl that are similar to the federal rules~ 
issued such a protective order. 
- ---- -... - - --- -- --~ 
on the ground that it violated their First Amendment rights • ...___ 
Both the state trial court and supreme court rejected this 
argument. 
They emphasized that the purpose of discovery is 
limited to the needs of parties to prepare fo~and try the 
case. The rules that authorize discovery expressly 
providj~, upon a showing of good cause,~for a protective 
order against its use for nontrial purposes. 
We affim the decision of the Washington Supreme 
Court. We hold that where,~as in this case~a protective 
order is entered on a showing of good caus~ limited to 
the context of pretrial civil discovery,J'and does not 
restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from 
other sources,j the orde~ does not offend the First ~~~ 
Allendment. ~J} lk ~~iv~d~,j~ 
Aeeer~ingly, the i•~~meB~ is affiraa~Justice ~. 
Brennan has filed a c6ncurring opinion in which Justice 
Marshall joins. 
Our decision is unanimous. 
82-1721 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart (Rob) 
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~Supreme Court . 
: Restrains Press 
. In Some Cases 
By Fred Barbash 
WuhlnC'On Paalllalf Wrller 
The Supreme Court, in a tint-of-
its-kind decision, 118id yesterday that 
· in IIOble circumstances judpe can 
. bar the prel!8 from publiehinc certain . 
· information. 
In a unanimous ruling, the court 
uid a judge in Wuhington l&ate 
acted properly when he ordered 
'newspapers DOt to publish material! 
:they bad obtained during pretrial 
·;•discovery" proceedings in a libel 
IUit against them. 
· · The decision appi'OYel a form of 
-prior restraint" 011 the preae, IOIDe-
. thing the court bad repeatedly re-
. jected u a violation of Fint Amend-
ment free-speech and free-press 
' 1U8f8Dtee&. 
: But the ruling applies ooly in Dar-
. lC'/11 circumstances, where the prell8 
: il a party in a civihuit ad obtains 
information through tbe discoYery 
process. In this situation, eaid Jus-
tice Lewis F. Powell Jr. writing for 
the court, trial judges have -.obrt.an-
tial latitude" to protect the privacy 
of other litigants by barrinc publi-
cation. 
First Amendment lawyers sug-
psted yesterday that the ruling fore-
shadows an increase in -pg orders" 
barring lawyers and other partici-
pants in civil or criminal CMeB from 
lpe8king with nporterL h alao 
weakens one deterrent to b'bel IUits 
· that news organizatioDB have come 
to rely on, the fear of additional em-
barrassing publicity. . 
In aDOther c:aae affecting lCC88 to 
lee COUJT, A7, Cel. 1 
\. " ' 
THE WASHINGTON POST 
High Court Restricts Publication 
Of Information in Certain Cases 
COURT, From AI 
the judicial Byltem )Wterday, the court ruled 
unanimously that pretrial proceedings in criminal . 
CIIMl8 .hould not pnerally be cloeed to the public 
when the defendant wants them open. The ruling, 
one in a aeries over the peat few yem opening up 
criminal proceediDp, ca~ts further doubt on the 
court'• controvenial 1979 decision allowing the 
doeure of aome pretrial hearings. · 
The prior restraint case, Seattle Times Co. v. 
RhiMhart, originated with a libel auit against The 
Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union-Bulle-
tin brought by Keith Milton Rhinehart, leader of 
a religious group calJed the Aquarian Foundation. 
Rhinehart, described in the opinion • the chief 
*medium" for 'tbti organization, which believes in 
communication with the dead, charged the news 
organizations with publishing false and damaging 
articles about him and his group. Other members 
of the f()Undation aJao sued. · 
Over · Rhinehart's objections, the trial judge 
eompelled the foundation to tum over to the op-
posing Bide a list of ita donors and the amounts of 
donations. But the judge also iBiued a -protective 
order" barring the D8WB orpnizationl from pub-
lishing or otherwise using the data except to pre-
pare for the trial. 
The judge acted after the f~tion uid pub-
liaation would subject ita members to harassment 
and nprisals. .The judge Will t.lld that members 
bad already received anonymous letters and tele-
phone cills, aome threatenillg 'phyaical harm. 
Powell, upholding the Washington Supreme 
Court, said that the "unique character of the dis-
Covery process" requires judges to have broad dis-
cretion to issue such orders on a showing of "good 
c:auae" by a party in a civil BUit. No •exacting First 
Amendment ecrutiny" is required, he uid. 
Parties in civil cases are allowed vut 8Cal88 to 
information about the other tide through the dis-
covery proce88, Powell uid. The courts need au-
thority to prevent abuees of the information, par-
ticularly information that "'if publicly released 
tice Thurgood Marshall, concurred in the opjnion 
but wrote leJ)8rately, explaining that the ruling 
"recognizes that pretrial protective. orders,, de-
signed to limit the dissemination of information 
pined through the civil dilcovery process, are 
subject to ecrutiny under the Firat Amendment." 
·The aecond press-related case yesterday, Waller 
u. Georgio., ltemmed from a decision by a ·Georgia 
judge to keep the press and public out of. bear-
ing on the admissibility of Wiietap evidence in a 
state gambling case, even though the defendant 
wanted an open bearing. 
Powell, writing for the court, said ·such "sup-
pression" bearings are often • important to the 
criminal justice system as the trial. Some cases 
end after the hearing, he said. 
In addition, auppression hearings ·frequently 
attack ~ conduct of police and prosecutor 
.... The public in general h• a strong interest in 
exposing IUbltantial allegations of police miscon-
duct to the aalutary effects of public acrutiny." 
·The Silth Amendment right to a public trial 
requires that any decision to dose "'UCh a hearing 
must be carefully justified, he Baid. In this case, 
Powell uid the judge's order wu too broad and 
too vague. It failed specifically to justify the rea-
IOns for closing the hearing and did not consider 
alternatives. In addition, he 118id, the judge cloeed 
the entire aeven-day hearing even though less 
than 21tl hours were devoted to the tapes. 
The court ruled in 1979 (Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale) that the press and public could be kept out 
of pretrial proceedings with the agreement nf the 
defendant. In 1980, however, it ruled that trials 
should generally be open. This year) it eaid jury 
eelection also should generally be open. 
While ·the Gannett ruling baa BOt been over· 
ruled, it has been eeverely weakened. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals here now is consid-
ering a protective order imposed on material ob- ' 
tained by The Washington Poet while defending 
·itaelf in a libel proceeding brought by Mobil Oil 
Co. President William P. Tavoulareas. 
could be damaging to reputation and privacy. The ,.... -------...---------
tovemment deaTly has a ~bstantial interest in 
. preventing this aort of abuse of its pl'OC888es." 
Powell said this was not a "classic" prior re-
straint and did not raise the •specter of govern- · 
ment censorship" that is inVolved in f!Ome cases. 
The newspapers .would never have had access to 
the information but -for t'he ·discovery process, he 
. ,Bilid. No traditional right of "access" to the infor-
mation e1ists, he added. Al!w, a news organization 
is ~ to publish the material if it obtains it some-
where else, he BSid. . 
Justice William J. Brennan· Jr., joined by Jus-
HIGH COURT BACKS 
TRIAL DATA CURB 
'' • . '•' I •:!.. '<II" ------- )'' ' 
Unanimously Says Judge May 
... ' , , ••.• f• , , •. , ..... . . , 
Forbid Pretrial Disclosure .. ~. 
J 
.. : ·.. i~(R~.it~if.~~t_~Fm;~Jt?;~_./~:~(~-· 
' ~~~:.~~~:; :: ·-~\ 1 ;:~·,·: ·;.·,·;x:~~ ~~- ~.;: · ,\·~~~-.. ~-
.! ~;:r;~~!!~;~~~; ;;~~t~~; 
·.1· WASHINGTON;=May'21 ;_IThe· su-·· ·. 
preme Court ruled unanimously today · 
.. that~es to !l c!Y!!_ ~a:~'I'S!!i~;Jn9uding 
l
• ·news organizations, may be barred -
from disclosing information obtained 
~ from· the Other side before the trial. 
'•! "-• - •. ... .... -··· ·-~ 
1 
The decision dealt with pretrial dis-
covery, the process bywhiclieach_-side-
in a civil lawsuit builds its case by ob-
tainirig ·relevant dcX:Uinents· ·arid other 
· material · from )the · other ·side: Ordl- ' . 
narily' suCh · infrii:niation ·can be. made -
' public by' either party. But if it is highly·. 
sensitive, one side often-asks the trial 
judge to issue a "protective order'J for- · 
bidding pretrial disclosure of the ma-
terial:. · .:· , ; ·_ ' , :·.: .. ·:: ·. ; ... ~· ~ .., · ·· 
Under the rules governing civil trials 
in the Federal courts and most state 
courts, the trial judge must have "good 
cause'.' for granting a party's request . 
for a Protective order. · -
.· Courts ·around the cotintry have been 
split over the extent to which such pro-
tective orders impinge on the free 
speech and free press rights that the 
parties could ordinarily exercise under 
the First Amendment . . 
Issue of •Prior Restraint• · 
The question is particularly acute 
when, as in the case-decided today, one 
of the parties is a news organization, 
typically a defendant in a libel suit. The 
press bas frequently argued that the 
protective order is a "prior restraint," 
which under the Supreme Court's First ' 
Amendment precedents . is _presump-
tively unconstitutional. · · 
In a second decision, also unani-
mous, the Court ruled that a criminal 
defendant may in most cases insist that ' 
a pretrial bearing be open to the public 
and the press, despite a prosecution re-
quest to conduct the bearing behind 
closed doors. . . 
· The second fu1ing was-based on the 
Sixth Amendment, which guarantees a 
criminal defendant's right to a "speedy 
and public trial." The decision did not 
overrule earlier Silpreme Court rulings 
under which the press has no independ-
ent right to attend a bearing if the. de-
fendant objects. 
The pretrial discovery case before 
the Court was an appeal by two Wash-
ington state nev.'Sp3.pers, The Seattle 
Tunes and The 'W:.lla Walla Union-
Lu.ii.:;•W, irom a dl·cision by the Su-
prerr.J Co~rt of was:un:;wa. That CC:!rt 
h:!1 u;lhelc.i a prote-ctive order issu_J L-1 
a lll ~l C:.'.S '=: bro"J"'.L arainst th~ t'' o 
p:-r-:::-~ by Ke:tb k!UJtui:lrt , t11~ le"'cier 
of a :;mall religious sect, the_ Aquarian 
F our;dation. _, , 
' In Jnt:pari.ng Ul c: ll ll~.l dllca: . ...-, the 
newEnpcrs 6ou&ht and n.-cctr<'<~ n:1 or:; j 
der mpelllng Mr. Rhlnchnrt to sup-. '· 
t l ·ply formation about the foundation's <·· 
ftnancial affairs, donors 1md members. 
Mr. Rhinehart asserted thnt public re-
. lease of the information would subject 
his membefs:·to Mrnsment, and the 
·· · trialfjudge.isSued an order barring the , 
newfWapers from publlshine the infor- -
mation ~ making it available . to any 
:, 'other news ·ol'ganizations. . .... 
I • • ' 
· The order applied 9flly to informa-
tion · obtained through the discovery 
, , process, with the newspapers remain-
, · · ing free to print .the information if they 
· :. c).btalned it independently; · ·:. · - · · 
. .. '. ' The libel suit has not yet gone to trial. 
· The protective order . will no longer 
) ,. , apply to whatever portion of the ma-
terial is eventually introduced as evi-
,: · .. ~ence . . .-~ ,· ;· ·''·· , ... · · .. 
The papers appealed on the ground 
that a court order limiting expression 
could be based only on a ."compelling 
governmental interest" which, they 
argued, bad not been shown. The Wash-
ington high Court rejected the argu-
ment, and the Supreme Court today up-
held that decision. .. 
· · Writing for the Court today, Associ-
ate Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. said, 
"An order prohibiting dissemination of 
discovered information before trial is 
not the kind of classic prior restraint 
·that requires exacting First Amend-
ment scrutiny." · 
Powell ExplaiDs Decision 
Justice Powell said, "A litigant has 
no First Amendment right of access to 
information made available only for 
purposes of trying his suit." Pretrial 
discovery, he said, is not "a tradition-
~1g~b~~~':v~f ~~~~~~t 1~ 
tude" to issue orders Ilmiting the re-
lease of potentially damaging informa-
tion. 
The opinion, Seattle Times v. Rhine-
hart, No. 82-1721, nevertheless quali-
fied the trial judge's discretion to some 
degree. The judge must have "good 
cause" to issue the protective order tn 
the first place, Justice Powell said. He 
also noted that the newspapers would 
be free to print any information that 
was introduced as evidence at trial, as 
·well as any information they obtained 
· :by other means . . :In·· those circu.ni-
. stances; he said, the order "does not of-
, fend the First Amendment." 
The Court did not addresS the conse-
quences of defying a protective order, 
but presumably the discloser of the in-, 
formation would be held in contempt. 
The second decision today was a 
criminal appeal from a decision of the 
Supreme Court of Georgia by two men 
convicted of commercial gambling.· 
Before trial, they cballenged the ad-
missibility of the state's wiretap evi-
dence. The judge ordered a pretrial 
bearing and granted the prosecutor's 
request to close the proceeding on the 
ground that the tapes to be played in 
court might implicate other people. 
The tapes were played for two hours of 
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June 27, 1984 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Lewis: 
v. 
Particularly impressive is the fact that 
in each instance your opinion commanded the support 
of the entire Court. 
I hope that a few days hence your Court 
will be in recess and you and Mrs. Powell will be 
able to take a well-earned holiday. 
Sincerely, 
* I have to confess that I've only read Seattle 
Times and Waller within the past few days, notwlth-
standing that they were handed down over a month 
ago. Let me assure you that this signifies no 
disinterest in your Court's work product - quite 
the contrary; the volume of opinions emanating from 
your Court is, however, awesome, and absorbing them 
is a substantial job for a slow reader like me. 
April 11, 1984 
SEAT GINA-POW 
82-1721 Seattle Times 
Rider A, page 16 
Rule 26(b) (1), by its terms, provides that a par~~ 
tain [any information not privileged] "which is r-elati-r.Je to 
" 
the subject matter involved in the pending action ••• ". It 
further provides that discovery is not limited to matters 
~ 
that will admissible at trial so long as the information 
A. 
sought "appears rasonably calculated to lead to · the discov-
ery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C.R. 26(b) (1) ~ 
---
April 11, 1984 
SEAT2 GINA-POW 
82-1721 Seattle Times 
Rider A, page 18 
If a litigant fails to comply with a request for discovery, 
the Court may issue an order directing compliance that is 
enforceable by the Court's contempt powers. Wash. Super. 
Ct. R. 37(b)* 
*In addition, f1D its contempt power, Rule 37(b} (2) author-
izes a trial court to enforce an order compelling discovery 
by other means including, for example, regarding designated 
facts as taken to be established for purposes of the action. 
Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)2. 
~-
lfp/ss 04/12/84 Rider A, p. 21 (Seattle) 
SEA21A SALLY-POW 
Note to Rob: This is an effort to summarize the 
substances of pp. 21-25: 
In Miller v. California, 43 u.s. 15, 23 (1973), we 
observed that "[f]reedom of speech ••• does not 
comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time." 
Obscenity was held not to be protected. See also American 
Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 u.s. 382, 394 (1950). 
There are "certain well defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech whose benefit to society is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order". Included 
among unprotected speech are utterances that are likely to 
cause breaches of the peace and fighting words. See 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 u.s. 568, 572-573 (1942) ~ 
2. 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 u.s. 444, 447 (1969). And in 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 u.s. 323, 340 (1974) we 
recognized the absence of any social interest in 
falsehoods. More recently, the Court also has held that 
certain kinds of commercial speech are entitled only 
totimited First Amendment protection. See Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 
u.s. 557, 562-563 (1980). 
We think it clear, however, that information 
obtained through civil discovery authorized by modern 
Rules of Civil Procedure may be information protected by 
the First Amendment. Indeed, we do not doubt that only 
rarely would such information fall within the classes of 
unprotected speech identified by decisions of this Court. 
In this case, as petitioners argue, there certainly is a 
3. 
public interest in knowing more about respondents 
Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation. This interest may 
well include most - and possibly all - of what has been 
discovered as a result of the Court's order under Rule 
26(b) (l). The critical question therefore bec~mes: 
whether the Court's protective order issued under Rule 
26(c) is an invalid restraint on that speech. This 
requires us to decide whether the "practice in question 
[furthers] an important or substantial governmental 
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and 
whether "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] 
no grea~er than is necessary or essential to the 
protection of the particular governmental interest 
involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 u.s. 396, 413 
4. 
{1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444 u.s. 348., 354-355 {1980); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 25 {1976). 
In considering this question it is important to 
bear in mind that the information at issue became 
available to petitioners only by virtue of the Court's 
order under Rule 26{b) {1), an order issued in the Court's 
discretion. A litigant has no First Amendment right of 
access to information sought for purposes of trying his 
suit. Rule 26{b) {1) is a matter of legislative grace. 
lfp/ss 04/12/84 Rider A, p. 29 (Seattle) 
SEA29A SALLY-POW 
The rules at issue enable parties to litigation 
to obtain information "relevant to the subject matter 
involved" that they believe will be helpful in the 
preparation and trial of the case, including the narrowing 
of the issues in dispute. Rule 26, however, must be 
viewed in its entirety. Because of the liberality of 
pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b) (1), it is 
necessary for the trial court to have the authority to 
issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c). It is 
clear from experience that pretrial discovery by 
depositions and interrogatories has a significant 
potential for abuse. This is not limited to matters of 
delay and expense: discovery also may seriously implicate 
2. 
the privacy of persons and other parties. The Rules do 
not distinguish between public and private information. 
Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation; 
relevant information in the hands of third parties may be 
subject to discovery. There is an opportunity, therefore, 
for litigants to obtain - negligently or purposefully -
information that in fact not only is irrelevant but if 
~ released would be damaging to reputation and 
privacy. The government interest in preventing abuse of 
its processes therefore is substantia1. 23 See Herbert v. 
Lando, supra, at 176-177. ~~le 26(c) includes among its 
express purpose the protection of a "party or person from 
anoyance, embarrassment oppression or undue burden or 
expense ••• " Although the Rule contains no specific 
reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that 
3. 
may be implicated, there can be no doubt that such matters 
are within the broad purpose of the Rule. As stated by 
Judge Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 
F.2d 403, 407-408, "[w]hether or not the Rule itself 
authorizes [a particular order] ••. we have no question 
as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the 
inherent 'equitable powers of courts of law over their own 
process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices 
I H It is to be remembered, in this connection, that 
government has provided expressly for liberal discovery 
for the sole purposes of assisting in the settlement of 
~ 
disputes~ use thereof for any other purpose may constitute 
abuse. 
The facts in this case, summarized in the margin 
below, 24 illustrate the need for balancing the right to 
4. 
discover information against the correlative right of a 
trial court to enter protective orders. Only through such 
~~~~~ 
orders may the rights ~e prot9cted of those who are 
1\ 
compelled - at the risk of being cited for contempt - to 
produce information. Moreover, as was emphasized in the 
opinions of the courts below, persons otherwise would be 
deterred from exercising the right of access to the courts 
if protective orders were not available. (Rob: There are 
some good quotes in the Supreme Court of Washington that 
you might put in the text or in a footnote. Also perhaps 
your footnotes 25 and 26 also go in here somewhere citing 
relevant cases). 
In this case, the trial court's order allowing 
discovery was extremely broad. As we noted, supta, at 
__ , it compelled respondents - among other things - to 
5. 
identify all persons who had made donations over a five-
year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation, 
together with the amounts donated. In effect the order 
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources 
of financial support. Respondents' affidavits requesting 
a protective order pointed out that public dissemination 
of this information would violate their First Amendment 
rights to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of 
association, the trial court was persuaded - for the 
reason well stated by it - that such an order was 
necessary.* 
*Here, Rob, I would simply make a cross reference back to 
note 11 where you set forth provisions of the order. 
6. 
Both the trial court, and the washington Supreme 
Court in its opinion affirming the entry of the protective 
order, carefully weighed the competing interests. 
The~oncluded that the public interest - and particularly 
the maintaining of fearless access to the courts -
required the restriction on public use or dissemination of 
the information at 
the identified governmental interests are substantial, 
that they are unrelated to the suppression of speech: and 
that in the circumstances of this case the limitation of 
petitioner's First Amendment was no greater than 
reasonably necessary to protect the governmental 
interests. See Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at 413: 
Brown v. Glines, supra, at 354-355: Buckley v. Valeo, 
supra, at 25. (Rob: You will note that I have tempered 
7. 
the language of Procunier by use of the word "reasonably". 
Take a look at the language in each of the three cases 
cited. It may not be helpful to cite them again at this 
particular point.) 
v 
We hold that the provision for protective orders 
contained in washington Super. Ct. R. 26(c) does not 
violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the 
protective order issued in this case was a proper one 
under this Rule. The judgment accordingly is 
Affirmed 
lfp/ss 04/12/84 Rider A, p. 29 (Seattle) 
SEA29 SALLY-POW 
Rob: Should we not add a footnote at the point indicated 
on page 29: 
It may be acknowleged that the civil rules of 
discovery, first adopted in 1938 for federal courts, have 
. 
not uniformly furthered the interests of speedy and 
inexpensive resolution of disputes. The disappointment in 
this respect does not, however, imply any lessening of the 
governmental interest and purpose. 
1· 
I 
lfp/ss 04/12/84 Rider A, p. 21 (Seattle) 
SEA21A SALLY-POW 
Note to Rob: This is an effort to summarize the 
substances of pp. 21-25: 
In Miller v. California, 43 u.s. 15, 23 (1973), we 
observed that "[f]reedom of speech ••. does not 
comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time." 
Obscenity was held not to be protected. See also American 
Communications Assn. v. Douds,_ 339 u.s. 382, 394 (1950). 
There are "certain well defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech whose benefit to society is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order". Included 
among unprotected speech are utterances that are likely to 
cause breaches of the peace and fighting words. See 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 u.s. 568, 572-573 (1942); 
2. 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 u.s. 444, 447 (1969). And in 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 u.s. 323, 340 (1974) we 
recognized the absence of any social interest in 
falsehoods. More recently, the Court also has held that 
certain kinds of commercial speech are entitled only 
tolimited First Amendment protection. See Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 
u.s. 557, 562-563 (1980). 
We think it clear, however, that information 
obtained through civil discovery authorized by modern 
Rules of Civil Procedure may be information protected by 
the First Amendment. Indeed, we do not doubt that only 
rarely would such information fall within the classes of 
unprotected speech identified by decisions of this Court. 
In this case, as petitioners argue, there certainly is a 
3. 
public interest in knowing more about respondents 
Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation. This interest may 
well include most - and possibly all - of what has been 
discovered as a result of the Court's order under Rule 
26(b) (1). The critical question therefore becaomes: 
whether the Court's protective order issued under Rule 
26(c) is an invalid restraint on that speech. This 
requires us to decide whether the "practice in question 
[furthers] an important or substantial governmental 
interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and 
whether "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] 
no greather than is necessary or essential to the 
protection of the particular governmental interest 
involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 u.s. 396, 413 
4. 
(1974}: see Brown v. Glines, 444 u.s. 348, 354-355 (1980}: 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 25 (1976}. 
In considering this question it is important to 
bear in mind that the information at issue became 
available to petitioners only by virtue of the Court's 
order under Rule 26 (b) ( 1} , an order issued in the Court's 
discretion. A litigant has no First Amendment right of 
access to information sought for purposes of trying his 
suit. Rule 26(b} (1} is a matter of legislative grace. 
lfp/ss 04/12/84 Rider A, p. 29 (Seattle) 
SEA29A SALLY-POW 
The rules at issue enable parties to litigation 
to obtain information "relevant to the subject matter 
involved" that they believe will be helpful in the 
preparation and trial of the case, including the narrowing 
of the issues in dispute. Rule 26, however, must be 
viewed in its entirety. Because of the liberality of 
pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b) (1), it is 
necessary for the trial court to have the authority to 
issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c). It is 
clear from experience that pretrial discovery by 
depositions and interrogatories has a significant 
potential for abuse. This is not limited to matters of 
delay and expense; discovery also may seriously implicate 
2. 
the privacy of persons and other parties. The Rules do 
not distinguish between public and private information. 
Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation: 
relevant information in the hands of third parties may be 
subject to discovery. There is an opportunity, therefore, 
for litigants to obtain - negligently or purposefully -
information that in fact not only is irrelevant but if 
publicity released would be damaging to reputation and 
privacy. The government interest in preventing abuse of 
its processes therefore is substantia1. 23 See Herbert v. 
Lando, supra, at 176-177. Rule 26(c) includes among its 
express purpose the protection of a "party or person from 
anoyance, embarrassment oppression or undue burden or 
expense ••• " Although the Rule contains no specific 
reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that 
3. 
may be implicated, there can be no doubt that such matters 
are within the broad purpose of the Rule. As stated by 
Judge Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 
F.2d 403, 407-408, "[w]hether or not the Rule itself 
authorizes [a particular order] ••• we have no question 
as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the 
inherent 'equitable powers of courts of law over their own 
process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices 
I H It is to be remembered, in this connection, that 
government has provided expressly for liberal discovery 
for the sole purposes of assisting in the settlement of 
disputes; use thereof for any other purpose may constitute 
abuse. 
The facts in this case, summarized in the margin 
below, 24 illustrate the need for balancing the right to 
4. 
discover information against the correlative right of a 
trial court to enter protective orders. Only through such 
orders may the rights be protected of those who are 
compelled - at the risk of being cited for contempt - to 
produce information. Moreover, as was emphasized in the 
opinions of the courts below, persons otherwise would be 
deterred from exercising the right of access to the courts 
if protective orders were not available. {Rob: There are 
some good quotes in the Supreme Court of Washington that 
you might put in the text or in a footnote. Also perhaps 
your footnotes 25 and 26 also go in here somewhere citing 
relevant cases). 
In this case, the trial court's order allowing 
discovery was extremely broad. As we noted, supta, at 
---' it compelled respondents - among other things - to 
5. 
identify all persons who had made donations over a five-
year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation, 
together with the amounts donated. In effect the order 
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources 
of financial support. Respondents' affidavits requesting 
a protective order pointed out that public dissemination 
of this information would violate their First Amendment 
rights to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of 
association, the trial court was persuaded - for the 
reason well stated by it - that such an order was 
necessary.* 
*Here, Rob, I would simply make a cross reference back to 
note 11 where you set forth provisions of the order. 
6. 
Both the trial court, and the Washington Supreme 
Court in its opinion affirming the entry of the protective 
order, carefully weighed the competing interests. 
Theyconcluded that the public interest - and particularly 
the maintaining of fearless access to the courts -
required the restriction on public use or dissemination of 
the information at issue prior to trial. We agree that 
the identified governmental interests are substantial, 
that they are unrelated to the suppression of speech; and 
that in the circumstances of this case the limitation of 
petitioner's First Amendment was no greater than 
reasonably necessary to protect the governmental 
interests. See Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at 413; 
Brown v. Glines, supra, at 354-355; Buckley v. Valeo, 
supra, at 25. (Rob: You will note that I have tempered 
7. 
the language of Procunier by use of the word "reasonably". 
Take a look at the language in each of the three cases 
cited. It may not be helpful to cite them again at this 
particular point.) 
v 
We hold that the provision for protective orders 
contained in Washington Super. Ct. R. 26(c) does not 
violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the 
protective order issued in this case was a proper one 
under this Rule. The judgment accordingly is 
Affirmed 
lfp/ss 04/12/84 Rider A, p. 21 (Seattle) 
SEA21 SALLY-POW 
If we conclude that this information is protected, we must 
decide whether Rule 26(b) -conferring broad discretion on 
a trial court to restrict dissemination of discovered 
information - is justified by a sufficient state interest. 
lfp/ss 04/12/84 Rider A, p. 21 (Seattle) 
SEA21 SALLY-POW 
If we conclude that this information is protected, we must 
decide whether Rule 26(b) -conferring broad discretion on 
a trial court to restrict dissemination of discovered 
information - is justified by a sufficient state interest. 
lfp/ss 04/19/84 Rider A, p. 24 (Seattle) 
SEA24 SALLY-POW 
The legislature of the State of Washington, following the 
example of the Congress in its approval of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, has determined that such 
discretion is necessary, and we find no reason to 
disagree. 
Rob: The remainder of page 24 that I have circled in 
pencil seems unnecessary, and I would omit it. If the 
Fed. Supp. case cited in footnote 23 is helpful on the 
point for which you cite it, you could simply leave the 
footnote in and add its holding stated as you have in the 
text. 
lfp/ss 04/19/84 Rider A, p. 26 (Seattle) 
SEA26 SALLY-POW 
Respondents' affidavits requesting a protective order 
persuaded the courts below that public dissemination of 
this information could violate their First Amendment 
rights to private, freedom of religion and association. 
~e trial court was persuaded - for reasons well stated by 
it - that such an order was necessary to protect the 
arguable rights of respondents, and also to insure that 
the availability of liberal discovery does not deter 
access to the courts. 24 We need not, of course, decide 
whether any constitutional rights of respondents would 
have been violated. It is sufficient for purposes of our 
decision to agree - as we do - that the Supreme Court of 
the State of Washington correctly tound no abuse of 
2. 
discretion by the trial court. We also hold that the 
protective order at issue in this case does not violate 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment 
accordingly is 
Affirmed 
Rob: We should be careful not to say or imply that 
respondents' asserted constitutional rights exist or are 
valid. The "right of privacy" for example - as Joe will 
tell you in connection with the Jaycee case - has never 
been defined broadly. Also the limits of the right of 
association remain vague. As you take one final look at 
the draft before having it printed, bear these thoughts in 
mind. It is important not to say too much. 
lfp/ss 04/21/84 Rider A, p. 14 (Seattle) 
SEA14 SALLY-POW 
Rob: The following may be helpful in n. 21, p. 14: 
In Herbert v. Lando, supra, at 176, the Court 
observed: "[T]here have been repeated expressions of 
concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices 
from this Court have joined the chorus." (citations 
omitted). But until and unless there are major changes in 
the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had 
on what in fact and in law are ample powers of the 
district judge to prevent abuse." Herbert v. Lando, 
supra, at 176, 177~ see also id., at 179 (Powell, J., 
concurring). But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and 
sometimes the inadequate overight of discovery by trial 
2. 
courts, do not in any respect lessen the importance of the 
purpose of the Rules and the government's substantial 
interest. 
lfp/ss 05/01/84 Seattle Times 
SEAl SALLY-POW 
..... ' . ~ ~ u 4.4· <"'tlf--1.{ 
We hold that the protective order , atd=Fwsue does 
1\ 
not offend the First Amendment. It was entered by the trial 
court upon a showing that constituted good cause as required 
by Rule 23(c), and also is limited to the context of 
pretrial civil discovery. 
~. J-t-_~ 
Moreover 4--1; does Pl'e"t restrict 
c "- ~ 
dissemination if the information were gained from other 
sources. ~ 
lfp/ss 04/21/84 Rider A, p. 14 (Seattle) 
SEA14 SALLY-POW 
Rob: The following may be helpful in n. 21, p. 14: 
~ In Herbert v. Lando, supra, at 176, the Court 
observed: "[T]here have been repeated expressions of 
concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices 
from this Court have joined the chorus~citations 
omitted). -ut until and unless there are major changes in 
the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had 
on what in fact and in law are ample powers of the 
district judge to prevent abuse." Herbert· v. Lando, 
supra, at 176, 177; see also id., at 179 (Powell, J., 
concurring).~ But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and 
J 
sometimes the inadequate overight of discovery by trial 
A 
2. 
courts, do not in any respect lessen the importance of the 
purpose of the Rules and the government's substantial 
interest. 
lfp/rmc April 21, 1984 
30P5SPl ROBERT-POW 
The affidavits detailed a series of letters and telephone calls 
defaming the Foundation, its members, and Rhinehart--including 
several that threatened physical harm to those associated with 
the Foundation. The affiants also described incidents at the 
Foundation's headquarters involving attacks, threats, and 
assaults directed at Foundation members by anonymous individuals 
and groups. In general, the affidavits averred that public 
release of the donor lists would adversely afect Foundation 
membership and income and would subject its members to additional 
harrassment and reprisals. 
INSERT 1 
The affidavits detailed a series of letters and telephone calls 
defaming the Foundation, its members, and Rhinehart--including 
several that threatened physical harm to those associated with 
the Foundation. The affiants also described incidents at the 
Foundation's headquarters involving attacks, threats, and 
assaults directed at Foundation members b anon mous individuals 
and rou s. n ra , the affidavits averred t at pu 1 
e ease o the donor lists would adversely a~ct Foundation ~ 
membership and income and would subject members to additional 
harrassment and reprisals. 
INSERT 2 
In Herbert v. 
'-JJ!_tJ s: 1 s--J ~ 
Lando,~:~l7./ the Court observed: 
"[T]here have been repeated expressions of concern about 
undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this 
Court have joined the chor~ " (c ~;ations omitted). But 
' •, I _(t/ 
~until and unless there are major changes in the present 
Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on what in 
fact and in law are ample the district judge to 
a_;;l-
prevent abuse." see 
also id., at 179 (Powell, J., concurring). But abuses of 
the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the inadequate 
ove ~ight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any 
2. 
~ ... Cjv~y ~ ~wl Vs;.~~ 
respect lessen the importance of the purpose of the Rules 




w~ ~ yc'-' r,~ 
~ r, aJ--~ .) tJt$; 
fi/7tJ S-12_ 1 ~ 
L~ 'r? Jl/eJz-
-/tJ {--e_ / ~ 1/ ({.J ve. 
flu_ 'l,r~t.ll~ If nt~ 
t( wk w« r--~,( 17/tr- { frr;? 
JtVI( '1 ~ ,, r/ "'' J. 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Rob 
Date: May 10, 1984 
MEMORANDUM 
Re: Justice Rehnquist's letter in Seattle Times 
I suggest that we substitute the following for our holding on 
page 16 in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart: 
We therefore hold that where, as in this case, a 
protective order is entered on a showing of good cause, 
is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, 
and does not restrict the dissemination of the 
information if gained from other sources, it does not 
offend the First Amendment.l!/ 
rmc 04/10/84 
The Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart ..ef.~ 
No. 82-1721 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litiga-
tion have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in advance of 
trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process. 
I 
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious 
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer tha"j( 
1,000 members, most of whom are located in the State of Washing-
Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the ability 
to communicate with the dead through a medium. Rhinehart is the 
primary Aquarian medium. 
Over the years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union-
Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and the Founda-
tion. 
\\ {\~S~dwfa.v'S 
Altogether ~ articles appeared in the seatt e-~imes and 
one articlQ iR tl::le UnioR-J3nllQt~ during the years 1973, 1978, 
/ 
page 2. 
1979. The five articles that appeared in 1973 focused on 
Rhinehart and the manner in which he operated the Foundation. 
They described seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people 
paid him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and 
The articles also stated that Rhinehart had sold friends. 
'I'\ C..~,. stones • that had been "expelled" from his body. 
t!+le RrswspapQr accounts, Rhinehart claimed thQ otm~es possessed 
'"1fla§ioal powers, ~e areieles also iFRpliog tl=tat Rl:linehar:~ l:lad 
...-raised s~abs;;tantial amounts of income in the Foundation's name, 
bat that moM-of the money had gone to Rhinehart. One of the 
~articles referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, 
for sodomy. 
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an 
"extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla State 
Penitentiary. The articles stated that Rhinehart treated 1,100 
inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave away between 
$35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes" t6 vario~o iAmate~a ng-
page 3. 
d'ur iu~ the snow, sometimes grassing as a man, e:l'te soJAQt iroes as ._ 
~ Another part of the prison show described in the arti-
cles was a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their gowns and biki-
nis and sang ... " App. 25a. Some of the articles referred again 
to Rhinehart's sodomy conviction. 
Two articles appeared in 1979. The articles referred to a 
purported connection between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of 
the popular television program, "The Incredible Hulk." According 
to the articles, Ferrigno once had served as a body guard for 
Rhinehart. The articles quoted telephone conversations with 
Ferrigno, in which he denied any involvement with the Aquarian 
Foundation and expressed a distrust of Rhinehart. 
II 
in_a false li~, Rhinehart brought 
~~-6 
n behalf of him-
of the articles 
the anatomy of both sexes 
half way with 
------------------
page 4. 
self and the Foundation against the Seattle Times, the Walla Wal-
la Union-Bulletin, the authors of the articles and their spouses. 
Five female members of the Foundation who had participated in the 
presentation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 2 
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements that 
were "fictional and untrue" and that the defendants--petitioners 
' here--knew, or should have known, of the falsehoods. According 
to the complaint, the articles "did and were calculated to hold 
[Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and ridicule, and to im-
peach his honesty, integrity, virtue, religious philosophy, repu-
tation as a person and in his profession as a spiritual leader." 
~ 
App. 8a. With respect to the Foundation, the complaint states: 
"'\ 
tend to interfere 
[the Foundation's] activities by prejudicing it in 
--~--~public estimation. Such communications tend to dispar-
religious corporation and the conduct of its 
activities and thus to obstruct the accom · ~QT] 
i te ur oses. In addition the articles 
have, or may have had, the effect of disc~uraging con-
tributions by the membership and public and thereby 
diminished the financial ability of the Foundation to 
2The record is unclear as to whether all five of the 
female plaintiffs participated in the "chorus line" 
described in the 1978 articles. The record also does not 
disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs were 
mentioned by name in the articles. 
page 5. 
pursue its corporate purposes." App. 9a. 
described the chorus line t 
complaint alleges that the article misrepresented the 
role of the Foundation's "choir" 3 and :m.i•led re~impq"ii 
"'\ ~ 
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all their 
clothes and wantonly danced naked •••• " App. 
the complaint continues, the article had caused al 
bers of the Foundation to suffer injury 
and damage, including embarrassment and 
and mental anguish, and 
3The complaint states: 
"In truth and fact, the women were not a chorus 
line--they did not dance. They were not wearing 
gowns--they were part of a church choir and were 
formally attired in church choir robes. In a 
subsequent part of the special presentation the 
women members of the choir did wear bikinis--
which were at no time removed." App. 6a. 
~-<Jf~;s fem.....,....,e,.be.-s of tAe F<>u~<latien. The 
complain~~ $14,100,000 in damages for the alleged 
defamation and invasions of privacy. 4 
Peti tionersl filed--. answe~ te tae Q<>IIIPl;W.R~ den~ , .. Al' oi 
'f;k,~ 
the allegations and assert~ affirmative defenses. 5 Petitioners 
1\ "' 
~iz.t,l~~~ promptly M!Ml'f discovery by eposing Rhinehart, request~ pro-
1 . 
duction of documents pertaining to the financial affairs of 
Rhinehart and the Foundation, and ~ serv~ extensive interroga-
Respondents 
~ I I A ~ ~J a. ~· c a t ea>t I ii:t ")f..uu· ~ ,..., v-1 
turned over ~ome financial documents, including several of 
~ 
4 4/&·~·u.. 
Although the complaint does not allege tha the~ 
articles caused a decline in membership of the ~oundation, 
.~pondent~s answers to defendants interrogatories raised 
~his issue. In response to petitioners request that 
respondent's explain the damages they are seeking, 
responden£7s claimed that the Foundation had experienced a 
drop in membership in Hawaii and Washington II from about 
q , _! 300 people to about 150 people, and [a] concurrent drop in 
lf.VJ- ~, contributions." Record 503. 
~ ...... ..,.,}' 5AJAoq_g -thE Affirm~t~:~defenses.., ":;.~!;t!:;{ pet!tie~ecs 
~ l~~ ~ contentions t at the articles were substantially true 
~r (0 and accurate, that tRQ -~~~Q•~s were privileged under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of 
limitations had run as to the 1973 articles, that 
respondents had consented to any invasions of privacy, and 
C
h respondents had no reasonable expectation of privacy 




Rhinehart's income tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to 
~~-e.~~ &, 
disclose other re~l:il d information p~iHiari±y petta.ining te t~ 
. A ) 
"" 




~ .al!!e.-£ eE-t:le-ed pe~oners '= £e'fl:il€~ for a li.-t/\of the Founda-
i./t;::L 
tion's donors during the preceding 10 years J and a list of ail of> 
~members Gf the ~t..jan during that period • ..:r-f 
h 
Petitioners filed a motion t.ltlGQl" Waliib in.g~oA Supe-£ ior Co~u~ 
~ Jl.lu_ s hiZt-.t ~.s· 
1\ Rule 26 (b) (1) requesting i-esuarwe &f an order compelling discov-
ery.8 In thei~orand~ tftis metion, petition-
6Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of 
his residence. He submitted an affidavit stating that he 
had relocated out of fear for his safety and that 
disclosure of his current address would subject him to 
risks of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an 
order compelling Rhinehart to give his address and the 
trial court granted the motion. 
7Respondents objected to several individual 
interrogatories and requests for production on various / 
grounds, such as relevancy, overbreadth, or general _,s 
inapplicability of the discovery rules. To the extent 
that respondents continues to assert these claims, they 
are not at issue before this Court. 
8cR 26(b) (1)1\ provides in full: 
-
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim 
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to 
the claim or defense of any other party, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
page 8. 
~4-t..k~ 
ers recognized that the principal peii:tlt of contil:tltLoR betlitze'iR t~ 
~ (J 
-r- parM-eo co~erl"l~S- respondents "refusal,i to permit any effective 
"'\ 
inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the source of their 
donations, their financial transactions, uses of wealth and as-
sets and their financial condition in general." Record 350. Re-
~4.~·~ ,..._ Jz-~P··~..,;... 
spondents opposed the motion fO~ th ; g  that compelled produc-
-1 ~ 
tion of the identities of its donors and members would violate 
the members' and donors' First Amendment rights to privacy, free-
dom of religion, and freedom of association. 
Respondents also moved for a protective order preventing pe-
titioners from disseminating any information gained through dis-
covery. Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their 
LA-c..~ 
~ to continue publishing articles about respondents and this 
including the existence, description, nature, 
custody, condition and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the 
identity and location of persons having 
knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not 
ground for objection that the information sought 
will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence." 
litigation, and their intent to use information gained through 
discovery in those articles. argued that the pu 
~ of the information sought by the motion to compel would 
~ impair their rights of freedom of expression, freedom of reli-
~ ~ of associa~t~i~o~n~·~--------------------------~ 
In a lengthy letter ruling, the trial cour~he mo-
l\ 
tion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors who 
made contributions during the five years preceding the date of 
( 
the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The ~1 court 
also required petitioners to divulge enough membership informa-
tion to substantiate any claims of diminished membership. Rely-
v~tf~~ 
~~~ ~. Di · · Balkin, the federal c~urt~_ Qf~ v- ~).., ~v appeals that had considered the question had~ 
~ Wl~Relolt e~:tb.st!-anYal dieeuseien that the First Amendment 
, //'Ill~ did not affect a trial court's authority to restrict l 
9 ~~~~ dissemination of information produced during pretrial '·~·rz-Y· discovery. See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 
~ 6 F. 2d 1001, 1006 (CA3 1976) ; International Paper Products ~ 
La , '2 v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (CA2 1963). ~ Halkin 'f!> ~~ ' Z5 ee1:1rt considered the issue iCR depth. Re§Qrri ng e tc a~ 
~ protective order as a "para igmatic prior restraint," efl-e 
~ ~c~~ dQ.tlii-rmiRes;l t t such qJ;Ae...rs require close 
/ F~en<3Hient scrutiny. The cour~d that before a 
~ ~ Footnote conti ed on next page. 
~ :dolu .. • ~11< /'•cdc e. tJI.. 
al-~~ .. (~-~~ 
··r1!:t:HL" l..L; ~-r~ 
page 10. 
refused to issue a protective order ., CQIJe r: i~ !!-he ==i-n format i ee:J 
facts alleged by respondents 
JI-
Tbe con~;t stated that the 
""" 
in support of their motion for~~ 
-1 
~e order were too conclusory to warrant a finding of 
"good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct. c. R. 26(c} . 10 The 
~ court should issue a protective order that restricts 
expression, it must be satisfied that t.hr t e c• i tw ia );)aue 6 
--t~rn--~+-- "the harm posed by dissemination must be 
substantial and serious; the restraining order must be 
narrowly drawn and precise; and there must be no 
alternative means of protecting the public interest which 
intrudes less directly on expression." Id., at 191. 
lOwash. Super. Ct. c. R. 26(c} provides: 
"Protective Orders. Upon moton by a party or by 
the person from whom discovery is sought, and 
for good cause shown, the court in which the 
action is pending or alternatively, on matters 
relating to a deposition, the court in the 
county where the deposition is to be taken may 
make any order which justice requires to protect 
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense, 
including one or more of the following: (1} that 
the discovery not be had; (2} that the discovery 
may be had only on specified terms and 
conditions, including a designation of the time 
or place; (3} that the discovery may be had only 
by a method of discovery other than that 
selected by the party seeking discovery; (4} 
that certain matters not be inquired into, or 
that the scope of the discovery be limited to 
certain matters; (5} that discovery be conducted 
with no one present except persons designated by 
the court; (6} that a deposition after being 
sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7} 
that a trade secret or other confidential 
research, development, or commercial information 
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a 
Footnote continued on next page. 
page 11. 
court stated, however, that the denial of petitioners' motion was 
"without prejudice to [respondents'] right to move for a protec-
tive order in respect to specifically described discovery materi-
als and a factual showing of good cause for restraining defend-
ants in their use of those materials." Record 16. 
In response to the trial court's letter ruling, respondents 
filed a motion for reconsideration in which they renewed their 
motion for a protective order. 
r~pGRaeR~itted affidavits of ...., 
eral~ers df~ o~dation] . ~Ao -~~gav~~s averr~hat 
"' .-..o.a~~~~l!... 




Foundation membership and income and would subject ii"'andatMn .. 
members to harassment and reprisals. 
~~:1affid~ts, the trial court issued a protec-
designated way; ( 8) that the parties 
simultaneously file specified documents or 
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be 
opened as directed by the court ••.• " 
CR 26(c) is identical to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c) and is 
typical of the provisions adopted in many states. 
page 12. 
tive order covering any information obtained through the discov-
ery process that pertained to "the financial affairs of the vari-
ous plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquar ian Foundation 
members, contributors, or clients, and the names and addresses of 
those who have been contributors, clients, or donors to any of 
the various plaintiffs." The order prohibited petitioners from 
publishing or disseminating the information in any way except 
where necessary to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, 
the order did not apply to information gained by means other than 
the discovery process. 11 In an accompanying opinion, the trial 
11The relevant portions of the protective order state: 
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is 
granted with respect to information gained by 
the defendants through the use of all of the 
discovery processes regarding the financial 
affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names and 
addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, 
contributors, or clients, and the names and 
addresses of those who have been contributors, 
clients, or donors to any of the various 
plaintiffs. 
3. The defendants and each of them shall make no 
use of and shall not disseminate the information 
defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through 
discovery, other than such use as is necessary 
in order for the discovering party to prepare 
and try the case. As a result, information 
gained by a defendant through the discovery 
Footnote continued on next page. 
page 13. 
court recognized that the protective order would restrict peti-
tioners' right to publish 
~~t~tl.J..,b~ 
informationF t.bei;:t'osse••l.<m, but J 
~t reasoned that the restriction was necessary to avoid 
the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on "a party's 
willingness to bring his case to court." 
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production order 
and petitioners appealed from the protective order. The Supreme 
Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d 673 (1982). With 
respect to the protective order, the court reasoned: 
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, osten-
sibly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior re-
stralnt of free expression', we are convinced that the 
interest of the judiciary in the integrity of its dis-
covery processes is sufficient to meet the 'heavy bur-
den' of justification. The need to preserve that in-
tegrity 1s adequate to sustain a rule like CR 26(c) 
which authorizes a trial court to protect the confiden-
tiality of information gi~en for purposes of li tiga-
tion." 654 P.2d, at 690. 
process may not be published by any of the 
defendants or made available to any news media 
for publication or dissemination. This 
~rotective order has no application except to 
1nformation gained by the defendants through the 
use of the discovery processes. 
12Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo 
that a protective order could be viewed as an infringement 
on First Amendment rights, the court also stated: 
"A persuasive argument can be made that when 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The court noted that "the information to be discovered concerned 
the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his organi-
zation, in which he and his associates had a recognizable privacy 
interest; and the giving of publicity to these matters would al-
legedly and understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and 
even oppression." Joint App. 130a-13la. Therefore, the court 
concluded, the trial court had not abused its discretion in issu-
ing the protective order. 13 
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its holding 
conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia in In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 
persons are required to give information which 
they would otherwise be entitled to keep to 
themselves, in order to secure a government 
benefit or perform an obligation to that 
government, those receiving that information 
waive the right to use it for any purpose except 
those which are authorized by the agency of 
government which exacted the information." 654 
P. 2d , at 6 81 . 
13The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because 
the protective order shields respondents from "abuse of 
the discovery privilege," respondents could not object to 
the order compelling production. We do not consider here 
that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision. 
• 
JU~ 7lL('~~k_f ~~ ~j!J'!'11 15. ~~~~u~ 
~ )Jl! ~ w & 1;., (c.-r ~~ 
4r~~h-'4~a~~~ 
(1979) 1 1)  Court of Appeals for the First Cir- j,._..._ 
cui t in In re San Juan Star Co. 1 662 F. 2d 108 (1981) 1 
15 and the ~~ 
Court of Georgia in Georgia Gazette Publishing Co. v. 
248 Ga. 528, 284 S.E.2d 386 (1981). We granted certiora-
J{z, 





Most states, including Washington, have adopted discovery 
provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of 
Ci vi 1 Procedure. F. James and G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 179 
14 
See note 9 supra. ~~~ ~ 
15 In San Juan Star ,~e Court of Appeals for the r;irst 
Circuit considered~ th.e ~tile .pU>pon-Rdeo jon Halki~ .axle b 
wajegt&o tR~ stringent approach to the constitutionality 
of protective orders. Although the San Juan court held 
that protective orders require some First Amendment 
scrutiny, the court reasoned that First Amendment 
interests are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery 
context. The court stated: "In general, then, we find the 
appropriate measure of such limitations in a standard of 
'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' 
to the First Amendment concerns at stake, " 662 F.2d, 
at 116. 
16The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is 
consistent with the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in International Products Corp. v. 
Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-408 (1963). 
c~ ( f-1 ? ? 
page 16. 
(1977) • 17 
"any matter, not privil"",.. _ _ , 
matter i1 Zt- ?~~ I1J.- Proc 
26 (b) (1); 41~~ con 
~~~
strued th j w(tAA-~ ;ions 
11' :J% o::t-~ 
should be ~· ~-~La ~le." 
~ 
/J,.L-~ ~ ~~ 
~ ~~Pb~ 
 :.:-----
Brumback, 7 .l:.'o Ld 1401 142 
7_ ifr'ms, t~ 
~. 4/t% ..... ., l 
proviaf for discovery 1 ~ information in the pos-
17see Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 wash. 2d 429, 
518 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1978); Moore v. Wentz, 11 Wash. App. 
796, 525 P.2d 290, ___ (Wash. App. 1974). The drafters of 
the Washington Civil Rules prefaced the rules with the 
comment that the format and numbering of the rules was 
intended to mirror that of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The drafters hoped that this would facilitate 
use of federal materials in the research of the Washington 
rules. In addition, the Washington Supreme Court has 
stated that when the language of a Washington rule and its 
federal counterpart are the same, courts should look to 
decisions interpreting the federal rule when trying to 
construe the Washington rule. American Discount Corp. v. 
Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 499 P.2d 869, 871 
(1972); see In the Matter of Johns-Manville Corp., 99 
Wash. 2d 193, 660 P.2d 271, (1983). This rule of 
statutory construction applies---rn this case because the 
Washington rule that provides for scope of civil discovery 
and the issuance of protective orders is virtually 
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Compare CR 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc. 26(b) and (c). 
!) 
.. 
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----
session of third parties. The rules also state that discovery 
not limited to matters that will be admissible at trial. 
is~ 
A party ) I 
may seek any information that "appears reasonably calculated to 
' lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Fed. Rule _c~
26(b)(l): Wash. Super. Ct. c . . R. 26(b)(l)_.z:-;:::t Fund 
--------- \_.~ - I ~ 
Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d 758, 575 P.2d 716, 719 
(1978): c. Wright and A. Miller, 8 Federal Practice and Procedure 
§2008 (1970) • provisions necessarily 
~lowj ~ discovery of much information that is only tangential-
ly relevant to the litigation. 
and Procedure ~26.56[1]. 
See 4 Moore • s Federal PractiJ 
The rules do not differentiate between information that is 
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests at-
tach. Under the rule~ ~~ l.t(j 
~H-.s-,1-d~  ~k,:l-
1'\ as-~ is not privileged.) and ~e~nt to the subject matter ~ 
11-i4-."'-~ 
9 
velwee iR1the pending action. 
i\ 
Thus, the rul~~ · ~l::ltfior i:oze exten-
"\ 





The rules not only provide for intrusive discovery, 
~ 
enlist the powers ction if neces ~ry. 
<fl _.=::::;:; • / I 
• \, If a litigant fails to ~~ with,(requests, Mor: !discoyerft ~
requeee~~~~ ~ -~k an order from the trial court compel-
' ~k+--'--~1 
ling discover~ . Feaa Ftl:l~ 37(~ wash. Super. Ct. c. 
R. 3 7 (a) • If the trial court issues the requested order, · and a 
~ 
party fails to comply, the . trial court can enforce the order 
through exercise of its contempt powers. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 
37(b); Wash. Super. Ct. R. 37(b). The trial court also can en-
force an order compelling discovery by issuing additional orders 
including: / 
I 
"(A) An order hat the matters regarding which the 
order [compelli g discovery] was made or any other des-
ignated facts shall be taken to be established for the 
purposes of he action in accordance with the claim of 
the party o taining ~e order; 
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to 
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or 
prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in 
evide ce; 
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, 
or staying further proceedings until the order [compel-
ling d1scovery] is obeyed, or dismissing the action or 
proceedings until the order [compelling discovery] is 
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceedings or any 
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; .•. " Wash. Super. Ct. c. 
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Th effect of these provisions is to give a 
powers to compel a 
discovery, or face penalties for contempt 18 or prejud' e to his 
case. When e possible sanctions for refusing a discovery re-
quest are coupled with the extensive scope of the discovery 
rules, the extent of the intrusion into private affairs that may 
I 
accompany litigation is ~ apparent. / ----------Despite t-he intrtls-i-v 
argue that the First Amendment imposes strict limits on the 
availability of any judicial order that has the effect of re-
str icting expression. 
different r~ther 
They contend that civil discovery is no j-
,s 
source of information, and therefore the 
1\ 
information is "protected speech" for First Amendment purposes. 
v. 
• 
page 2~ "'l,A.J 
~~ ~!b--t-~~~f~~ 
~~~~ 
They submit, however, that ~ tr~ 
- --- I - - I 1 ., ·~ 
They submit, 
al court should grant such a protective order only after 
specific finding that it is the least intrusive means of avoiding 
a substantial, serious, and immediate threat to a compelling 
state interest. consideration of 
this area, we conclude that the rule petitioners 
is not required by the First Amendment. 
IV 
a~~Vtft9 language, the F1 
ngress shall make no law ••• abridging the freedom of speech, 
of the press: or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
e, and to petition the Go ment for a redress of grievances." 
~ The protections afforded by the First Amendment are encompassed 
within the term "liberty" as contained in the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth ;~d~ent, and ~ therefor~ applicable to 
(?~ ~efi~~ action o~t~l~gislaturQs and cour~s. See First National 
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 u.s. 765, 779 (1978); Nebraska Press Assn. 




page 21 • 
son , 3 4 3 U. S • 4 9 5 , 50 0-5 0 1 ( 19 52 ) • The broad sweep of the First 
Amendment seems to prohibit all restraints on free expression, 
but this Court has declined to give that language af ent:i:rely -r 
literal interpretation. ~iller v. California, 413 u.S. 15, 23 
(1973) • "Freedom of speech does not comprehend the right to 
speak on any subject at any time." American Communications Assn. 
v. Douds, 339 u.s. 382, 394 (1950). There are "certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech" whose benefit to 
society is "clearly outweighed by the social interest in order." 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 u.s. 568, 572-573 (1942) ~ Gertz 
v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 u.s. 323, 340 (1974). 
91~~~UL-L 
1\ must ~t determine whether information gained through civil 
discovery, and not yet presented at trial, 4s ~Q cf tbQ Rarro, · 
. 
~ 
~~~~~~~~~~~~-.A&c-~~~~ protected by the First Amend-
1\ a·4~~ 
decide whether van ;;~7overn-
~.S~a-i/ 
a rule, like that in effect in ~Washing-
ment. 
t.,/- iA.... , 
If ~~' we must ~n 
~;:;:J. 
interes ( justifies 
A 
ment 
ton, affording a trial court broad discretion to restrict the 
page 22. 
$..4A-
dissemination of discovered information. 1. Landmark Communica-
Hans. Inc. v. Virginia, 435 u.s. 829, 841 (1978). 
A 
Our past decisions have recognized two classes of expression 
the First Amendment does not protect. First, we have held 
that utterances that comprise "no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas" or that are of "slight social value as a step to 
truth" are unprotected. See Chaplinsky, supra, at 572. Included 
\ in this category are profanity, obscenity, and false statements 
of fact. See Miller v. California, 413 u.s. 15, 23 (1973): 
Gertz, supra, at 340. The second category of unprotected speech 
utterances that are likely to cause breaches of the 
peace. Incitements to riot and fighting words fall~tl¥ within 
this category. See Chaplinsky, supra, at 573: Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 u.s. 444, 447 (1969) .~ 
~e ~ als~held that certain kinds of commercial 
speech are entitled to only limited First Amendment 
protection. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 




It is clear that the dissemination of information gained 
through pretrial discovery is protected by the First Amendment. 
To be sure, most civil discovery relates to essentially private 
matters. Assigning fault in a car accident, quieting title to 
I 
real estate, or parcelling up the tangible re ains of a marriage 
may not be subjects in which society has ;{ compelling interest. 
I 
Nevertheless, civil actions often involve subjects with which the 
public properly is concerned. For example, the newspaper arti-
cles at issue in this case described an unorthodox religious or-
ganization which actively sought new members and financial sup-
port from the general public. The articles also reported the 
manner in which the leader and several of his followers enter-
tained a large segment of the inmate population at a state peni-
tentiary. These articles served a useful function by making the 
public aware of the existence of the religion, the substance of 
its philosophy, and its principal method of raising funds. Sto-
ries concerning the management of prison affairs are also of pub-
lie interest. Although more compelling examples can be imagined, 
page 24. 
the present case amply illustrates that information proL in 
pretrial discovery may be of value to society. The ntermittant 
occurence of cases such as this is sufficient to gener-
alization that discovered information is alw; ys of "slight social 
I 
value as a step to truth." Accord Craig )1. Harney, 331 u.s. 367, 
378 (1947). ~ 
We also are satisfied that dj/~semination of such information 
I 
would not lead to breaches of the peace. The prospect that an 
I 
/ 
adverse party might try to disseminate discovered information 
I 
might cause some citiiens to resolve their disputes through less 
peaceful methods t~an civil litigation. That possibility is too 
I 
remote, however, to suggest that dissemination poses a realistic 
threat to society. We therefore hold that information gained 
through civil discovery is protected speech. 
I 
I B 
' Having determined that the dissemination of discovered infor-
I 
mation is "protected speech," we must consider whether the issu-
ance of a protective order under Wash. Super. Ct. c. R. 26(c) is 
page 25. 
----constitutional ~-a:-±"fi't on that speech. ---- This inquiry requires 
us to decide whether the "practice in question [furthers] an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the 
suppression of expression" and whether "the limitation of First 
Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential 
to the protection of the particular governmental interest in-
volved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 u.s. 396, 413 (1974}: see 
Brown v. Glines, 444 u.s. 348, 354-355 (1980}: Buckley v. Valeo, 




right of access to information needed 
~I 
Conrt loc.g,__.bas held tb•~ there is nol\ First Amendment right to 
~ 
sa~ information. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965}. 
"There is an undoubted right to gather news 'from any source by 




that the First Amendment compels others--private persons or 




u.s. 1, 11 (1978). ~opinion of Burger, 
sserts a First Amendment right to disseminate 
~~f.,to ~
matio~must realize that his access to that in rmation is a rna 
ter of legislative grace and judicia 
In addition, we n e that the First Amendment 
I / 
affected by fi protective order are thdse of a trial participant. 
/ 
' / 
Tri / p(rticipants occupy a special status in relation to the 
.First Although litigants do not "surrender their 
First Amendment rights at the courthouse door," In re Halkin, 598 
F.2d, at 186, those rights ~~~subordinatedlto other inter-
/\ 
ests that arise in this setting. For instance, on several occa-
sions this Court has approved restriction on the communications 
of trial participants where necessary to further the administra-
tion of justice. See Nebraska Press, 427 u.s., at 563; id., at 
601 and n. 27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring): Oklahoma Press Publish-
page 27. 
ing Co. v. District Court, 430 u.s. 308, 310-311 (1977): Sheppard 
v. Maxwell, 384 u.s. 333, 361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, 
a court often finds it necessary to restrict the free expression 
of participants, including counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf 
Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 u.s. 89, 104 n. 21 (1981). 
Fu~~~c~Q, ~ order prohibiting dissemination of discovered 
information before trail is not the kind of classic prior re-
straint that requires ~~st Amendment scrutiny. 
'\ 
See Gan-
nett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 u.s., at 399 (Powell, J. concurring). 
As in this case, such a protective order prevents a party from 
disseminating only that information obtained through use of the 
discovery process. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical 
information covered by the protective order as long as the infor-
mation is gained through means other than the court's processes. 
Finally, it is significant that the information at issue here 
.. ~ ,_~ . d.~~~~. ,., r'1! 'th l.S 11A•QFH\e:et~ ga1ne JaR p!'.Q-·~ ... ...... sc;:.rurer.z. UR±l: ~-e- ='-"'"'- a s em-
""' 
~Jmw, ;Pretrial ~~ :' .. ~~"'J~~ :i::l~e 
~~vf4(...~ .. ~0 
in~ Such proceedings were not open to the public at 
Footnote(s) 20 will appear on following pages. 
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common law, Gannett Co., supra, at 389 (1979), and, in general, 
they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice. 
See id., at 390; Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order 
Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983). Much of- the information 
~ ~ ~ 1.- -~""'"-' ""tt.~,d>'-
that-~faces during pretrial discoveryA~only tangentially re-
·•Pi p lei? 
lated ; to the underlying cause of action. 
presented at trial is presumptively public information, the ----? 
me cannot be said for information that ultimately may only 
ible evidenc • In sum, judicial limitations on a 
of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted 
~ 
party to a~ lesser extent than would the same restraint in a dif-
20 In a concurring opinion in Gannett, CHIEF JUSTICE 
BURGER stated: 
"During the last 40 years in which the pretrial 
processes have been enormously expanded, it has 
never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, 
that a pretrial deposition or pretrial 
interrogatories were · other than wholly private 
to the litigants. A pretrial deposition does 
not become part of a 'trial' until and unless 
the contents of the deposition are offered in 




Therefore, our ~y-s-is of the provision for 
protective orders contained in the Washington Civil Rules takes 
into account the unique position that such orders occupy in rela-
tion to the First Amendment. 
I 
~i ned to further ~ important governmental interests. 




tice. One of the essential functions of a government is to pro-
ae-e~·1h~~ 
vide for the peaceful resolution of disputes ~fiia ~~ j~riedic-
· i\ 
rl~, ~ 
f;Lo.o.. Civil rules, including discovery rules, .,a.pe designed to 
~ ~~~~~ 
further ~ interest by attempting to,.(~e "the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of eery action." Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc. 1; Wash. Super. Ct. c. R. 1. By providing for liberal and 
extensive discovery, the rules enable each party to assemble all 
the information that is necessary to try his case and narrow the 
issues that are in dispute. 21 If trial is necessary, pretrial 
Footnote(s) 21 will appear on following pages. 
~t 
~r? ~ /,t) 
/ 1 pvt 
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~ .' 
discovery will have smoothed the way. In short, liberal discov-
ery rules are intended to make civil litigation "less a game of ~ 1.) • 1.. 
blindman' s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues I~ 
and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." United 
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 u.s. 677, 682 (1958) • 22 Re-
21 In Hickman 
stated: 
v. Taylor, supra, the Court 
"The various instruments of discovery now serve 
(1) as a device, along with the pre-trial 
hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and clarify the 
basic issues between the parties, and ( 2) as a 
device for ascertaining the facts, or 
information as to the existence or whereabouts 
of facts, relative to those issues. Thus civil 
trials in the federal courts no longer need be 
carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, 
consistent with recognized privileges, for the 
parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge 





the advent of modern discovery 
to information in advance trial 
As a general rule: 
procedures, 
was severly 
"(1) Discovery could be had only of facts which 
pertained to the case of the party seeking 
discovery. Any attempt to pry into the 
adversary's case was regarded as an improper 
fishing expedition. (2) Some courts insisted 
that the facts sought by discovery had to be 
otherwise unavailable to the party seeking them • 
... (3) Discovery could reach only facts or 
documents which would be admissible in evidence 
at the trial. (4) Discovery could be had only 
against the adverse party." F. James and G. 
Hazard, Civil Procedure §6.1 (1977). 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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stricting the availability of protective orders might cause those 
prossessing information to be less willing comply voluntarily 
with requests for production and might make trial courts less 
willing to compel production. To the extent that complete access 
to relevant facts "is essential to proper litigation," Hickman, 
supra, at 507, either result is inimical to the efficient admin-
istration of justice. 
A government also has an inherent interest in seeing that the 
tools of civil justice are not put to an unjust use. Although 
extensive pretrial discovery may further the expeditious settle-
ment of disputes, the potential for abuse is great. See Herbert 
v. Lando, 441 u.s. 153, 179 (1979}; id., at 179 (Powell, J. con-
curring}; Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amend-
ments to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. The discovery rules do not 
distinguish between public and private information. Nor do they 
These limitations had the practical effect of leading to 
prolonged trials that were filled with surprises for all 
concerned. 
page 32. 
place limits on the amount of discovery that a party may attempt. 
Moreover, the rules do not apply only to the parties to the liti-
gation; relevant information in the hands of third parties is 
equally subject to discovery. Clearly, the unscrupulous or 
uncareful use of the power to force discovery may subject the 
producing party to at least inconvenience and at most a gross 
invasion of privacy. Just as a sovereign has an interest in corn-
pelling discovery to ensure the fair adjudication of civil dis-
putes, it has a substantial interest in seeing that its processes 
are not abused. 23 See Herbert v. Lando, supra, at 176-177; 
23 This consideration alone prompted Judge Friendly to 
state in International Products Co. v. Koons: 
"[W]e entertain no doubt as to the 
constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal 
court to forbid the publicizing, in advance of 
trial, of information obtained by one party from 
another by use of the court's processes. 
Whether or not the Rule itself authorizes so 
much of the order as also seals all affidavits 
subrni tted by defendants on various motions, we 
have no question as to the court's jurisdiction 
to do this under the inherent 'equitable powers 
of courts of law over their own process, to 
prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices," 
••• or as to the propriety of the exercise of 
discretion here." Id., at 407-408 (citations 
omitted). ---
page 33. 
Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 u.s. 145-146 (1888). A government provides 
for liberal discovery for the sole purpose of assisting in the 
settlement of disputes; any other use of discovered information 
may constitute abuse. 
The second governmental interest that is furthered by pretri-
al protective orders is the protection of the rights of those who 
must produce information. 24 As stated above, the civil rules in 
24Although not commonplace in civil litigation, the facts 
of this case illustrate the potential conflict of 
interests that may arise. The Aquarian Foundation is a 
small, unorthodox and apparently unpopular religion. The 
trial court's decision to grant the protective order was 
based on affidavits of Foundation members. The affidavits 
stated that each time the Foundation received publicity, 
members received physical threats and suffered 
harrassment. Under the order compelling discovery, 
respondents are required to produce a list of all 
donations for the five year period preceding the 
institution of this suit, along with the names and 
addresses of all donors. Because all members are required 
to make donations, and very few donors are not members, 
the list of donors effectively comprises the members of 
the Foundation. As a result, respondents understandably 
are concerned as to the likely detrimental effect that 
dissemination might have on this unpopular religious sect 
and its members. Petitioners do not deny their intent to 
publish discovered information that is not subject to a 
protective order. Therefore, petitioners, in the exercise 
of their First Amendment right to freedom of the press, 
may penalize respondents for the exercise of their First 
Amendment right to freedom of religion. Release of the 
names of donors also potentially would infringe the 
donors' freedom of association. See Brown v. Socialist 
Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 103 S.Ct. 416, 420 (1982). 
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most jurisdictions allow extensive and intrusive discovery of 
information held by litigants and third parties. If the statu-
tory prerequisites are met, the subject of a discovery request 
must produce information or risk being found in contempt. The 
threat that discovered information will be disclosed may impli-
cate several fundamental rights of the producing party. First 
and foremost, discovery and dissemination is an invasion of the 
producing party's right to privacy. 25 Second, a party who wishes 
to file a suit but anticipates an adversary's discovery and dis-
semination of sensitive information may be deterred from exercis-
ing his right of access to the courts. 26 Finally, although less 
of a problem in civil litigation than in criminal trials, wide 
dissemination of pretrial materials could jeopardize the li ti-
gant's right to a fair trial. Publicity could make it difficult 
to impanel an impartial jury or might induce a litigant to accept 
25see Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s. 589, 599 (1977): Cox 
Broadcasting v. Cohn;-420 u.s. 469, 488 (1974). 
26 see California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972): NAACP v. Button, 371 
u.s. 415, 428-429 (1963). 
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an unfavorable and unjust settlement. In short, several legiti-
mate and substantial governmental interests are served by giving 
trial courts a mechanism by which they may limit the dissemina-
tion of discovered information. 
3 
We also find that the provision for protective orders in the 
Washington civil rules is "no greater than necessary" to protect 
these interests. In order to properlyj~anage the wide range of 
situations that may arise and the ever-varying interests of those 
involved, a trial court must have broad discretion to control the 
uses to which the fruits of discovery will be put. Rule 26 (c) 
provides for the issuance of a protective order "for good cause 
shown." The rule implies that the good cause standard is satis-
fied if an order is necessary "to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense." 27 By requiring a showing of good cause, the state has 
27 In its decision in this case, Supreme Court of 
Washington stated that "'good cause' is established if the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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established a low threshold of necessity for the issuance of a 
protective order. The rule thereby gives the trial court much 
latitude to prevent abuse and encourage broad and liberal discov-
ery. 28 More importantly, Rule 26(c) is construed as only autho-
rizing restraints on information obtained through the court's 
processes. 29 These features of the rule indicate that it is in-
tended to further significant governmental interests and there-
fore is compatible with the First Amendment. 30 
moving party shows that any of the harms spoken of in the 
rule is threatened and can be avoided without impeding the 
discovery process." 
28The "good cause" requirement is not, however, some sort 
of magical formula that creates a shield from 
constitutional attack. In this context, the important 
inquiry is whether the party seeking the protective order 
has shown to the satisfaction of the court that 
dissemination will have an adverse effect on a legitimate 
interest. Once this standard is satisfied, the First 
Amendment does not limit the trial court's discretion to 
issue a protective order designed to protect the 
governmental interests that discovery implicates. 
29see Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 
1001, 1007 (CA3 1976) • The Supreme Court of Washington 
assumed without discussion that a litigant who obtains 
information covered by a protective order by means 
independent of the court's processes would be entitled to 
disseminate that information. 654 P.2d, at 689. 
30Petrs contend that the First Amendment mandates a more 
stringent inquiry. In their view, a trial court should 
predicate a protective order on a specific finding that 
the absence of such an order would "immediately imperil a 




In light of the substantial governmental interests served by pre-
trial protective orders and the limited impact that such orders 
have on First Amendment interests, we hold that the provision for 
protective orders contained in Washington Super. Ct. c. R. 26(c) 
does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Unit-
ed States Constitution. The judgment accordingly is 
Affirmed. 
compelling state interest." This standard, at best, would 
be difficult for a party seeking a protective order to 
satisfy. A potential lit1gant would have little assurance 
that he could exercise his right to bring suit without 
risking discovery and disclosure. In a similar vien, 
petitioners' standard virtually ignores the privacy rights 
of those who must produce information. 
Also, the burden on judicial resources that 
petitioners suggested standard would require would be 
immense. Each time a party moved for a protective order, 
the trial court would have to conduct a painstaking 
examination of each i tern for which the order is sought. 
See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 
F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Furthermore, many trial 
courts might find it preferable to deny discovery requests 
rather than risking reversal of a decision to grant a 
protective order. In short, petitioners' rule likely 
would not protect many of the same legitimate state 
interests that generate the need for protective orders in 
the first place. We hold that the First Amendment does 
not require this result. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, we consider the extent of the First Amendment ) / 
~ right of a party to civil litigation to disseminate, in advance ~  




Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious 
group, the Aquar ian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer than 
1,000 members, most of whom are located in the State of Washing-
ton. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the ability 
to communicate with the dead through a medium. Rhinehart is the 
primary Aquarian medium • 
. ~-r 
Over t~ years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union-
Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and the Founda-
tion. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the newspapers during 
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the years 1973, 1978, 1979. The five articles that appeared in 
1973 focused on Rhinehart and the manner in which he operated the 
Foundation. They described seances conducted by Rhinehart in 
which people paid him to put them in touch with deceased rela-
tives and friends. The articles also stated that Rhinehart had 
sold magical "stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. 
One article referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, 
for sodomy. The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated 
on an "extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla 
State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated 
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave away 
between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One article de-
scribed a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their gowns and biki-
nis and sang ... " App. 25a. The two articles that appeared in 
1979 referred to a purported connection between Rhinehart and Lou 




Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior 
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Seattle 
Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of the arti-
cles and the spouses of the authors. Five female members of the 
Foundation who had participated in the presentation at the peni-
~ntiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 1 The complaint alleges 
that the articles contained statements that were "fictional and 
untrue," and that the defendants--petitioners here--knew, or 
should have known, According to the com-
plaint, the articles "did and were calculated to hold [Rhinehart] 
up to public scorn, hatred and ridicule, and to impeach his hon-
esty, integrity, virtue, religious philosophy, reputation as a 
person and in his profession as a spiritual leader." App. Sa. 
With respect to the Foundation, the complaint also states: "[T]he 
articles have, or may have had, the effect of discouraging con-
1The record is unclear as to whether all five of the 
female plaintiffs participated in the "chorus line" 
described in the 1978 articles. The record also does not 
disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs were 
mentioned by name in the articles. 
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tributions by the membership and public and thereby diminished 
the financial ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate 
purposes." App. 9a. The complaint alleges that the articles rnis-
represented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely irn-
plied that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all 
their clothes and wantonly danced naked .••• " App. 6a. The corn-
plaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the alleged defamation 
d . . f . 2 an Invasions o privacy. 
Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allegations 
of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. 3 ' Petition-
2Although the complaint does not allege specifically 
that the articles caused a decline in membership of the 
Foundation, respondents' answers to defendants 
interrogatories raised this issue. In response to 
petitioners request that respondents' explain the damages 
they are seeking, respondents' claimed that the Foundation 
had experienced a drop in membership in Hawaii and 
Washington "from about 300 people to about 150 people, and 
[a] concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503. 
3Affirrnative defenses included contentions that the 
articles were substantially true and accurate, that they 
were privileged under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
and that the statute of limitations had run as to the 1973 
articles, that the individual respondents had consented to 
any invasions of privacy, and that respondents had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy when performing before 
1,100 prisoners. 
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ers promptly initiated extensive discovery. They deposed 
Rhinehart, requested production of documents pertaining to the 
financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Foundation, and served 
extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and the other respondents. 
Respondents turned over a number of financial documents, includ-
ing several of Rhinehart's income tax returns. Respondents re-
fused, however, to disclose certain financial information, 4 the 
identity of the Foundation's donors during the preceding 10 
years, and a list of its members during that period. 
~~~!'~~ 
Petitioners filed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37 
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their supporting 
memorandum, petitioners recognized that the principal issue as to 
4Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of 
his residence. He submitted an affidavit stating that he 
had relocated out of fear for his safety and that 
disclosure of his current address would subject him to 
risks of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an 
order compelling Rhinehart to give his address and the 
trial cour~ granted the motion. 
Swash. Super. Ct. c. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A 
party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all 
persons affected thereby, may apply to the court in the 
county where the deposition was taken, or in the county 
where the action is pending, for an order compelling 
discovery •.. " 
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discovery was respondents "refusal[] to permit any effective in-
quiry into their financial affairs, such as the source of their 
donations, their financial transactions, uses of wealth and as-
sets and their financial condition in general." Record 350. Re-
spondents opposed the motion arguing i-ft< !=JB:tie-ulaor that compelled 
production of the identities of the Foundation's donors and mem-
bers would violate ~ members~nd 
rights to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of associa-
tion. Respondents also moved for a protective order preventing 
petitioners from disseminating any information gained through 
discovery. Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their 
intention to continue publishing articles about respondents and 
this litigation, and their intent to use information gained 
through discovery in future articles. 
In a lengthy ~r ruling, the trial court initially granted 
the motion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all do-
nors who made contributions during the five years preceding the 
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The court 
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also required petitioners to divulge enough membership informa-
tion to substantiate any claims of diminished membership. Rely-
ing on In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (CADC 1979), 6 the court refused 
to issue a protective order. It stated that the facts alleged by 
respondents in support of their motion for such an order were too 
conclusory to warrant a finding of "good cause" as required by 
7 Wash. Super. Ct. c. R. 26(c). The court stated, however, that 
6The Halkin decision was debated by the courts below. 
Prior to Halkin, the only federal court of appeals to 
consider the question directly had understood that the 
First Amendment did not affect a trial court's authority 
to restrict dissemination of information produced during 
pretrial discovery. See International Paper Products v. 
Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (CA2 1963) . Halkin 
considered the issue at length. Characterizing a 
protective order as a "paradigmatic prior restraint," 
Halkin held that such orders require close scrutiny. The 
court also held that before a court should issue a 
protective order that restricts expression, it must be 
satisfied that "the harm posed by dissemination must be 
substantial and serious; the restraining order must be 
narrowly drawn and precise; and there must be no 
alternative means of protecting the public interest which 
intrudes less directly on expression." Id., at 191. 
?wash. Super. Ct. c. R. 26(c) provides: 
"Protective Orders. Upon moton by a party or by 
the person from whom discovery is sought, and 
for good cause shown, the court in which the 
action is pending or alternatively, on matters 
relating to a deposition, the court in the 
county where the deposition is to be taken may 
make any order which justice requires to protect 
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
page 8. 
the denial of petitioners' motion was "without prejudice to [re-
spondents'] right to move for a protective order in respect to 
specifically described discovery materials and a factual showing 
of good cause for restraining defendants in their use of those 
materials." Record 16. 
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which they 
renewed their motion for a protective order. They submitted af-
fidavits of several Foundation members to support their request. 
including one or more of the following: (1) that 
the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery 
may be had only on specified terms and 
conditions, including a designation of the time 
or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only 
by a method of discovery other than that 
selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) 
that certain matters not be inquired into, or 
that the scope of the discovery be limited to 
certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted 
with no one present except persons designated by 
the court; ( 6) that a deposition after being 
sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) 
that a trade secret or other confidential 
research, development, or commercial information 
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a 
designated way; (8) that the parties 
simultaneously file specified documents or 
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be 
opened as directed by the court .... " 
Rule 26 (c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many 
states. 
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The affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists 
~ would adversely affect Foundation membership and in-
come and would subject its members to harassment and reprisals. 
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a pro-
~ ? 
tective order covering any information obtained through the dis-
covery process that pertained to "the financial affairs of the 
various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian Founda-
tion members, contributors, or clients, and the names and ad-
dresses of those who have been contributors, clients, or donors 
to any of the various plaintiffs." The order prohibited peti-
tioners from publishing)~ disseminatin~t~rmation in any 
way except where necessary to prepare for and try the case. By 
its terms, the order did not apply to information gained by means 
other than the discovery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, 
relevant portions of the protective order state: 
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is 
granted with respect to information gained by 
the defendants through the use of all of the 
discovery processes regarding the financial 
affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names and 
addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, 
contributors, or clients, and the names and 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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the trial court recognized that the protective order would re-
strict petitioners' right to publish information obtained by dis-
covery, but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary 
to avoid the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on 
"a party's willingness to bring his case to court." 
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production order 
and petitioners appealed from the protective order. The Supreme 
Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P.2d 673 (1982). With 
respect to the protective order, the court reasoned: 
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, osten-
sibly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior re-
stralnt of free expression', we are convinced that the 
interest of the judiciary in the integrity of its dis-
covery processes is suff1cient to meet the 'heavy bur-
addresses of those who have been contributors, 
clients, or donors to any of the various 
plaintiffs. 
3. The defendants and each of them shall make no 
use of and shall not disseminate the information 
defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through 
discovery, other than such use as is necessary 
in order for_ the discovering party to prepare 
and try the case. As a result, information 
gained by a defendant through the discovery 
process may not be published by any of the 
defendants or made available to any news media 
for publication or dissemination. This 
protective order has no application except to 
information gained by the defendants through the 
use of the discovery processes. 
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den' of justification. The need to preserve that in-
tegrity is adequate to sustain a rule like Rule 26 (c) 
which authorizes a trial court to protect the confiden-
tiality of information g~ven for purposes of litiga-
tion." 654 P.2d, at 690. 
~e court noted that "the information to be discovered concerned 
the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his organi-
zation, in which he and his associates had a recognizable privacy 
interest: and the giving of publicity to these matters would al-
legedly and understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and 
even oppression." Joint App. 130a-13la. Therefore, the court 
concluded, the trial court had not abused its discretion in issu-
ing the protective order. lO 
9Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo 
that a protective order could be viewed as an infringement 
on First Amendment rights, the court also stated: 
"A persuasive argument can be made that when 
persons are required to give ;information which 
they would otherwise be entitled to keep to 
themselves, in order to secure a government 
benefit or perform an obligation to that 
government, those receiving that information 
waive the right to use it for any purpose except 
those which are authorized by the agency of 
government which exacted the information." 654 
P. 2d , at 6 81 • 
10The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because 
the protective order shields respondents from "abuse of 
the discovery privilege," respondents could not object to 
the order compelling production. We do not consider here 
that aspect or the Washington Supreme Court's decision. 
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The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its holding 
conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia in In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 
(1979) , 11 and applies a different standard from that of the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San Juan Star Co., 662 
F.2d 108 (1981). 12 We granted certiorari to resolve the con-
flict. 13 We affirm. 
III 
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discovery 
provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of 
11see note 11 supra. 
12 In San Juan Star, the Co rt of Appeals for the First 
Circuit considered and ejected Halkin's stringent 
ayproach to the con tituti nality of protective orders. 
A though the San Jua court held that protective orders 
~rfiqldi:re. iaQm.Q-First Am ndment s.r~1siny, the court reasoned 
~ 
that Riuat :AHUiHlGH\.Qnt interests are somewhat lessened in 
the civil discovery context. The court stated: "In 
· general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such 
limitations in a standard of 'good cause' that 
incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' to the First 
Amendment concerns at stake, .•. " 662 F.2d, at 116. 
13The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is 
consistent with the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in International Products Corp. v. 
Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-408 (1963). 
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Civil Procedure. F. James and G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 179 
(1977) • 14 Rule 26 (b) (1), by its terms, provides that a party 
"may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, ... " It further provides that discovery is not limited to 
matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the informa-
tion sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26 (b) ( 1) ; 
Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co. , 89 Wash. 2d 758, 5 75 P. 2d 
716, 719 (1978); cf. c. Wright and A. Miller, 8 Federal Practice 
and Procedure §2008 (1970) . 15 
14see Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 
518 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1978). The Washington Supreme Court 
has stated that when the language of a Washington rule and 
its federal counterpart are the same, courts should look 
to decisions interpreting the federal rule when trying to 
construe the Washington rule. American Discount Corp. v. 
o a West Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 499 P. 2d 869, 871 . . . 
this ga~~ beea1:1oc he washington rule that provides for 
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective 
orders is virtuall~ identical to its counterpart in the 
Federal Rules of C1vil Procedure. Compare Wash. Super. 
Ct. c. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b) 
and (c) . 
15cR 26 (b) (1), identical to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26 (b) (1) in effect at the time, provides in 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The rules do not differentiate between information that is 
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests at-
tach. Under the rules, the only express limitations are that the 
information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to the sub-
ject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules often allow 
extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third 
parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a request for dis-
full: 
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim 
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to 
the claim or defense of any other party, 
including the existence, description, nature, 
custody, condition and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the 
identity and location of persons having 
knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not 
ground for objection that the information sought 
will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence." 
16under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third 
party by oral or written examination. The litigant can 
compel the third party to submit to the deposition and to 
produce tanqible evidence at the deposition by serving the 
third party with a subpoena persuant to Rule 45. Rule 45 
authorizes a trial court to quash or modify a request for 
tangible evidence in a subpoena "if it is unreasonable or 
oppressive." Rule 45 also provides: "Failure by any 
person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served 
upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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covery, the Court may issue an order directing compliance that is 
enforceable by the Court's contempt powers. Wash. Super. Ct. R. 
37(b). 17 
Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict 
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the 
effect of restricting expression. They contend that civil dis-
covery is not different from other sources of information, and 
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First Amend-
ment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this case to dis-
seminate any information gained through discovery. They do rec-
~f~l-h .t..e.. 
ognize that in limited circumstances, not present here, some in-
-\ 
formation may be restrained. They submit, however, that: 
"When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it 
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture 
are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover, 
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before 
issuing such an order a court must determine that there 
are no alternatives which intrude less directly on ex-
the subpoena issued." Wash. Super. Ct. c. R. 45(f). 
17rn addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b) (2) 
authorizes a trial court to enforce an order compelling 
discovery by other means including, for example, regarding 
designated facts as taken to be established for purposes 
of tlie action. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37 (b) (2) (A). 
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pression." Petitioners' Brief, at 10. 
We decline to adopt the stringent rule urged by petitioners. 
IV 
The protections afforded by the First Amendment are encom-
passed within the term "liberty" as contained in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore 
to the action of the states. See First National Bank v. 
Bellotti, 435 u.s. 765, 779 (1978); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stu-
art, 427 u.s. 539, 556 (1975): Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, --
343 u.s. 495, 500-501 (1952). The broad sweep of the First / 
Amendment seems to prohibit all restraints on free expression, 
but this Court has declined to give that language an entirely 
literal interpretation. In Miller v. California, 43 u.s. 15, 23 
(1973), we observed that "[f]reedom of speech ... does not com-
prehend the right to speak on any subject at any time." See also 
American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 u.s. 382, 394-395 
(1950). There are "certain well defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech" whose benefit to society is "clearly out-
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weighed by the social interest in order." Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 u.s. 568, 572-573 (1942). 18 
We think it clear, however, that information obtained 
through civil discovery authorized by modern Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure may be information protected by the First Amendment. In-
deed, we do not doubt that only rarely would such information 
fall within the classes of unprotected speech identified by deci-
sions of this Court. In this case, as petitioners argue, there 
certainly is a public interest in knowing more about respondents 
Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation. This interest may well 
include most--and possibly all--of what has been discovered as a 
result of the Court's order under Rule 26 (b) (1). 
The critical question therefore becomes: whether the Court's 
.~-Y 
J _.,... 
18 Included among the classes of unprotected s eech are 
utterances that are likely to cause breaches of ~ e peace 
and speech that is obscene. See Chapl ins ky, at 
573; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 44 7 ( 1969) And 
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 u.s. 323, 340 (1974) 
we recognized the absence~of any social interest in 
falsehoods. M~ ~he Court also has held that 7f 
certain kinds of commercial ~ speech are entitled only to 
limited First Amendment protection. See Central Hudson 
C..a.s & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 
u.s. 557, 562-563 (1980). 
page 18. 
protective order issued under Rule 26(c) is an invalid restraint 
on that protected speech. This requires us to decide whether the 
"practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial gov-
ernmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" 
and whether "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no 
~ grea~er than is necessary or essential to the protection of the 
particular governmental interest involved." Procunier v. Marti-
nez, 416 u.s. 396, 413 (1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444 u.s. 348, 
354-355 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 25 (1976). 
A ~~~~ 
o recognize the extent of -~~~, At the outset, it is important 
~ 
impairment of First Amendment rights t a protective order  
such as the one at issue here~usej · As 
i,,,, Jfi 
civil litiga-~
tion, petitioners . d~ f . ~b . ga1ne A 1n ormat1on'\ y v1 ue of the trial 
court's discovery processes. 19 
19Although litigants do not "surrender their First 
Amendment rights at the courthouse door," In re Halkin, 
598 F.2d, at 186, those rights may be subordinated to 
other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, 
on several occasions this Court has approved restriction 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment right of 
access to information ~t 2~or purposes of trying his suit. 
~ Zemel v. Rusk, 381 u.s. 1, 16-17 (1965) ~ Houchins v. KQED, 
Inc., 438 u.s. 1, 11 (1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Thus, 
continued court control over the discovered information does not 
raise the same spectre of government censorship that such con-
trols might suggest in other situations. See In re Halkin, 598 
F.2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, J. dissenting). 
~
F~, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not 
bl . t f . . 1 t . 1 20 pu 1c componen s o a c1v1 r1a • Such proceedings were not 
on the communications of trial participants where 
necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant. 
See Nebraska Press, 427 u.s., at 563~ id., at 601 and n. 
27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring)~ Oklahoma--"Press Publishing 
/l_);,., ..a:u_ v. District Court 430 u.s. 308, 310-311 (1977) ~ 
J<.A""' ,.I, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 3S4 U.S. 333, 361 ( 1966) • "In the 
r~ conduct of a case, a court often finds it necessary to 
~'.~j restrict the free expression of participants, including 
~~- counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 
452 u.s. 89, 104 n. 21 (1981}. 
~ 20In a concurring opinion in Gannett, CHIEF JUSTICE 
~~ M;;;:;v 
BURGER stated: 
~ .. ~77 
,_~K · 
~ &Jl ,,vJ 
ur~ ~~ 1 
~V/~~lq 
"During the last 40 years in which the pretrial 
processes have been enormously expanded, it has 
never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, 
that a pretrial deposition or pretrial 
interrogatories were other than wholly private 
to the litigants. A . pretrial deposition does 
not become part of a 1 trial 1 unti 1 and unless 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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open to the public at common law, Gannett Co., supra, at 389 
(1979}, and, in general, they are conducted in private as a mat-
ter of modern practice. See id., at 390: Marcus, Myth and Reali-
ty in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983}. 
Much of the information that surfaces during pretrial discovery 
may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying 
cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, but 
not yet admitted, information is not a restriction on a tradi-
tionally accessible source of information. 
Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting 
dissemination of discovered information before trail is not the 
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First 
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 u.s., at 
399 (Powell, J. concurring}. As in this case, such a protective 
order prevents a party from disseminating only that information 
the contents of the deposition are offered in 
evidence." 443 u.s., at 368. 
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obtained through use of the discovery process. Thus, the party 
may disseminate the identical information covered by the protec-
tive order as long as the information is gained through means 
other than the court 1 s processes. In sum, judicial limitations 
on a party 1 s ability to disseminate information discovered in 
advance of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the 
restricted party to a far lesser extent than would the same re-
straint in a different context. Therefore, our consideration of 
the provision for protective orders contained in the Washington 
Civil Rules takes into account the unique position that such or-
ders occupy in relation to the First Amendment. 
B 
Rule 26(c} furthers a substantial governmental interest. The 
/1 
Washington Civil Rules enable parties to litigation to obtain 
information "relevant to the subject matter involved" that they 
believe will be helpful in the preparation and trial of the case. 
incl~adif'lEj t:Se"""'R-a~&Wil'\9 -ef- e~H~ issues i:R dis~te. Rule 26, how-
ever, must be viewed in its entirety. Liberal discovery is pro-
page 22. 
Because of th~ liberality of pretrial discovery permitted 
by Rule 26(b) (1), it is necessary for the trial court to have the 
authority to issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c). It 
is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by depositions 
and interrogatories has a significant potential for 21 abuse. 
This abuse is not limited to matters of delay and expense; dis-
~ ~~ ~1--.t.?~ 
covery also may seriously implicate the p~iv~)of litigants and 
third parties. 22 The Rules do not distinguish between public and 
private information. Nor do they apply only to parties to the 
litigation ~~~ nt information in the hands of third parties 
21see Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 
Amendments to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. It may be 
acknowledged that the civil rules of discovery, first 
adopted in 1938 for federal courts, have not uniformly 
furthered the interests of speedy and inexpensive 
resolution of disputes. The disappointment in this 
respect does not, however, imply any lessening of the 
governmental interest and purpose. 
22cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s. 589, 599 (1977); Cox 
Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 u.s. 469, 488 (1974). Rule 
26(c) includes among its express purpose the protection of 
a "party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression or undue burden or expense ••• " Although the 
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other 
rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters 
are implicit in the broad purpos( :::;_e ~ ,___.-
page 23. 
may be subject to discovery. 
There is an opportunity, ther for litigants to obtain--
only is 
m _).- ~ 
:::;.· tion* ar privac~ 
~~eventing this sort of abuse of its processes. See Herbert v. 
rando, supra, at 176-177: Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 u.s. 145-146 
(1888) • As stated by Judge Friendly in International Products 
ea. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-408, "(w]hether or not the Rule 
~/.u.t&a..t 
itself authorizes [a particular order] •.• we have · no question 
"\ 
as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent 
'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to 
prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices .. I II The preven-
tion of the abuse that can attend the coerced production of in-
formation under a state's discovery rule is ~sufficient justifi- ~ 
~~~~ 
cation for a ~rou i~iO'fl £EH protective orders. 
"' c 
page 24. 
We also find that the scope of the provision for protective 
~ LL...4 
. ~..,~ ~· 
orders 1n the Washington rules p~s constitutional m~~te~. To 
""\ -1 
be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court 
to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree 
/ 
of protection is requir j'-Tfie !e<j1slature has determined that 
- ~ 
such discretion is necessar~ l'w!ve~ and we agree. The trial 
" a:; ~ 
is in the best position to weigh ~ly the competing 
"' 
eeds and. interests of those affected by discovery. Moreover, 
~~Amendment scrutiny of each request for a protective 
would n~gessita~e burdensome evidentiary findings 23 and 
might lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals--a result in-
~ ~1£~-f,...;Lu.. 
imical to the~goal of securing "the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determipation of every action." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 1. The 
unique character of the discovery process requires 
court have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders. We 
therefore hold that where, as in this case, a protective order is 
23 see, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co., 529 F.Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
25. 
1:-o 
limited ~ the 
1\ 
pretrial civil discovery and 
does not a~t:em% t-o restrict the dissemination of information 




illustrate the concerns that justifiably may prompt a court to 
~ 4/wf-/&A~-~ 1 
issue a protective order. I~i....<:! ~ "'"'"" . the trial cou t' d ·~ r s or er 
~he Aquarian Foundation is a 
apparently unpopular religion. The tria court's 
to grant the protective order was based on 
Foundation members. The affidavits stat d 
the Foundation received publicity, m ers received 
physical threats and suffered harra m nt. Under the 
order compelling discovery, respond ts ~ required to 
produce a list of all donations r the five year period ,.._ __ 
preceding the institution of 1 s suit, a J.ORS w1 k ... 
names and addresses of all onors. Because all member t::j,L~ 
are required to make dona · ons, and ~ few donors ar e-"---
not members, the list o donors effectively comprises the ~ 
members of the Foun ion. As a result, respondents 
understandably are ncerned as to the likely detrimental 
effect that disse nation might have on this unpopular 
religious sect d its members. Petitioners do not deny 
their intent t publish discovered information that is not 
subject to protective order. Therefore, petitioners, in 
the exerci e of their First Amendment right to freedom of 
the. pre s, may penalize respondents for the exercise of 
p-'~lA/ the1r irst Amendment right to freedom of religion. 
t;t¥'~ .. [) , ~el . se of the names of . donors al~o potentially would 
: ~~ , ~ 1 1nge the donors' freedom of assoc1ation. See Brown v. 
!#.,.. 'J,~ Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 103 S.Ct. 416, 
~ J'' ~ 420 (1982) • /t -- ,/ 
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allowing discovery was extremely 
s;. •• ~uw<:,zc•l-; w--·p£;2!~ 
broad. It compelled respondents 
? 
- among other things - to identify all persons who had made dona-
tions over a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foun-
dation, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order 
~ .#.:u ;a , ( '•s•t,., 
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of fi-
..:;: 
rder ~t~p~s==ion of thi:Cc. 
" ~
~otlld violate their First Amendment rights to privacy, 
elig~ and ef court was 
it--that such an order 
~ 




discovery does notl\ gbse-I=-t:~et: ~ 
9 ~~~ ~'-'\ ~See note 8 supra (quoting the terms f the protective 
order). The Supreme Court of Washington the importance of 
ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to 
the courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather 
than e~pose themselves to unwanted publicity, individuals 
)- may( well forego the pursuit of their just claims. The 
judicial system will thus have made the utilization of its 
remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or 
unwilling to use it, resulting in frustration of a right 
as valuable as that of speech itself." 654 P.2d, at 689. 
Cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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ermined that the trial court's decision met t 
requirement's of state law for the issuance of 
order. Having found that the State's provi protective 
orders satisfies the Uflit~eatas Con itution, we are bound by 
the state courts' construction o state law. 
VI~ 
We hold the provisioR ~o.r protective orderl 
does not violate t e 
First Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment accordingly 
Affirmed ------------
404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
428-429 (1963). 
j ( 
. ,. , 
rmc 03/14/84 
The Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart 
No. 82-1721 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litiga-
tion have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in advance of 
trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process. 
I 
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious 
group, the Aquar ian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer than 
1,000 members, most of whom are located in the State of Washing-
ton. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the ability 
to communicate with the dead through a medium. Rhinehart is the 
primary Aquarian medium. 
Over the years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union-
Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and the Founda-
tion. 1 
13~ 
Feef4flg th1 t these articles cast him and his followers in 






Rhinehart brought this action on behalf of himself 
~ lj 
md-the Found~tiun. Four other members of the Foundation joined 
the suit as plaintiffs. The complaint seeks $14,100,000 in darn-
~ 
~es for defamation and invasion of privacy. The complaint al-
leges that the newspapers and the authors of the articles, all 
~titioners here, defamed Rhinehart by referring to him as a "Jim 
Jones Guyana-like leader of 'a bizarre Seattle cult.'" The corn-
plaint also objects to several passages in the articles that 
challenged the legitimacy of Rhinehart's activities a~ im-
plied that Rhinehart c~ ly had defrauded his followers and 
supporters. The complaint alleges that t j he articles injured 
Rhinehart's reputation and impeded the Foundation's fund-raising 
efforts. 2 With respect to the four individual members of the 
oundation who joined the suit, the complaint alleges that the 
1At issue in this case are 11 articles published in 
1973, 1978, and 1979. The record does not contain a copy 
of the articles, but Rhinehart appended excerpts from the 
articles to his original complaint. See App. 20a-29a. 
2The complaint implies that disparaging remarks in the 
articles had made the retention of old members and the 
recruitment of new ones more difficult. 
:; 7Cd-- ~-1-~-~ page 3. 




1na~~u~~teiy in the 
nude during a Foundation presentation at a prison. According to 
'? 
the complaint, the publication of these misrepresentations and 
inaccuracies, and petitioners' conduct in gathering information 
L-d4c!. / z , (. 
for the articles, constituted a~ actionable invasion of privacy. 
7 
Petitioners filed an 
") 1\ 
-~.).~.~--1-AA·:~ 




Petitioners deposed Rhinehart and requested 
the production of certain documents. Respondents turned over 
some financial information, including Rhinehart's income tax re-
turns for several years, 3 but r~~"de"ts refused to produce re-
quested documents containing the names and addresses of donors to 
and members of the Foundation. They also refused to divulge 
Rhinehart's current address. 
3Respondents contend that petitioners assured them in 
the early stages of discovery that any information that 
respondents produced would not be published. Respondents 
argue that petitioners thereby waived their right to 
object to any protective order subsequently issued by the 
trial court. The Washington Supreme Court apparently did 
not cons ide r t h i s argument • Ow:~~::I:-Q.J..+l~_Q,fiiiiiiiiQ~t;L-l~e.cc.u;I.CI..f~--~~ 
.. 
page 4 . 
Petitioners viewed respondents' initial response to their 
requests for information as inadequate. They filed a motion re-
questing an order compelling discovery persuant to washington 
z &(.? Jl' ( 
Rule 26(c~. 4 Respondents opposed the motion Superior Court Civil 
on the ground that compelled production of the identities of its 
4cR 26(c) provides: 
"Protective Orders. Upon moton by a party or by 
the person from whom discovery is sought, and 
for good cause shown, the court in which the 
action is pending or alternatively, on matters 
relating to a deposition, the court in the 
county where the deposition is to be taken may 
make any order which justice requires to protect 
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense, 
including one or more of the following: (1) that 
the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery 
may be had only on specified terms and 
conditions, including a designation of the time 
or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only 
by a method of discovery other than that 
selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) 
that certain matters not be inquired into, or 
that the scope of the discovery be limited to 
certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted 
with no one present except persons designated by 
the court; (6) that a deposition after being 
sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) 
that a trade secret or other confidential 
research, development, or commercial information 
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a 
designated way; (8) that the parties 
simultaneously file specified documents or 
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be 
opened as directed by the court. " 
CR 26(c) is identical to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c) and is 
typical of the provisions adopted in many states. 
page 5. 
donors and members would violate the members' and donors' First 
Amendment rights to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of 
association. The trial court rejected this argument and ordered 
respondents to identify all donors who made contributions during 
the five years preceding the date of the complaint, along with 
the amounts donated. Th t 'l 1 . d~e r1a court a so requ1re PQ elelBRers 
to divulge enough membership information to substantiate any 
claims of diminished membership. 
y~~M 




covering any information gained by petitioners through~ 
~~/ .? 
discovery process and prohibiting petitioners 
information to third parties. Initially, the 
from disclosing the ~ 
-'\ 
~1 court refused 
to grant the protective order, stating that such an order would 
have "the effect of imposing prior restraint on the freedom of 
speech and of the press guaranteed by the first amendment." .---
/.ter . the trial court's 
~ 
i rri tia:l ruling, respondents submitted 
affidavits of several members of the Foundation. The affidavits 
averred that public release of the donor lists potentially would 
: JJ. ~--( page 6. 
~/);'(... ~~ .') . J # , ~ ·~tv a~ .. 
YUrv v . Lb~~~~~ 
~ ~~~ :j ~~If , 
cause a drop in Foundation membership and income and would sub-
ject Foundation members to harassment and repr isa~ Based on 
these affidavits, the trial court issued an order, as autAeFtBeo 
;1--! 9:~) 
A¥ Waahington Ci sri 1 Rule 2e'(b) (:l:i'r. protecting . any information 
obtained through the discovery process that pertained to "the 
financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names and ad-
dresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, 
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, 
clients, or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." The order 
h 'b't d t't' f . ·~d' ' . ·t. th . f pro 1 1 e pe 1 1oner s rom us lf't9 .It or 1 ssem1na 1ng e 1n orma-
tion in any way except where necessary to prepare for and try the 
case. By its terms, the order did not apply to information 
gained by means other than the discovery process. 5 In an accom-
5The relevant portions of the protective order state: 
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is 
granted with respect to information gained by 
the defendants through the use of all of -tne-
discovery processes regarding the financial 
affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names and 
addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, 
contributors, or clients, and the names and 
addresses of those who have been contributors, 
clients, or donors to any of the various 
plaintiffs. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
panying opinion, 
U- 9 ~.{-~ ~ page 7. 
~~,,~\)~ 
r-W-'a.e..~~' 1\ ~~~f. 
~~}-~~~· 
the trial court recognized that the protective 
order would restrict petitioners' right to publish information in 
their possession, but the court reasoned that the restriction was 
\\ 
necessary to avoid the '~hilling effect that dissemination would 
have on "a party's willingness to bring his case to court." 
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production order 
and petitioners appealed from the protective order. The~ 
WL--14v ~1- k lY(W~f-w.. 
~ Supreme Court \ affirmed both. 654 P.2d 673 (1982). RegardiAg 
the protective order, the court reasoned: 
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, osten-
sibly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior re-
straint of free expression', we are convinced that the 
interest of the judiciary in the integrity of its dis-
covery processes is sufficient to meet the 'heavy bur-
den' of justification. The need to preserve that in-
tegrity is adequate to sustain a rule like CR 26 (c) 
which authorizes a trial court to protect the confiden-
3. The defendants and each of them shall make no 
use of and shall not disseminate the information 
defined in paragraph 2 which is gained througn--~ 
discovery, other than such use as is necessary 
in order for the ·discovering party to prepare 
and try the case. As a result, information 
gained by a defendant through the discovery 
process may not be published by any of the 
defendants or made available to any news media 
for publication or dissemination. This 
protective order has no application except to 
information gained by the defendants through the 
use of the discovery processes. 
page 8. 
tiali ty of information c.r ven for purposes of li tiga-
tion." 654 P.2d, at 690. 
The court noted that a predicate to a protective order under CR 
26 (c) is a finding by the trial court that the movant has "good 
cause" for objecting to dissemination of the information and that 
the protective order is needed to "protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
~~
expense." According to the court 'A these findings erdinar ily ar e;;-- 7 




6Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo 
that a protective order could be viewed as an infringement 
on First Amendment rights, the court also stated: 
"A persuasive argument can be made that when 
persons are required to give information which 
they would otherwise be entitled to keep to 
themselves, in order to secure a government 
benefit or perform an obligation to that 
government, those receiving that information 
waive the right to use it for any purpose except 
those which are authorized by the agency of 
government which exacted the information." CITE 
~etition, at 20a) 
7The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because 
the protective order shields respondents from "abuse of 
the discovery privilege," respondents could not object to 
the order compelling production. We do not consider here 
that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision. 
\.1 
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holdings of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia in In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (1979), 8 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San Juan 
Star Co., 662 F.2d 108 (1981), 9 and the Supreme Court of Georgia 
in Georgia Gazette Publishing Co. v. Ramsey, 248 Ga. 528, 284 
8The Halkin decision was a atershed in this area of the 
law. Until a panel of th Court of Appeals for the 
mstrict of Columbia decided Halkin, the federal courts of 
appeals that had consider d the question had assumed 
without substantial discussi n that the First Amendment 
did not affect a trial c urt's authority to restrict 
dissemination of informati produced during pretrial 
discovery. See Rodgers v. U ited States Steel Cor ., 536 
F. 2d 1001, 1006 (CA3 1976) ; International Paper Products 
v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407 408 (CA2 1963) • The Halk in 
court considered the issue in de~. Referring to a 
protective order as a "paradigmatic prior restraint," t~ 
~ court determined that such orders require close 
First Amendment scrutiny. The court held that before a 
trial court should issue a protective order that restric~ 
expression, it must be satisfied that three criteria have 
been met--"the harm posed by dissemination must be 
substantial and serious; the restraining order must be 
narrowly drawn and precise; and there must be no 
alternative means~protecting the public interest which 
intrudes less directly on expression." Id., at 191. 
9In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit considered the rule propounded in Halkin and 
rejected that stringent approach to the constitutionality 
of protective orders. Although the San Juan court held 
that protective orders require some First Amendment 
scrutiny, the court reasoned that First Amendment 
interests are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery 
context. The court stated: "In general, then, we find the 
appropriate measure of such limitations in a standard of 
'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' 
to the First Amendment concerns at stake, ••• " 662 F.2d, 
at 116. 
page 10. 
S.E.2d 386 (1981). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict 
1-k_ 
on t~~ First Amendment issue. 
II 
~~~~~ 
A 'the First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law ••• 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances." The protections afforded by the 
First Amendment are encompassed within the term "liberty" as con-
tained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
~applicable to the action of state legislatures 
and courts. See First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 u.s. 765, 
779 ( 1978) ; Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 42 7 U.S. 539, 556 
(1975); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 u.s. 495, 500-501 
~.t-<-~ 
(1952). The broad sweep of the First Amendment s~ms to prohibit 
"' 
all restraints on free expression, but this Court has declined to 
t}...-
give that language aR -eQ.t;;k:.eq literal interpretation. "Freedom 
" 
of speech ••. does not comprehend the right to speak on any sub-
ject at any time." American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 
1\ 
u.s. 382, 394 
U ~ ~~ page 11. 
J ~OJ~~~ ~. ~.(~~ ~#'t:~·' q~i 5~;_ ''F.~~ .JZk 
(1950). Today, we consider whether the First · 
7? 
• 1 
Amendment protects a party to a civil suit who wishes to dissemi-
A 
for the peaceful resolution of disputes. See L. Fuller, The Mo-
rality of Law 55 (1977): K. Llewellyn, Bramble Bush 12 (1962). 
As a means of accomplishing this goal, all states, 
:a~ 
and the United  
States, provide a judicial system responsible for civil matters 
and designed to facilitate dispute resolution. One common ele-
_.~,_j t t .).( , / 
ment in all of these systems is a provision for civil discovery. 
'\ 
The washington civil rules, like their federal counterparts, -
~ ~·~ - h . d . d . . d 1-~F:) 
~~we~l9Reu to secure t e JUSt, spee y, an 1nexpens1ve eter- J 
mination of every action." CR 1: Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. Also 
common to both the Washington and federal rules are provisions 
for exterisive pretrial discovery. McGugart v. Bromback, 463 P.2d 
140, 142 (Wash. 1969) • Under those rules, a party "may obtain 
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant 
page 12. 
to the subject matter involved in the pending action." CR 26(b) 
(1983-1984 Supp.) . The rule also states that discovery is not 
limited to matters that will be admissible at trial. Instead, a 
party may seek any information that "appears reasonably calculat-
ed to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." CR 26(b) (1) 
(1983-1984 Supp.); 10 Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 
Wash. 2d 758, 575 P.2d 716, 719 (1978); Bushman, supra, at 1081. 
The broad scope of these provisions necessarily allows for dis-
covery of much information that is only tangentially relevant to 
the litigation. See 4 Moore's Federal Practice and Procedure 
26 (b) (1) provides in full: 
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim 
or defense fo the party seeking discovery or to 
the claim or defense of any other party, 
including the existence, description, nature, 
custody, condition and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the 
identity and location of persons having 
knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not 
ground for objection that the information sought 
will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence." 
page 13. 
,[26.56[1]. If a litigant fails to cooperate with requests for 1 
discovery, the requesting party may seek an order from the trial ~ 
court compelling discovery. CR 37 (a) (1983-1984 Supp.). If the 
trial court issues the requested order, and a party fails to com- I 
ply, the trial court can enforce the order through exercise of t:fl( 
its contempt powers. CR 37 (b) (1983-1984 Supp.). ) )~ 
lA--"-' 
The Washington Supreme Court has recognized that the same 
policy considerations that led to adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure underlie the Washington Civil Rules. 
McGugart, supra, at 143. 11 The purpose of such liberal discovery 
11 In the State of Washington, as in many states, the 
rules of civil procedure are modeled on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 
Wash. 2d 429, 518 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1978); Moore v. Wentz, 
11 Wash. App. 796, 525 P.2d 290, (Wash. App. 1974). 
The drafters of the Washington Civil Rules prefaced the 
rules with the comment that the format and numbering of 
the rules was intended to mirror that of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The drafters hoped that this would 
facilitate use of federal materials in the research of the ~ 
Washington rules. In addition, the Washington Supreme Vf~ 
Court has stated that when the language of a Washington 
rule and its federal counterpart are the same, courts 
should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule 
when trying to construe the Washington rule. American 
Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 499 
P.2d 869, 871 (1972); see In the Matter of Johns-Manville 
Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 193, 660 P.2d 271, (1983). This 
rule of statutory construction applies--in this case 
because the Washington rule that provides for scope of J 
Footnote continued on next page. ~ 
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rules is to make civil trials "less a game of blindman's bluff 
and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed 
to the fullest practicable extent." United States v. Proctor & 
Gamble Co., 356 u.s. 677, 682 (1958). By giving parties access 
to all relevant unprivileged information before trial, modern 
~~ 
discovery rules ~e to narrow the issues that need to be liti-
gated and allow • the parties to obtain and organize evidence for \ 
~~~~~~~k.,J.~-1-o 
use at trial. '\ Di scaveqr thereh;r .I\ expedi te;t-- the conduct: of -the j 
s. 
trial alld bel ps to el imiRate surprise. See C. Wright and A. 
1\ 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2001 (1970). "Mutual 
knowledge of all the relevant facts _atherea by both parties is 
I essential to proper litigation ... - McGugart 1 supra, at 143 (quot-
( 
ing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 u.s. 495, 507 (1947)). 12 _) --
civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is 
virtually identical to its counterpart in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare CR 26(b) and (c) with 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b) and (c). 
12 In Hickman, the Court emphasized 
pretrial discovery: 
~~ 
the ~impert~~ce of 
1'The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism -1' 
established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most 
significant innovations of the Federal Rules of -
Civil Procedure. Under the prior federal 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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It is important to emphasize that broad discovery rules are 
intended to further the state's interest in expediting and fa-
cilitating the administration of justice, not to provide a source 
of public information. Pretrial access to information in civil 
trials is not a result mandated by the First Amendment guarantee 
of freedom of expressio • 13 This Court has long held that the 
l-.~ ~ 
practice, the pre-trial functions of notice-
giving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation 
were performed primarily and inadequately by the 
pleadings. Inquiry into the issues and the 
facts before trial was narrowly ~nfined and was 
often cumbersome in method. ~The new rules, 
however, restrict the pleadings to the task of 
general notice-giving and invest the deposition-
discovery process with a vital role in the 
preparation for trial. The various instruments 
of discovery now serve (1) as a device, along 
with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 16, to 
narrow and clarify the basic issues between the 
parties, and ( 2) as a device for ascertaining 
the facts, or information as to the existence o 
whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues. 
us civil trials in the federal courts no 
longer need be carried on in the dark. The way 
is now clear, consistent with recognized 
privileges, for the parties to obtain the 
fu lest possible knowl~~~~~~~--~~~~~~ 
ts before trial." 29 u.s., 
13Pretrial proceedings were not open to the public at 
common law, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 u.s. 368, 389 
(1979), and pretrial discovery ordinarily is conducted in 
private as a matter of modern practice. See generally 
Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 
69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983). 
First Amendment does not create a right to gather information. ( 
Pell v. Procunier, 417 u.s. 817, 834 (1974): Zemel v. Rusk, 381 
u.s. 1, 16-17 (1965). As a result, a state legislature is free 





Conversely, a legislature, in the exercise of its sovereign pow-~~? 
(JI 
ers, may confer broad rights of discovery in the civil 
In any event, a litigant's right to discovery depends on 
of the legislature. ~~-· 
~~-~ 
Although proponents of liberal discovery rules extoll 
benefits that can accrue from extensive access to pretrial access 
to information, they also acknowledge that the rules are suscep-
tible to abuse. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 u.s. 153, 179 (1979) 
(POWELL, J., concurring). 14 It would be impossible for a legis-
lature to anticipate every abuse that can occur. As a result, it 
is common practice in many jurisdictions to allow the trial court 
14one of the most commonly v iced objections to current 
civil practice is the tende cy of parties to abuse the 
POWELL, 446 u.s. 997 (1980): omma~ to 1983 Amendment of 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c). 
fl-lr- tU.L ~ ~ ~. 





case. See c. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice 
(1970). In Washington, the civil rules au-
court, upon a showing of "good cause," to issue 
~ ~- ~ . ~u~ 
order wRere n y to~ party or person 
/\ 
nee, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
~I 
J(s in this 
A 
~r 
case, such an order may ~t the recip-
ient of discovered information not to use or disseminate the in-
formation except to the extent necessary to prepare for trial. 
lba-~~~ 
~t, a protective order, such as that under consid-
5f.b'f-
eration here, is an "a~~Rt;.t"'~ the discovering party's 
W~ ~ ~e-..,.J1 ~~ ~ .<<(; )@¢;Mf >~ ~ 
freedom of expression. IR tl:l:i:--et---- cen-ts-ext ,---fl.Qweve.r, the Eirst k ~)... 
~
~~~--~ s~J 
t does not operate to lessen the trial court's power to 
1\ -. 
, 1#--f~~ ~
restr1ct the l1t1gant's right to disseminate ~ information. 
~ ~ 
~ The power to order such a restriction derives from the state's 
·~~ 
~ 1 power to deny access altogether. If a party chooses to take ad-
vantage of the court's processes to gain access to information, 
7 ( .d 
page 18. 
are designed 
ensure that the information is used only for the purposes for 
~ .. 
access is intended. Accord Snepp v. United States, 444 u.s. r 
.J~ 
a.,_ -~ 
(1980). If the First Amendment does not prevent the trial ~
~4/-tA... 
from refusing to provide any discovery to litigants, it ~~ 
4~ 
prevent the court from granting only limited access.~ 
~.~ 






Petitioners argue that the source of information should make 
no difference in determining whether the First Amendment protects 
parties who want to disseminate that information. Civil discov-
ery, in petitioners' view, 
I I I ./1 
I· ~ ~ # ) " ' ' I 
is just another source ol information A 
ith no constitutional significance'j They contend that the pub-
lie has as much interest in, and will benefit as much from, in-
formation generated by civil discovery as that gathered in other 
ways. Thus, the argument continues, we should employ the same 
First Amendment analysis ~~!,~~~~~,;.. 
. ""' 
~~~a-1-~. 
c:ere limited outside the pretrial discovery context and requirej 
page 19. 
respondents to overcome the ordinarily heavy presumption favoring 
First Amendment protection. 15 Petitioners contend that under 
that analysis, a protective order should issue "[o]nly after the 
court adequately weighs all the interests and concludes that the 
harm posed by dissemination of specific documents is so substan-
tial and serious that the denial of such an order would immedi-
ately imperil a compelling state interest II Brief of Peti-
tioners, at 42. Petitioners also submit that if a protective 
order is warranted, it should be narrowly /;:::.t:;:e1 and should 
restrict dissemination by the least intrusive means available. 
Id • , at 4 3-4 5 • 
Petitioners' argument overlooks the fact that their posses-
15Petitioners would have us vi .... £";h~~rder as 
the kind of "prior retraint" k-~QhemQQtl.¥ 4- de~OQHCed in 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 u.s. 697 (1931), and its progeny. 
We reject petitioners' contention that a protective order 
requires traditional "prior restraint" analysis. Unlike 
the classic prior restraint, see Gannett Co. v. 
PePasguale, 443 u.s., at 399 (POWELL, J., concurring), the 
protective order at issue here does not preclude 
~ ~ petitioners from publishing any information about 
~v"-~ respondents or other members of the foundation. Instead, 
~~ ~  ,JA the order only prohibits pretrial dissemination of certain 




sion of information is a matter of legislative and judicial 
grace, not constitutional right. Through its civil discovery 
rules, the Washington legislature has enabled petitioners to 
~deeply into the private affairs of others and to enforce 
~ 
~ 
~ inquiries with the contempt power of the courts. Civil dis-
" 
covery is ~ mos~trusive method of ~nformation and 
A 
one of the least resistable. nhate'lle-f -ttre---pubHc- iut~t in 
~~~~~ 
di~~~ww~wu~~~~-w~~~~~~~e-~·~h petitioners contention 
A. 




Petitioners' argument also ignores the adverse effects that 
dissemination might have on the rights of the 
produce information under the discovery rules. 
1 
.. ~h~ _ _//i~11k 
1t1gant w ; -~~ 
-1 
First, this Court 
has recognized that the First Amendment guarantees the right of 
access to the courts. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 u.s. 508, 510 (1972); see NAACP v. Button, 371 
Ck~~~~~~ 
u.s. 415, 428-429 (1963). A rule restricting ~e availability of 
~ ~~,1-o~~~~~~ 
protective orders might have a chilling effect on the exercise of 
~~~-~ 
~~ ~ ~~V"~4e=e.e•--z.....-h ~ 
~- ~~~~ 
1"~L~~, ~-~- -~ , -~· 
~,.3 w/() . 
page 21. 
this right of access. 16 A potential litigant faced with possible 
~f asem l Halron o ~information ~ocuc-ed during pretrial discovery 
~~itant to bring suit if discovery might uncover per-
"\ 
sonally embarrassing, politically sensitive, or commercially 
valuable information. 1? 
Second, although less of a problem in the civil context than 
in criminal trials, wide dissemination of pretrial materials 
could jeopardize the ability of the court to afford the litigants 
a fair trial. Publicity could make it~ to impanel an 
~ 
16The trial cour~in this case based the protective order 
on the · · l e.ffect that dissemination would have on 
respondents' exercise of their right of access to the 
courts. The preamble to the order states that the trial 
court issued the order after "having considered that the 
absence of protective orders would have a chilling effect 
on a person's willingness to bring a case to court and 
that this would have the effect of denying persons access 
to the courts, ••• " ~ ? ~.$ 
17under the rule proposed y petitioners, a pr tective 
order would not survive a Fi st Amendment challeng unless 
the party requesting the rder ~ demonstrate that 
denial of the order "wo ld immediately imperil a 
compelling state interest." wrry te~ if a~ private 
litigants would be able to meet this exacting standard. 
Moreover, the subjective nature of the recommended test 
would make it difficult for any litigant to predict the 
outcome of his re uest for protection. · · 
· ght ave a subs tan e feet 




impartial jury or might ~ a litigant to accept an unfavorable 
settlement. Thus, petitioners proposed rule could create a con-
flict between the rights of freedom of expression and the due 
process right to a fair trial. 
Third, petitioners (ii,.{'~H\eflt over looks the substantial inva-
sion of privacy rights that may result from application of liber-
al discovery rules. 18 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 u.s. 589, 599 
(1977). Liberal discovery rules do not make an exception for 
1"~~~ 
a.~~~~~ 
18The f this case illustrate the ~ conflict of 
interests ~ t p. The Aquarian Foundation is a 
small, unorthodox religion. The trial court's decision to 
grant the protective order was based on affidavits of 
Foundation members. The affidavits stated that each time 
the Foundation received publicity, members received 
physical threats and suffered harrassment. Under the 
/.LJ ... L ~ order compelling discovery, respondents A wj JJ ba~e to 
~-- · 6 · · produce a list of all donations for the five year period 
preceding the institution of this suit, along with the 
names and addresses of all donors. Because all members 
are required to make donations, and very few donors are 
not members, the list of donors effectively comprises the 
members of the Foundation. As a result, respondents 
JL _ .~ ~ •..o .1...... ~ .L.L£. ightfl:illy _f~ ta-t j f ~~n caJ) ad fOf' tlnde-r,-
~- t d the 
 Foundation will suffer for no reason ....J'J:.her ,_than their 
choice of religion. Petitioners h.av8 ~e~denied ehere~ 
tG.-t- ~ ~ intent to publish .3![¥:! discovered information that is not J 
subject to a protective order. Therefore, petitioners, in · 
~ the exercise of their First Amendment right to freedom of · 
~f-IJ'1;<- the press, may penalize respondents for the exercise of t 
~I'A-- A.~~, their First Amendment right to freedom of religion. 
/1i.A.-·~ Release of the names of donors ..(would ~ infringe the 
~ ~ donors' freedom of association. See Brown v. Socialist 
~I'(~ Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 103 S.Ct. 416, 420 (1982). J 
 
~~-~~(1./AA-c(} ~~J df-~~-~-~ 1 J..-.1-<. ,_




intimate or embarrassing information.~e possibility of disclo~ 
sure of such private matters underscores the inequity of forcing ) 
a litigant to "bear his soul" under threat of contempt, only to 
' deny the court the power to control the dissemination of the re- , 
sulting information. 
Petitioners' argument that discovery is just "another source 
of information" also fails to acknowledge decisions in which this 
Court has recognized the special status that trial participants 
occupy in relation to the First Amendment. Although litigants do 
not "surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse 
door," In re Halkin, 598 F.2d, at 186, those rights must be 
viewed from a different perspective. For instance, this Court 
has approved restriction of the communications of trial partici-
pants where necessary to further the administration of justice. 
"In the conduct of a case, a court often finds it necessary to 
restrict the free expression of participants, including counsel, 
witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 u.s. 89, 
104 n. 21 (1981). We also have suggested such restrictions as 
6 
acceptable alternatives to restraints on observers of court pro-
ceedings and the press. Nebraska Press, 427 u.s., at 563; see 
also Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 
308, 310-311 (1977); Nebraska Press, 427 u.S., at 601 and n. 27 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 
361 (1966). These statements necessarily imply that the First 
Amendment rights of a trial participant in some situations may be 
subordinate to other First Amendment considerations and the 
court's interest in the administration of justice. 
Finally, we note that the rule petitioners' urge would under- ~ 
mine the supervisory powers of trial courts. Courts 'Of law ~-
herently have extensive equitable powers over their own processes 
to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice. Gumbel v. Pitkin, 
124 u.s. 131, 144 (1888). As discussed above, liberal discovery 
~~.. ~f~ 
rules create the risk of abuse and may be used to t~ the fair 
'1 




19we are not unmindful of the 
\l!t~;srupulou.s members of the 
~) Footnote continued on 
investigative uses to whic~~ 
media could put a court's 
next page. 
page 25. 
vent such abuse and based on a showing of good cause is a reason- ~~ 
able and necessary exercise of a trial court's inherent powers. { 
By limiting a trial court's powers in this context, we might 
cause trial courts to deny discovery requests in cases where 
abuse is likely. In that event, recognition of a First Amendment 
right to disseminate discovered information would discourage the 
salutory practice of liberal pretrial discovery. That result, as 
suggested by the widespread enactment of liberal discovery proce-
dures, is not conducive to the effective and efficient adminis-
tration of justice. 
III 
In light of the minimal First Amendment rights implicated by 
pretrial protective orders and the substantial adverse impact 
that petitioners' proposed rule would have on other important 
discovery processes. Such offensive use of discovery for 
nonlitigious purposes would turn the courts into tools of 
the press. We have never adopted the position that 
freedom of the press is so important that the press should 
be able to use the judicial processes to gather 
information. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 
(1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 u.s. 1, 16-17 (1965). 
:; 
page 26. 
rights, we hold that the trial court's protective order did not 
violate the First Amendment. 20 The judgment accordingly is 
Affirmed. 
20our holding today is limited to pretrial proceedings in 
a civil trial. Respondents concede that any information 
that is admitted at trial is presumptively public. See 
Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 u.s. 555, 576 
(1980) (plurality op.) 
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KEITH MILTON RHINEHART ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF WASHINGTON 
[April -, 1984] 
JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litiga-
tion have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in ad-
vance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discov-
ery process. 
I 
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious 
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer 
than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State ofWash-
ington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the 
ability to communicate with the dead through a medium. 
Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium. 
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla 
Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and 
the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the 
newspapers during the years 1973, 1978 and 1979. The five 
articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the 
manner in which he operated the Foundation. They de-
scribed seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid 
him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends. 
The articles also stated that Rhinehart had sold magical 
"stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. One article 
referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, for sodomy. 
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an 
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State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated 
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave 
away hetween ~~5 . 000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One 
article described a ,;chorus line of girls [who] shed their 
gowns and bikinis and sang .... " App. 25a. The two arti-
cles that ~ppeared in ~979 referred to a purported connection · 
between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular 
television program, "The Incredible Hulk." 
II 
Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior 
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Se-
attle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of 
the articles and the spouses of the authors. Five female 
members of the Foundation who had participated in the pres-
entation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 1 
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements 
that were "fictional and untrue," and that the defendants-
petitioners here-knew, or should have known, they were 
false. According to the complaint, the articles "did and were 
calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and 
ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, reli-
gious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession 
as a spiritual leader." App. 8a. With respect to the Foun-
dation, the complaint also states: "[T]he articles have, or may 
have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the 
membership and public and thereby diminished the financial 
ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes." 
App. 9a. The complaint alleges that the articles misrepre-
sented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely implied 
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all 
their clothes and wantonly danced naked .... " App. 6a. 
1 The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs par-
ticipated in the "chorus line" described in the 1978 articles. The record 
also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs wre mentioned 
by name in the articles. c6 
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The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the al-
leged defamation and invasions of privacy. 2 
Petitioners filed an answer, denyhb" f"'"ny of t!"le ~ll:::g-:­
tions of the complaint and asserting affirmativ~ ddenses. 3 
Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They 
deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents per- · 
taining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Founda-
tion, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and 
the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number 
of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's in-
come tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to dis-
close certain financial information, 4 the identity of the Foun-
dation's donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its 
members during that period. 
Petitioners filed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37 
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their sup-
2 Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles 
- ":\ ~a~se~ a ~ecline in membership of the Foundation, respondents' answers to 
1 . , .... ~s interrogatories raised this issue. In response to petitioners re-n.t.--k ~'? quest that respondents' explain the damages they are seeking, respond-
/ ents' claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in 
Hawaii and Washington "from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a] 
concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503. 
3 Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were sub-
stantially true and accurate, that they were privileged under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of limitations had run as to 
the 1973 articles, that the individual respondents had consented to any in-
vasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy when performing before 1,100 prisoners. 
'Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence. 
He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his 
safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks 
of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling 
Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion. 
6 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A party, upon 
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons· affected thereby, may 
apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in the 
county where the action is pending, for an order compelling discovery. 
" 
82-1721-0PINION 
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porting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the princi-
pal issue as to discovery was respondents "refusal[] to permit 
any effecti•re i:rrmiry into their f1Y)~""'dal affairs, such as the 
source of tiH::.lr donations, tla~ir tinancial transactions, uses of 
wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general." 
Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion arguing in · 
particular that compelled production of the identities of the 
Foundation's donors and members would violate the First 
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, free-
dom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents 
also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from 
disseminating any information gained through discovery. 
Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention 
to continue publishing articles about respondents and this liti-
gation, and their intent to use information gained through 
discovery in future articles. 
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the mo-
tion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors 
who made contributions during the five years preceding the 
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The 
court also required petitioners to divulge enough member-
ship information to substantiate any claims of diminished 
membership. Relying on In re Halkin, 598 F. 2d 176 
(CADC 1979), 6 the court refused to issue a protective order. 
6 The Halkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to 
H alkin, the only federal court of appeals to consider the question directly 
had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court's au-
thority to restrict dissemination of information produced during pretrial 
discovery. See International Paper Products v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 
407-408 (CA21963). Halkin considered the issue at length. Characteriz-
ing a protective order as a "paradigmatic prior restraint," Halkin held that 
such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court 
should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satis-
fied that "the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and seri-
ous; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there 
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which in-
trudes less directly on expression." I d., at 191. 
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It stated that the facts alleged by respondents in support of 
their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant 
a findinl! of "good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct 
C R. ~o(c). 7 The court stated, however, that the denial of 
petitioners' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents'] 
right to move for a pr_otective order in respect to specifically · 
described discovery materials and a factual showing of good 
cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materi-
als." Record 16. 
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which 
they renewed their motion for a protective order. They sub-
mitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support 
their request. t\ The affidavits averred that public release of 
the donor lists would adversely affect Foundation member-
ship and income and would subject its members .to~ harass-
ment and reprisals. o..~J 
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a pro-
tective order covering all information obtained through the 
7 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c) provides: 
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the ac-
tion is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the 
court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more 
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery 
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation 
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of 
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that 
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be 
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one 
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after 
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or 
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not 
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties 
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed 
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court .... " 
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many states. 
~  _p:;.fl ~ 2 4,(cj >-£ 
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discovery process that pertained to "the financial affairs of 
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian 
Foundation members, contributo:rP n ... cl;Pnts, ., ... d +"~ ... ,... ..,~.,~s 
and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, 
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." App. 65a. The 
order prohibited petit-ioners from publishing, disseminating, 
or using the information in any way except where necessary 
to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did 
not apply to information gained by means other than the dis-
covery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial 
court recognized that the protective order would restrict pe-
titioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery, 
but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to 
avoid the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on 
"a party's willingness to bring his case to court." Record 63. 
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production 
order and petitioners appealed from the protective order. 
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d 
673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court 
reasoned: 
8 The relevant portions of the protective order state: 
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted with respect to in-
formation gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery 
processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names 
and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, 
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, 
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs. 
3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not dis-
seminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through 
discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering 
party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a 
defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of 
the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dis-
semination. This protective order has no application except to information 
gained by the defendants through the use of the discovery processes. 
App. 65a. 
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"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensi-
bly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of 
free lw~rePf:'iOn,' we ., .. ~ "(ln"inced that the interest Of 
the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is 
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification. 
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sus-
tain a rule like Rule 26(c) which authorizes a trial court 
to protect the confidentiality of information given for 
purposes of litigation." I d., at 690. 9 
The court noted that "[t]he information to be discovered con-
cerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his 
organization, in which he and his associates had a recog-
nizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these 
matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoy-
ance, embarrassment and even oppression." Ibid. There-
fore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its 
discretion in issuing the protective order. 10 
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its 
holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re H alkin, 598 
F. 2d 176 (1979),u and applies a different standard from that 
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San 
9 Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a 
protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment 
rights, the court also stated: 
"A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to 
give information which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to them-
selves, in order to secure a government benefit or perform an obligation to 
that government, those receiving that information waive the right to use it 
for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of gov-
ernment which exacted the information." 654 P. 2d, at 681. 
10 The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective 
order shields respondents from "abuse of the discovery privilege," re-
spondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not 
consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision. 
11 See note 11 supra. 
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Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981). 12 We granted certiorari 
to resolve the conflict. 13 We affirm. 
III 
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discov-
ery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal . 
Rules of Civil Proceaure. F. James and G. Hazard, Civil 
Procedure 179 (1977). 14 Rule 26(b)(1) provides that a party 
"may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, 
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pend-
ing action. . .. " It further provides that discovery is not 
limited to matters that will be admissible at trial so long as 
the information sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. 
C. R. 26(b)(1); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 
Wash. 2d 758, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); cf. C. Wright and A. 
Miller, 8 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970). 15 
12 In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit consid-
ered and rejected Halkin's ~inge1~t approach to the constitutionality of 
protective orders. Although the San Juan court held that protective or-
ders may implicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that 
such interests are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The 
court stated: "In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such 
limitations in a standard of 'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened 
sensitivity' to the First Amendment concerns at stake .... " 662 F. 2d, at 
116. 
13 The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is consistent with the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International 
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (1963). 
14 See Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P. 2d 
1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when 
the language of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the 
same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guid-
ance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 
499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington rule that provides for the 
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually 
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Com-
pare Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b) 
and (c). 
15 CR 26(b)(1), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) in 
effect at the time, provides in full: 
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The rules do not differentiate between information that is 
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests at-
tach. Under the ruh"' . th~ only eJCp-r~se J1 ..... ~+ ... tions are that 
the information sougl1t is not privil.:!g·ect, and is relevant to 
the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules 
often allow extensive_ intrusion into the affairs of both liti- · 
gants and third parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a 
request for discovery, the Court may issue an order directing 
compliance that is enforceable by the Court's contempt pow-
ers. Wash. Super. Ct. R. 37(b). 17 
Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict 
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the ef-
fect of restricting expression. They contend that civil dis-
covery is not different from other sources of information, and 
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First 
Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this 
case to disseminate any information gained through discov-
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking dis-
covery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the 
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of 
persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground 
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence." 
16 Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or 
written examination. The litigant can compel the third party t.d\'§:i:ili~~::i 
--__.:~..ae:pe~~~!tfte, to produce tangible evidence at tae ael'esiti9n by serv-
ing the third party with a subpoena persuant to Rule 45. Rule 45(b)(l) 
authorizes a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible evidence 
"if it is unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 45 also provides: "Failure by 
any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him 
may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued." 
Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 45(f). 
17 In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court 
to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for ex-
ample, regarding designated facts as taken to be established for purposes 
of the action. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A). 
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ery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not 
thought to be present here, some information may be re-
strained. They submit, however, that: 
''When f! prv~.ci.!Live order seeks to limit expression, it 
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture · 
are insufficient. - Any restraining order, moreover, 
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before is-
suing such an order a court must determine that there 
are no alternatives which intrude less directly on expres-
sion." Petitioners' Brief, at 10. 
f\ We deeliHe-t-o-ru:lopt ~~~nt :rule arged by petitiea~ 
The protections afforded by the First Amendment are en-
compassed within the term "liberty" as contained in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore 
are applicable to the action of the states. See First National 
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 779 (1978); Nebraska Press 
Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 556 (1976); Joseph Burstyn, 
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 500-501 (1952). The broad 
sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all re-
straints on free expression, but this Court has declined to 
give that language an entirely literal interpretation. In 
American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 
394-395 (1950), 'W# observed that "[f]reedom of speech ... 
does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any 
time." See also Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 23 (1973). 
There are "certain well defined and narrowly limited classes 
of speech" whose benefit to society is "clearly outweighed by 
the social interest in order." Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U. S. 568, 571, 572 (1942). 18 
18 Included among the classes of unprotected speech are utterances that 
are likely to cause breaches of the peace and speech that is obscene. See 
Chaplinsky, supra, at 573; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 
(1969); Miller v. California, supra. And in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc ., 
lfp/ss 04/21/84 Rider A, p. 10 (Seattle) 
SEAlO SALLY-POW 
We think the rul~ urged by petitioners would impose an 
unwarranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a 
trial court to oversee the discovery process. 
.. . 
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~_9t,A.cieafi ~that information obtained 
C/ through civif discovery authorized by modern Rules of Civil 
Procedure may be information protectprl 1-Jy the ~irp~ 
Amendment. Indeed, we do not doubt that only rarely 
would such information fall within the classes of unprotected 
speech identified by decisions of this Court. In this case, as 
petitioners argue, there certainly is a public interest in know-
ing more about respondents Rhinehart and the Aquarian 
Foundation. This interest may well include most-and pos-
sibly all-of what has been discovered as a result of the 
Court's order under Rule 26(b)(1). ~ 
The critical question therefore be~ whether the 
Court's protective order issued under Rule 26(c) is an invalid 
restraint on that protected speech. This requires us to de-
cide whether the "practice in question [furthers] an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the 
suppression of expression" and whether "the limitation of 
First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary 
or essential to the protection of the particular governmental 
interest involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 
413 (1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354-355 
(1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976). 
A 
At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the 
impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective 
order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all 
civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish 
to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery 
418 U. S. 323, 340 (1974) we stated that "there is no constitutional value in 
false statements of fact." The Court also has held that certain kinds of 
commercial speech are entitled only to limited First Amendment protec-
tion. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 447 U. S. 557, 562-563 (1980). 
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processes. 19 As the rules authorizing discovery were 
adopted by the state legislature, the processes thereunder 
are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no Fir~1:, 
Amendment right of access to information sought for pur-
poses of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17 
(1965); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 11 (1978) (opin-
ion of BURGER, C. J.). Thus, continued court control over 
the discovered information does not raise the same spectre of 
government censorship that such control! might suggest in ~ 
other situations. See In re Halkin, 598 F. 2d, at 206-207 
(Wilkey, J. dissenting). 
Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not 
public components of a civil trial. 20 Such proceedings were 
not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they 
are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice. 
See id., at 390; Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective 
Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the 
information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be 
unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying 
19 Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at 
the courthouse door," In re Halkin, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be 
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on 
several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communica-
tions of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a crimi-
nal defendant. See Nebraska Press, 427 U. S., at 563; id., at 601 and n. 27 
(BRENNAN, J ., concurring); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. District 
Court, 430 U. S. 308, 310-311 (1977); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 
361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, a court often finds it necessary to 
restrict the free expression of participants, including counsel, witnesses, 
and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89, 104 n. 21 (1981). 
20 In a concurring opinion in Gannett, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER stated: 
"[D]uring the last 40 years in which the pretrial processes have been enor-
mously expanded, it has never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, 
that a pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly 
private to the litigants. A pretrial deposition does not become part of a 
'trial' until and unless the contents of the deposition are offered in evi-
dence." 443 U. S., at 396. 
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cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, 
but not yet admitted, information is not a restriction on a tra-
ditionally accessible source of information. 
Finall:r, ; c is significant t '-' note that an order prohibiting 
dissemination of aiscovered information before trial is not the 
kind of classic prior r~straint that requires exacting First 
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 
U. S., at 399 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such 
a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only 
that information obtained through use of the discovery proc-
ess. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical informa-
tion covered by the protective order as long as the informa-
tion is gained through means other than the court's 
processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to 
disseminate information discovered in advance of trial impli-
cates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a 
far lesser extent than would the same restraint in a different 
context. Therefore, our consideration of the provision for 
protective orders contained in the Washington Civil Rules 
takes into account the unique position that such orders oc-
cupy in relation to the First Amendment. 
B 
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest un-
related to the suppression of expression. Procunier, 416 
U. S., at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to 
litigation to obtain information "relevant to the subject mat-
ter involved" that they believe will be helpful in the prepara-
tion and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed 
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole 
purpose of assisting in the of litigated dis-
putes. Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permit-
ted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is necessary for the trial court to have 
the authority to issue protective orders conferred by Rule 
26(c). It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by 
depositions and interrogatories has a significant potential for 
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abuse. 21 This abuse is not limited to matters of delay and ex-
pense; discovery also may seriously implicate privacy inter-
eF~to. nf Utigantc:: !\I"r1 t h~-rrl rarties. 22 The Rules do not distin-
guish between public and private information. Nor do they 
apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant information 
in the hands of third parties may be subject to discovery. 
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtain-
incidentally or purposefully-information that in fact not only 
is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to 
reputation and privacy. The government clearly has a sub-
stantial interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its proc-
esses. See Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176-177 
(1979); Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 145-146 (1888). As 
stated by Judge Friendly in International Products Co. v. 
Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408, "[w]hether or not the Rule 
itself authorizes [a particular protective order] . . . we have 
no question as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the 
inherent 'equitable powers of courts of law over their own 
process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices ... "'. 
(citing Gumbel v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the 
abuse that can attend the coerced production of information 
under a state's discovery rule is sufficient justification for the 
authorization of protective orders. 
21 See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments 
to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. c1 · es o 
scovery, first adopte m 1938 for federal courts, have not uniformly fur-
thered the interests of speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes. The 
-l---+-'disappointment in this respect does not, however, imply an l · 
the OV 
Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488-491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its ex-
press purpose the protection of a "party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression or undue burden or expense ... " Although the 
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests 
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and 
language of the Rule. 
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c 
We also find that the scope of the provision for protective 
orders in th...; Washington rules poses, in itself, no constit~ 
tional concern. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad discre-
tion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is ap-
propriate and what degree of protection is required. The 
legislature of the State of Washington, following the example 
of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, has determined that such discretion is necessary, 
and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is in the 
best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and inter-
ests of parties affected by discovery. 23 The unique character 
of the discovery process requires that the trial court have 
substantial latitude to fashion protective orders. We there-
fore hold that where, as in this case, a protective order is lim-
ited to the narrow context of pretrial civil discovery and does 
not restrict the dissemination of" information gained from 
other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment. 
v 
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably 
may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have 
noted, the trial court's order allowing discovery was ex-
tremely broad. It compelled respondents-among other 
things-to identify all persons who had made donations over 
a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Founda-
tion, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order 
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of 
financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington found 
that dissemination of this information would "result in annoy-
ance, embarrassment and even oppression." 654 P. 2d, at 
23 In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for 
a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and 
_ J.l ~t lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeal§/ See, e. g., Zemlh 
~.... Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866 (ED Pa. 
1981). 
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690. 24 It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the 
highest court in the state found no abuse of discretion in the 
t-rio:tJ court's decision to issue a protective order f.~?rsuant to a 
constitutional state law. The judgment accodingly is 
Affirmed 
24 See note 8 supra (quoting t t s of e otective order). The ~-~..,; . 1 
Supreme Court of Washington the importance of ensuring that potential/ 
litigants have unimpeded acces to the courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly\__ 
observed, rather than expose themselves to unwanted publicity, individ- -------
uals may well forego the pursuit of their just claims. The judicial system 
will thus have made the utilization of its remedies so onerous that the peo-
ple will be reluctant or unwilling to use it, resulting in frustration of a right 
as valuable as that of speech itself." 654 P. 2d, at 689. Cf. California 
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429-431 (1963). 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litiga-
tion have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in ad-
vance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discov-
ery process. 
I 
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious 
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer 
than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State of Wash-
ington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the 
ability to communicate with the dead through a medium. 
Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium. 
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla 
Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and 
the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the 
newspapers during the years 1973, 1978 and 1979. The five 
articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the 
manner in which he operated the Foundation. They de-
scribed seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid 
him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends. 
The articles also stated that Rhinehart had sold magical 
"stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. One article 
referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, for sodomy. 
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an 
"extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla 
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State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated 
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave 
away between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One 
article described a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their 
gowns and bikinis and sang .... " App. 25a. The two arti-
cles that appeared in 1979 referred to a purported connection 
between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular 
television program, "The Incredible Hulk." 
II 
Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior 
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Se-
attle Times, the Walia Walia Union-Bulletin, the authors of 
the articles and the spouses of the authors. Five female 
members of the Foundation who had participated in the pres-
entation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 1 
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements 
that were "fictional and untrue," and that the defendants-
petitioners here-knew, or should have known, they were 
false. According to the complaint, the articles "did and were 
calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and 
ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, reli-
gious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession 
as a spiritual leader." App. 8a. With respect to the Foun-
dation, the complaint also states: "(T]he articles have, or may 
have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the 
membership and public and thereby diminished the financial 
ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes." 
App. 9a. The complaint alleges that the articles misrepre-
sented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely implied 
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all 
their clothes and wantonly danced naked .... " App. 6a. 
' The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs par-
ticipated in the "chorus line" described in the 1978 articles. The record 
also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs was mentioned 
by name in the articles. 
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The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the al-
leged defamation and invasions of privacy.2 
Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allega-
tions of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. a 
Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They 
deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents per-
taining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Founda-
tion, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and 
the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number 
of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's in-
come tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to dis-
close certain financial information, • the identity of the Foun-
dation's donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its 
members during that period. 
Petitioners filed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37 
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their sup-
'Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles 
caused a decline in membership of the Foundation, respondents' answers to 
petitioners interrogatories raised this issue. In response to petitioners re-
quest that respondents' explain the damages they are seeking, respond-
ents' claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in 
Hawaii and Washington ''from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a] 
concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503. 
1 Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were sub-
stantially true and accurate, that they were privileged under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of limitations had run as to 
the 1973 articles, that the individual respondents had consented to any in-
vasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy when performing before 1,100 prism1ers. 
• Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence. 
He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his 
safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks 
of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling 
Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion. 
'Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A party, upon 
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may 
apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in the 
county where the action is pending, for an order compelling 
discovery .... " 
82-1721-0PINION 
4 SEATILE TIMES CO. v. RHINEHART 
porting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the princi-
pal issue as to discovery was respondents "refusal[] to permit 
any effective inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the 
source of their donations, their financial transactions, uses of 
wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general." 
Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion arguing in 
particular that compelled production of the identities of the 
Foundation's donors and members would violate the First 
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, free-
dom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents 
also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from 
disseminating any information gained through discovery. 
Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention 
to continue publishing articles about respondents and this liti-
gation, and their intent to use information gained through 
discovery in future articles. 
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the mo-
tion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors 
who made contributions during the five years preceding the 
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The 
court also required petitioners to divulge enough member-
ship information to substantiate any claims of diminished 
membership. Relying on In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d 176 
(CADC 1979), 6 the court refused to issue a protective order. 
'The Halkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to 
H alkin, the only federal court of appeals to consider the question directly 
had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court's au-
thority to restrict dissemination of infonnation produced during pretrial 
discovery. See International Paper Products v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 
407-408 (CA2 1963). Halkin considered the issue at length. Characteriz-
ing a protective order as a ''paradigmatic prior restraint," Halkin held that 
such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court 
should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satis-
fied that ''the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and seri-
ous; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there 
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which in-
trudes less directly on expression." Id., at 191. 
82-1721-0PINION 
SEATTLE TIMES CO. v. RHINEHART 5 
It stated that the facts alleged by respondents in support of 
their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant 
a finding of "good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct. 
C. R. 26(c).7 The court stated, however, that the denial of 
petitioners' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents'] 
right to move for a protective order in respect to specifically 
described discovery materials and a factual showing of good 
cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materi-
als." Record 16. 
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which 
they renewed their motion for a protective order. They sub-
mitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support 
their request. The affidavits detailed a series of letters and 
telephone calls defaming the Foundation, its members, and 
Rhinehart-including several that threatened physical harm 
to those associated with the Foundation. The affiants also 
described incidents at the Foundation's headquarters involv-
ing attacks, threats, and assaults directed at Foundation 
7 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c) provides: 
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the ac-
tion is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the 
court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more 
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery 
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation 
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of 
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that 
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be 
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one 
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after 
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or 
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not 
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties 
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed 
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court .... " 
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many states. 
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members by anonymous individuals and groups. In general, 
the affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists 
would adversely affect Foundation membership and income 
and would subject its members to additional harassment and 
reprisals. 
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a pro-
tective order covering all information obtained through the 
discovery process that pertained to ''the financial affairs of 
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian 
Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names 
and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, 
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." App. 65a. The 
order prohibited petitioners from publishing, disseminating, 
or using the information in any way except where necessary 
to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did 
not apply to information gained by means other than the dis-
covery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial 
court recognized that the protective order would restrict pe-
titioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery, 
but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to 
avoid the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on 
"a party's willingness to bring his case to court." Record 63. 
8 The relevant portions of the protective order state: 
''2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted with respect to in-
fonnation gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery 
processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names 
and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, 
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, 
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs. 
"3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not dis-
seminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through 
discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering 
party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a 
defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of 
the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dis-
semination. This protective order has no application except to information 
gained by the defendants through the use of the discovery processes." 
App. 65a. 
82-1721--0PINION 
SEATTLE TIMES CO. v. RHINEHART 7 
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production 
order and petitioners appealed from the protective order. 
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d 
673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court 
reasoned: 
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensi-
bly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of 
free expression,' we are convinced that the interest of 
the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is 
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification. 
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sus-
tain a rule like Rule 26(c) which authorizes a trial court 
to protect the confidentiality of information given for 
purposes of litigation." Id., at 690.9 
The court noted that "[t]he information to be discovered con-
cerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his 
organization, in which he and his associates had a recog-
nizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these 
matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoy-
ance, embarrassment and even oppression." Ibid. There-
fore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its 
discretion in issuing the protective order. 10 
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its 
holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court 
• Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a 
protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment 
rights , the court also stated: 
"A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to 
give information which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to them-
selves, in order to secure a government benefit or perform an obligation to 
that government, those receiving that information waive the right to use it 
for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of gov-
ernment which exacted the information." 654 P. 2d, at 681. 
10 The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective 
order shields respondents from "abuse of the discovery privilege," re-
spondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not 
consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision. 
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re Balkin, 598 
F. 2d 176 (1979), 11 and applies a different standard from that 
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San 
Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981).u We granted certiorari 
to resolve the conflict. 13 We. affirm. 
III 
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discov-
ery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal 
Rules 'of Civil Procedure. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Pro-
cedure 179 (1977). 14 Rule 26(b)(l) provides that a party "may 
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion." It further provides that discovery is not limited to 
matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the informa-
tion sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 
11 See note 11 supra. 
u In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit consid-
ered and rejected Balkin's approach to the constitutionality of protective 
orders. Although the San Juan court held that protective orders may im-
plicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that such interests 
are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The court stated: 
"In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such limitations in a 
standard of 'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' to the 
First Amendment concerns at stake .... " 662 F. 2d, at 116. 
11 The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is consistent with the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International 
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407·-408 (1963). 
"See Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P. 2d 
1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when 
the language of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the 
same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guid-
ance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 
499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington rule that provides for the 
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually 
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Com-
pare Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b) 
and (c). 
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26(b)(l); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d 
758, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); d. C. Wright & A. Miller, 8 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970). 15 
The rules do not differentiate between infonnation that is 
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests at-
tach. Under the rules, the only express limitations are that 
the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to 
the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules 
often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both liti-
gants and third parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a 
request for discovery, the Court may issue an order directing 
compliance that is enforceable by the Court's contempt pow-
ers. Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37(b). 17 
uwash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b)(l), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b)(1) in effect at the time, provides in full: 
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking dis-
covery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the exist-
ence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of per-
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for 
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence." 
''Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or 
,...~-"""'i""'tten examination. The litigant can compel the third party to be de-
pose and to produce tangible evidence at the deposition by 
serving the third party with a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45. Rule 
45(b)(1) authorizes a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible 
evidence "if it is unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 45 also provides: 
"Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served 
upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena 
issued." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 45(f). 
17 In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court 
to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for ex-
ample, regarding designated facts as established for purposes of the action. 
Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A). 
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Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict 
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the ef-
fect of restricting expression. They contend that civil dis-
covery is not different from other sources of information, and 
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First 
Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this 
case to disseminate any information gained through discov-
ery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not 
thought to be present here, some information may be re-
strained. They submit, however, that: 
''When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it 
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture 
are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover, 
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before is-
suing such an order a court must determine that there 
are no alternatives which intrude less directly on expres-
sion." Petitioners' Brief 10. 
We think the rule urged by petitioners would impose an un-
warranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a trial 
court to oversee the discovery process. 
IV 
It is, of course, clear that information obtained through 
civil discovery authorized by modern Rules of Civil Proce-
dure may be information protected by the First Amendment. 
Indeed, we do not doubt that only rarely would such informa-
tion fall within the classes of unprotected speech identified by 
decisions of this Court. In this case, as petitioners argue, 
there certainly is a public interest in knowing more about re-
spondents Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation. This in-
terest may well include most-and possibly all--of what has 
been discovered as a result of the Court's order under Rule 
26(b)(l). 
The critical question therefore is: whether protective or-
ders issued under Rule 26(c) are invalid restraints on pro-
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tected speech. 18 This requires us to decide whether the 
''practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial 
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of ex-
pression" and whether "the limitation of First Amendment 
freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the 
protection of the particular governmental interest involved." 
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974); see Brown 
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-355 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 u. s. 1, 25 (1976). 
A 
At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the 
impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective 
order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all 
civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish 
to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery 
processes. As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted e·-
by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are ~ mat~ / ~ & 
ter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Am~ 1 ~ t:..fJ :£. 
r~ght o! access to information i9\lgfit or purposes of trying ( ._ _'(__' A. 
1 
his swt. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17. (~965); _,.-(A.t rVt...f fflT f-0 
--. ---,.__.,. TJ'fleh:t"rn • 1{~438'-B:-S. 1,1-1 (1978) (oplillon of /?.h.~~~ .. ~ 
BURGER, G~ J.). Thus, continued court control over the dis- ;;_r~ 
covered information does not raise the same spectre of gov- '- -u 
ernment censorship that such control might suggest in other ~ ~ 
situations. See In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, C~ J..t,~ 
J. dissenting). 19 t-1 1 "tt.(_ 
18 Although the broad sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit 
all restraints on free expression, this Court has observed that "[f)reedom of 
speech ... does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any 
time." American Communications Assn. v. Dmuis, 339 U.S. 382, 
394-395 (1950). 
18 Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at 
the courthouse door," In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be 
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on 
several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communica-
tions of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a crimi-




lA-y~- ·~ ~). 
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Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not 
public components of a civil trial . ., Such proceedings were 
not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they 
are conducted in private as · a matter of modern practice. 
See id., at 390; Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective 
Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the 
information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be 
unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying 
cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, 
but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a 
traditionally accessible source of information. 
Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting 
dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the 
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First 
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 
U. S., at 399 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such 
a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only 
that information obtained through use of the discovery proc-
ess. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical informa-
tion covered by the protective order as long as the informa-
tion is gained through means independent of the court's 
processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to 
id. , at 601 and n. 27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Oklalwma Press Publish-
ing Co. v. District Court , 430 U. S. 308, 310-311 (1977); Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U. S. 333, 361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, a court often 
finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including 
counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89, 
104 n. 21 (1981) . 
., In a concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S., 368 
(1979), CmEF JUSTICE BURGER stated: 
"[D]uring the last 40 years in which the pretrial processes have been enor-
mously expanded, it has never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, 
that a pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly 
private to the litigants. A pretrial deposition does not become part of a 
'trial' until and unless the contents of the deposition are offered in evi-
dence." 443 U. S., at 396. 
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disseminate information discovered in advance of trial impli-
cates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a 
far lesser extent than would restraints on desemination of in-
formation in a different context. Therefore, our consider-
ation of the provision for protective orders contained in the 
Washington Civil Rules takes into account the unique posi-
tion that such orders occupy in relation to the First 
Amendment. 
B 
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest un-
related to the suppression of expression. Procunier, 416 
U. S., at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to 
litigation to obtain information ''relevant to the subject mat-
ter involved" that they believe will be helpful in the prepara-
tion and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed 
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole 
purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settle-
ment, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pre-
trial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(l), it is necessary for 
the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders 
conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that 
pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a 
significant potential for abuse. 21 This abuse is not limited to 
matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously 
n See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments 
to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176 
(1979) , the Court observed: "[T]here have been repeated expressions of 
concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this 
Court have joined the chorus. But until and unless there are major 
changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on 
what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent 
abuse." ld., at 176, 177 (citations omitted); see also id., at 179 (POWELL, 
J., concurring). But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the 
inadequate oversight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any respect 
lessen the importance of discovery in civil litigation and the government's 
substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the discovery process. 
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implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. 22 
The Rules do not distinguish between public and private in-
fonnation. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litiga-
tion, as relevant infonnation in the hands of third parties may 
be subject to discovery. 
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtain-
incidentally or purposefully-infonnation that not only is ir-
relevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputa-
tion and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial 
interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf. 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176-177 (1979); Gumbel v. 
Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 14&-146 (1888). Ai3 stated by Judge 
Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 
403, 407~08 (CA21963), "[w]hether or not the Rule itself au-
thorizes [a particular protective order] ... we have no ques-
tion as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent 
'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to 
prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices.'" (citing Gumbel 
v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can at-
tend the coerced production of infonnation under a state's 
discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization 
of protective orders. 23 
21 Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488-491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its ex-
press purposes the protection of a "party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." Although the 
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests 
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and 
language of the Rule. 
Zl The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the impor-
tance of ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to the 
courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose them-
selves to unwanted publicity, individuals may well forego the pursuit of 
their just claims. The judicial system will thus have made the utilization 
of its remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or unwilling to 
use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valuable as that of speech it-
self." 654 P. 2d, at 689. Cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
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We also find that the provision for protective orders in the 
Washington rules requires, in itself, no heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad 
discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order 
is appropriate and what degree of protection is required. 
The legislature of the State of Washington, following the ex-
ample of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, has determined that such discretion is nec-
essary, and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is 
in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and 
interests of parties affected by discovery.u The unique char-
acter of the discovery process requires that the trial court 
have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders. We 
therefore hold that where, as in this case, a protective order 
is limited to the narrow context of pretrial civil discovery and 
does not restrict the dissemination of the information gained 
from other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment. 
v 
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably 
may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have 
noted, the trial court's order allowing discovery was ex-
tremely broad. It compelled respondents-among other 
things-to identify all persons who had made donations over 
a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Founda-
tion, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order 
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of 
financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington found 
that dissemination of this information would ''result in annoy-
Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
429-431 (1963). 
M In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for 
a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and 
could lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals, as this case illustrates. 
See, e. g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. 
Supp. 866 (ED Pa. 1981). 
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ance, embarrassment and even oppression." 654 P. 2d, at 
690. It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the 
highest court in the state found no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court's decision to issue a protective order persuant to a 
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JUSTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litiga-
tion have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in ad-
vance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discov-
ery process. 
I 
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious 
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer 
than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State of Wash-
ington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the 
ability to communicate with the dead through a medium. 
Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium. 
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla 
Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and 
the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the 
newspapers during the years 1973, 1978 and 1979. The five 
articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the 
manner in which he operated the Foundation. They de-
scribed seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid 
him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends. 
The articles also stated that Rhinehart had sold magical 
"stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. One article 
referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, for sodomy. 
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an 
"extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla 
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State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated 
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave 
away between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One 
article described a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their 
gowns and bikinis and sang .... " App. 25a. The two arti-
cles that appeared in 1979 referred to a purported connection 
between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular 
television program, "The Incredible Hulk." 
II 
Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior 
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Se-
attle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of 
the articles and the spouses of the authors. Five female 
members of the Foundation who had participated in the pres-
entation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 1 
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements 
that were "fictional and untrue," and that the defendants-
petitioners here-lmew, or should have known, they were 
false. According to the complaint, the articles "did and were 
calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and 
ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, reli-
gious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession 
as a spiritual leader." App. 8a. With respect to the Foun-
dation, the complaint also states: "[T]he articles have, or may 
have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the 
membership and public and thereby diminished the financial 
ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes." 
App. 9a. The complaint alleges that the articles misrepre-
sented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely implied 
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all 
their clothes and wantonly danced naked .... " App. 6a. 
1 The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs par-
ticipated in the "chorus line" described in the 1978 articles. The record 
also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs was mentioned 
by name in the articles. 
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The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the al-
leged defamation and invasions of privacy. 2 
Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allega-
tions of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. 8 
Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They 
deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents per-
taining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Founda-
tion, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and 
the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number 
of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's in-
come tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to dis-
close certain financial information, • the identity of the Foun-
dation's donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its 
members during that period. 
Petitioners filed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37 
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their sup-
z Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles 
caused a decline in membership of the Foundation, respondents' answers to 
petitioners interrogatories raised this issue. In response to petitioners re-
quest that respondents' explain the damages they· are seeking, respond-
ents' claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in 
Hawaii and Washington "from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a] 
concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503. 
1 Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were sub-
stantially true and accurate, that they/ were privileged under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of limitations had run as to 
the 1973 articles, that the individual respondents had consented to any in-
vasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy when performing before 1,100 prisoners. 
• Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence. 
He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his 
safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks 
of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling 
Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion. 
5 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A party, upon 
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may 
apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in the 
county where the action is pending, for an order compelling 
discovery .... " 
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porting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the princi-
pal issue as to discovery was respondents ''refusal[] to permit 
any effective inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the 
source of their donations, their financial transactions, uses of 
wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general." 
Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion arguing in 
particular that compelled production of the identities of the 
Foundation's donors and members would violate the First I 
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, free-
dom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents 
also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from 
disseminating any information gained through discovery. 
Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention 
to continue publishing articles about respondents and this liti-
gation, and their intent to use information gained through 
discovery in future articles. 
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the mo-
tion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors 
who made contributions during the five years preceding the 
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The 
court also required petitioners to divulge enough member-
ship information to substantiate any claims of diminished 
membership. Relying on In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d 176 
(CADC 1979),6 the court refused to issue a protective order. 
'The Balkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to 
Balkin, the only federal court of appeals to consider the question directly 
had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court's au-
thority to restrict dissemination of infonnation produced during pretrial 
discovery. See International Paper Products v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 
407-408 (CA21963). Balkin considered the issue at length. Characteriz-
ing a protective order as a ''paradigmatic prior restraint," Balkin held that 
such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court 
should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satis-
fied that "the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and seri-
ous; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there 
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which in-
trudes less directly on expression." Id., at 191. 
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It stated that the facts alleged by respondents in support of 
their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant 
a finding of "good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct. 
C. R. 26(c). 7 The court stated, however, that the denial of 
petitioners' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents'] 
right to move for a protective order in respect to specifically 
described discovery materials and a factual showing of good 
cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materi-
als." Record 16. 
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in whlch 
they renewed their motion for a protective order. They sub-
mitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support 
their request. The affidavits detailed a series of letters and 
telephone calls defaming the Foundation, its members, and 
Rhinehart-including several that threatened physical harm 
to those associated with the Foundation. The afflantS. also 
described incidents at the Foundation's headquarters involv-
ing attacks, threats, and assaults directed at Foundation 
7 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c) provides: 
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the ac-
tion is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the 
court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more 
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery 
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation 
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of 
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that 
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be 
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one 
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after 
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or 
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not 
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties 
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed 
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. . . . " 
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many states. 
I 
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members by anonymous individuals and groups. In general, 
the affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists 
would adversely affect Fo~dation mell!be~hip and .income 
and would subject itS members to additional harassment and 
reprisals. 
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a pro-
tective order covering all information obtained through the 
discovery process that pertained to ''the financial affairs of 
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian 
Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names 
and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, 
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." App. 65a. The 
order prohibited petitioners from publishing, disseminating, 
or using the information in any way except where necessary 
to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did 
not apply to information gained by means other than the dis-
covery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial 
court recognized that the protective order would restrict pe-
titioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery, 
but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to 
avoid the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on 
"a party's willingness to bring his case to court." Record 63. 
8 The relevant portions of the protective order state: 
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted with respect to in-
formation gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery 
processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names 
and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, 
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, 
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs. 
"3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not dis-
seminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through 
discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering 
party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a 
defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of 
the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dis-
semination. This protective order has no application except to information 
gained by the defendants through the use of the discovery processes." 
App. 65a. 
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Respondents appealed from the trial court's production 
order and petitioners appealed from the protective order. 
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d 
673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court 
reasoned: 
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensi-
bly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of 
free expression,' we are convinced that the interest of 
the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is 
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification. 
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sus-
tain a rule like Rule 26(c) which authorizes a trial court 
to protect the confidentiality of information given for 
purposes of litigation." /d., at 690.9 
The court noted that "[t]he information to be discovered con-
cerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his 
organization, in which he and his associates had a recog-
nizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these 
matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoy-
ance, embarrassment and even oppression." Ibid. There-
fore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its 
discretion in issuing the protective order. 10 
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its 
holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court 
• Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a 
protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment 
rights, the court also stated: 
"A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to 
give information which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to them-
selves, in order to secure a government benefit or perform an obligation to 
that government, those receiving that information waive the right to use it 
for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of gov-
ernment which exacted the information." 654 P. 2d, at 681. 
10 The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective 
order shields respondents from "abuse of the discovery privilege," re-
spondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not 
consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision. 
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re Balkin, 598 
F. 2d 176 (1979), 11 and applies a different standard from that 
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San 
Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981). 12 We granted certiorari 
to resolve the conflict. 13 We. affirm. 
III 
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discov-
ery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Pro-
cedure 179 (1977). 14 Rule 26(b)(l) provides that a party "may 
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion." It further provides that discovery is not limited to 
matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the infonna-
tion sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 
11 See note 11 supra. 
11 In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit consid-
ered and rejected Balkin's approach to the constitutionality of protective 
orders. Although the San Juan court held that protective orders may im-
plicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that such interests 
are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The court stated: 
"In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such limitations in a 
standard of 'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' to the 
First Amendment concerns at stake .... " 662 F. 2d, at 116. 
a The holding of the Supreme Court ofWashington is consistent with the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International 
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (1963). 
14 See Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P. 2d 
1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when 
the language of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the 
same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guid-
ance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 
499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington rule that provides for the 
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually 
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Com-
pare Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b) 
and (c). 
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26(b)(l); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d 
758, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); cf. C. Wright & A. Miller, 8 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970). 16 
The rules do not differentiate between infonnation that is 
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests at-
tach. Under the rules, the only express limitations are that 
the infonnation sought is not privileged, and is relevant to 
the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules 
often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both liti-
gants and third parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a 
request for discovery, the Court may issue an order directing 
compliance that is enforceable by the Court's contempt pow-
ers. Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37(b). 17 
16 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b)(1), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b)(l) in effect at the time, provides in full: 
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking dis-
covery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the exist-
ence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of per-
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for 
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence." 
18 Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or 
v-~o..::.:it:.:::ten examination. The litigant can compel the third party to be de-
pose and to produce tangible evidence at the deposition by 
serving the third party with a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45. Rule 
45(b)(1) authorizes a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible 
evidence ''if it is unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 45 also provides: 
"Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served 
upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena 
issued." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 45({). 
17 In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court 
to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for ex-
ample, regarding designated facts as established for purposes of the action. 
Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A). 
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Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict 
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the ef-
fect of restricting expression. They contend that civil dis-
covery is not different from other sources of information, and 
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First 
Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this 
case to disseminate any information gained through discov-
ery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not 
thought to be present here, some information may be re-
strained. They submit, however, that: 
"When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it 
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture 
are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover, 
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before is-
suing such an order a court must determine that there 
ar~ no alternatives which intrude less directly on expres-
sion." Petitioners' Brief 10. 
We think the rule urged by petitioners would impose an un-
warranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a trial 
court to oversee the discovery process. 
IV 
It is, of course, clear that information obtained through 
civil discovery authorized by modern Rules of Civil Proce-
dure may be information protected by the First Amendment. 
Indeed, we do not doubt that only rarely would such informa-
tion fall within the classes of unprotected speech identified by 
decisions of this Court. In this case, as petitioners argue, 
there certainly is a public interest in knowing more about re-
spondents Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation. This in-
terest may well include most-and possibly all-of what has 
been discovered as a result of the Court's order under Rule 
26(b)(l). 
The critical question therefore is: whether protective or-
ders issued under Rule 26(c) are invalid restraints on pro-
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tected speech. 18 This requires us to decide whether the 
''practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial 
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of ex-
pression" and whether ''the limitation of First Amendment 
freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the 
protection of the particular governmental interest involved." 
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); see Broum 
v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354-355 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 u. s. 1, 25 (1976). 
A 
At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the 
impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective 
order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all 
civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish 
to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery 
processes. As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted 
by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are a mat-
ter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment 
right of access to information sought for purposes of trying 
his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965); 
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 11 (1978) (opinion of 
BURGER, C. J.). Thus, continued court control over the dis-
covered information does not raise the same spectre of gov-
ernment censorship that such control might suggest in other 
situations. See In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, 
J. dissenting). 19 
18 Although the broad sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit 
all restraints on free expression, this Court has observed that "[f)reedom of 
speech ... does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any 
time." American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 
394-395 (1950). 
11 Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at 
the courthouse door," In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be 
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on 
several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communica-
tions of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a crimi-
nal defendant. See Nebraska Press v. Stuart, 427 U. S., 539, 563 (1976; 
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Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not 
public components of a civil trial. 31 Such proceedings were 
not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they 
are conducted in private as · a matter of modern practice. 
,. See id., at 390; Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective 
Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the 
information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be 
unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying 
cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, 
but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a 
traditionally accessible source of information. 
Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting 
dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the 
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First 
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 
U. S., at 399 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such 
a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only 
that information obtained through use of the discovery proc-
ess. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical informa-
tion covered by the protective order as long as the informa-
tion is gained through means independent of the court's 
processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to 
id., at 601 and n. 2:7 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Oklahoma Press Publish· 
ing Co. v. District Court, 430 U. S. 308, 310-311 (1977); Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U. S. 333, 361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, a court often 
finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including 
counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89, 
104 n. 21 (1981). 
20 In a concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S., 368 
(1979), CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER stated: 
"[D]uring the last 40 years in which the pretrial processes have been enor-
mously expanded, it has never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, 
that a pretrial deposition or pretrial interrogatories were other than wholly 
private to the litigants. A pretrial deposition does not become part of a 
'trial' until and unless the contents of the deposition are offered in evi-
dence." 443 U. S., at 396. 
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disseminate infonnation discovered in advance of trial impli-
cates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a 
far lesser extent than would restraints on desemination of in-
fonnation in a different context. Therefore, our consider-
ation of the provision for protective orders contained in the 
Washington Civil Rules takes into account the unique posi-
tion that such orders occupy in relation to the First 
Amendment. 
B 
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest un-
related to the suppression of expression. Procunier, 416 
U. S., at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to 
litigation to obtain infonnation ''relevant to the subject mat-
ter involved" that they believe will be helpful in the prepara-
tion and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed 
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole 
purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settle-
ment, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pre-
trial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(l), it is necessary for 
the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders 
conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that 
pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a 
significant potential for abuse. 21 This abuse is not limited to 
matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously 
n See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments 
to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176 
(1979), the Court observed: "[T]here have been repeated expressions of 
concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this 
Court have joined the chorus. But until and unless there are major 
changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on 
what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent 
abuse." /d., at 176, 177 (citations omitted); see also id., at 179 (PoWELL, 
J., concurring). But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the 
inadequate oversight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any respect 
lessen the importance of discovery in civil litigation and the government's 
substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the discovery process. 
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implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. 22 
The Rules do not distinguish between public and private in-
formation. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litiga-
tion, as relevant infonnation in the hands of third parties may 
be subject to discovery. 
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtain-
incidentally or purposefully-information that not only is ir-
relevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputa-
tion and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial 
interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf. 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 17~177 (1979); Gumbel v. 
Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 14~146 (1888). As stated by Judge 
Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 
403, 407-408 (CA21963), "[w]hether or not the Rule itself au-
thorizes [a particular protective order] ... we have no ques-
tion as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent 
'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to 
prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices."' (citing Gumbel 
v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can at-
tend the coerced production of infonnation under a state's 
discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization 
of protective orders. 23 
12 Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488--491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its ex-
press purposes the protection of a "party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." Although the 
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests 
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and 
language of the Rule. 
"The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the impor-
tance of ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to the 
courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose them-
selves to unwanted publicity, individuals may well forego the pursuit of 
their just claims. The judicial system will thus have made the utilization 
of its remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or unwilling to 
use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valuable as that of speech it-
self." 654 P. 2d, at 689. Cf. California Motar Transpart Co. v. Trucking 
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we also find that the prOVISion for protective orders in the 
Washington rules requires, in itself, no heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad 
discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order 
is appropriate and what degree of protection is required. 
The legislature of the State of Washington, following the ex-
ample of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, has determined that such discretion is nec-
essary, and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is 
in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and 
interests of parties affected by discovery. 24 The unique char-
acter of the discovery process requires that the trial co~ 
have substantial latitude to fashion protective ord~rs. J e 
therefore hold that where, as in this case, a protective order 
is limited to the narrow context of pretrial civil discovery and 
does not restrict the dissemination of the information gained 
<5fir'Other sourc s, it ,qoes ~t offend the First Amendment.! 
v 
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably 
may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have 
noted, the trial court's order allowing discovery was ex-
tremely broad. It compelled respondents-among other 
things-to identify all persons who had made donations over 
a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Founda-
tion, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order 
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of 
financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington found 
that dissemination of this information would "result in annoy-
Unlimiwt, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
429-431 (1963). 
u In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for 
a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and 
could lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals, as this case illustrates. 
See, e. g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. 
Supp. 866 (ED Pa. 1981). 
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ance, embarrassment and even oppression." 654 P. 2d,, at 
690. It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the 
highest court in the state found no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court's decision to issue a protective order persuant to a 
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JUSTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litiga-
tion have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in ad·-
vance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discov-
ery process. 
I 
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious 
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer 
than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State of Wash-
ington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the 
ability to communicate with the dead through a medium. 
Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium. 
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla 
Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and 
the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the 
newspapers during the years 1973, 1978 and 1979. The five 
articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the 
manner in which he operated the Foundation. They de-
scribed seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid 
him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends. 
The articles also stated that Rhinehart had sold magical 
"stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. One article 
referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, for sodomy. 
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an 
"extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla 
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State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated 
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave 
away between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One 
article described a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their 
gowns and bikinis and sang .... " App. 25a. The two arti-
cles that appeared in 1979 referred to a purported connection 
between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular 
television program, "The Incredible Hulk." 
II 
Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior 
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Se-
attle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of 
the articles and the spouses of the authors. Five female 
members of the Foundation who had participated in the pres-
entation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs.' 
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements 
that were "fictional and untrue," and that the defendants-
petitioners here-knew, or should have known, they were 
false. According to the complaint, the articles "did and were 
calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and 
ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, reli-
gious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession 
as a spiritual leader." App. 8a. With respect to the Foun-
dation, the complaint also states: "[T]he articles have, or may 
have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the 
membership and public and thereby diminished the financial 
ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes." 
App. 9a. The complaint alleges that the articles misrepre-
sented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely implied 
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all 
their clothes and wantonly danced naked. . . . " App. 6a. 
' The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs par-
ticipated in the "chorus line" described in the 1978 articles. The record 
also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs was mentioned 
by name in the articles. 
82-1721-0PINION 
SEATTLE TIMES CO. v. RHINEHART 3 
The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the al-
leged defamation and invasions of privacy. 2 
Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allega-
tions of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. 3 
Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They 
deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents per-
taining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Founda-
tion, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and 
the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number 
of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's in-
come tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to dis-
close certain financial information, 4 the identity of the Foun-
dation's donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its 
members during that period. 
Petitioners filed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37 
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their sup-
2 Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles 
caused a decline in membership of the Foundation, respondents' answers to 
petitioners interrogatories raised this issue. In response to petitioners re-
quest that respondents' explain the damages they are seeking, respond-
ents' claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in 
Hawaii and Washington "from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a] 
concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503. 
3 Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were sub-
stantially true and accurate, that they were privileged under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of limitations had run as to 
the 1973 articles, that the individual respondents had consented to any in-
vasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy when performing before 1,100 prisoners. 
' Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence. 
He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his 
safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks 
of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling 
Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion. 
5 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A party, upon 
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may 
apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in the 
county where the action is pending, for an order compelling 
discovery .. .. " 
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porting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the princi-
pal issue as to discovery was respondents "refusal[] to permit 
any effective inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the 
source of their donations, their financial transactions, uses of 
wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general." 
Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion arguing in 
particular that compelled production of the identities of the 
Foundation's donors and members would violate the First 
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, free-
dom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents 
also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from 
disseminating any information gained through discovery. 
Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention · 
to continue publishing articles about respondents and this liti-
gation, and their intent to use information gained through 
discovery in future articles. 
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the mo-
tion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors 
who made contributions during the five years preceding the 
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The 
court also required petitioners to divulge enough member-
ship information to substantiate any claims of diminished 
membership. Relying on In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d 176 
(CADC 1979), 6 the court refused to issue a protective order. 
6 The Halkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to 
H alkin, the only federal court of appeals to consider the question directly 
had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court's au-
thority to restrict dissemination of information produced during pretrial 
discovery. See International Paper Products v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 
407-408 (CA21963). Halkin considered the issue at length. Characteriz-
ing a protective order as a "paradigmatic prior restraint," Halkin held that 
such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court 
should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satis-
fied that "the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and seri-
ous; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there 
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which in-
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It stated that the facts alleged by respondents in support of 
their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant 
a finding of "good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct. 
C. R. 26(c). 7 The court stated, however, that the denial of 
petitioners' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents'] 
right to move for a protective order in respect to specifically 
described discovery materials and a factual showing of good 
cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materi-
als." Record 16. 
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which 
they renewed their motion for a protective order. They sub-
mitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support 
their request. The affidavits detailed a series of letters and 
telephone calls defaming the Foundation, its members, and 
Rhinehart-including several that threatened physical harm 
to those associated with the Foundation. The affiants also 
described incidents at the Foundation's headquarters involv-
ing attacks, threats, and assaults directed at Foundation 
' Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c) provides: 
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the ac-
tion is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the 
court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more 
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery 
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation 
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of 
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that 
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be 
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one 
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after 
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or 
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not 
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties 
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed 
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. . . . " 
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many states. 
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members by anonymous individuals and groups. In general, 
the affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists 
would adversely affect Foundation membership and income 
and would subject its members to additional harassment and 
reprisals. 
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a pro-
tective order covering all information obtained through the 
discovery process that pertained to "the financial affairs of 
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian 
Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names 
and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, 
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." App. 65a. The 
order prohibited petitioners from publishing, disseminating, 
or using the information in any way except where necessary 
to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did 
not apply to information gained by means other than the dis-
covery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial 
court recognized that the protective order would restrict pe-
titioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery, 
but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to 
avoid the 1'chilling effect" that dissemination would have on 
"a party's willingness to bring his. case to court." Record 63. 
8 The relevant portions of the protective order state: 
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted with respect to in-
formation gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery 
processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names 
and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, 
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, 
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs. 
"3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not dis-
seminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through 
discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering 
party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a 
defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of 
the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dis-
semination. This protective order has no application except to information 
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Respondents appealed from the trial court's production 
order and petitioners appealed from the protective order. 
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d 
673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court 
reasoned: 
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensi-
bly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of 
free expression,' we are convinced that the interest of 
the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is 
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification. 
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sus-
tain a rule like Rule 26(c) which authorizes a trial court 
to protect the confidentiality of information given for 
purposes of litigation." I d., at 690. 9 
The court noted that "[t]he information to be discovered con-
cerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his 
organization, in which he and his associates had a recog-
nizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these 
matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoy-
ance, embarrassment and even oppression." Ibid. There-
fore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its 
discretion in issuing the protective order. 10 
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its 
holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court 
9 Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a 
protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment 
rights, the court also stated: 
"A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to 
give information which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to them-
selves, in order to secure a government benefit or perform an obligation to 
that government, those receiving that information waive the right to use it 
for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of gov-
ernment which exacted the information." 654 P. 2d, at 681. 
'
0 The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective 
order shields respondents from "abuse of the discovery privilege," re-
spondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not 
consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision. 
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re Halkin, 598 
F. 2d 176 (1979), 11 and applies a different standard from that 
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San 
Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981). 12 We granted certiorari 
to resolve the conflict. 13 We affirm. 
III 
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discov-
ery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Pro-
cedure 179 (1977). 14 Rule 26(b)(1) provides that a party "may 
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion." It further provides that discovery is not limited to 
matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the informa-
tion sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 
11 See note 11 supra. 
12 In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit consid-
ered and rejected Halkin's approach to the constitutionality of protective 
orders. Although the San Juan court held that protective orders may im-
plicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that such interests 
are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The court stated: 
"In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such limitations in a 
standard of 'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' to the 
First Amendment concerns at stake .... " 662 F. 2d, at 116. 
13 The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is consistent with the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International 
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (1963). 
14 See Bushman v. Ne:w Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P. 2d 
1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when 
the language of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the 
same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guid-
ance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc ., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 
499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington rule that provides for the 
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually 
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Com-
pare Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b) 
and (c). 
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26(b)(l); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d 
758, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); cf. C. Wright & A. Miller, 8 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970). 15 
The rules do not differentiate between information that is 
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests at-
tach. Under the rules, the only express limitations are that 
the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to 
the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules 
often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both liti-
gants and third parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a 
request for discovery, the Court may issue an order directing 
compliance that is enforceable by the Court's contempt pow-
ers. Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37(b). 17 
15 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b)(1), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b)(1) in effect at the time, provides in full: 
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking dis-
covery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the exist-
ence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of per-
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for 
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence." 
16 Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or 
written examination. The litigant can compel the third party to be de-
posed and to produce tangible evidence at the deposition by serving the 
third party with a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45. Rule 45(b)(1) authorizes 
a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible evidence "if it is 
unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 45 also provides: "Failure by any per-
son without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be 
deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued." Wash. 
Super. Ct. C. R. 45(f). 
17 In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court 
to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for ex-
ample, regarding designated facts as established for purposes of the action. 
Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A). 
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Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict 
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the ef-
fect of restricting expression. They contend that civil dis-
covery is not different from other sources of information, and 
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First 
Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this 
case to disseminate any information gained through discov-
ery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not 
thought to be present here, some information may be re-
strained. They submit, however, that: 
"When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it 
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture 
are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover, 
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before is-
suing such an order a court must determine that there 
are no alternatives which intrude less directly on expres-
sion." Petitioners' Brief 10. 
We think the rule urged by petitioners would impose an un-
warranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a trial 
court to oversee the discovery process. 
IV 
It is, of course, clear that information obtained through 
civil discovery authorized by modern rules of civil procedure 
would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected 
speech identified by decisions of this Court. In this case, as 
petitioners argue, there certainly is a public interest in know-
ing more about respondents. This interest may well include 
most-and possibly all-of what has been discovered as a re-
sult of the court's order under Rule 26(b)(l). It does not nec-
essarily follow, however, that a litigant has an unrestrained 
right to disseminate information that has been obtained 
through pretrial discovery. For even though the broad 
sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all re-
straints on free expression, this Court has observed that 
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"freedom of speech . . . does not comprehend the right to 
speak on any subject ·at any time." American Communica-
tions Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 394-395 (1950). 
The critical question that this case presents is whether a 
litigant's freedom comprehends the right to disseminate in-
formation that he has obtained pursuant to a court order that 
both granted him access to that information and placed re-
straints on the way in which the information might be used. 
In addressing that question it is necessary to conisder 
whether the "practice in question [furthers] an important or 
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppres-
sion of expression" and whether "the limitation of First 
Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary ores-
sential to the protection of the particular governmental inter-
est involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 
(1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354-355 (1980); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976). 
A 
At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the 
impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective 
order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all 
civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish 
to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery 
processes. As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted 
by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are a mat-
ter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment 
right of access to information made available only for pur-
poses of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17~ 
(1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it 
the unrestrained right to gather information."). Thus, con-
tinued court control over the discovered information does not 
raise the same spectre of government censorship that such 
control might suggest in other situations. See In re Halkin, 
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598 F. 2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, J. dissenting). 18 
Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not 
public components of a civil trial. 19 Such proceedings were 
not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they 
are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice. 
See id., at 396 (BURGER, C. J., concurring); Marcus, Myth \ 
and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the information that surfaces during 
pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially re-
lated, to the underlying cause of action. Therefore, re-
straints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, informa-
tion are not a restriction on a traditionally aeeeesibt source 
of information. /~lAb~ 
18 Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at 
the courthouse door," In re Halkin, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be 
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on 
several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communica-
tions of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a crimi-
nal defendant. See Nebraska Press v. Stuart, 427 U. S., 539, 563 (1976; 
id., at 601 and n. 27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Oklahoma Press Publish-
ing Co. v. District Court, 430 U. S. 308, 31()...:311 (1977); Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U. S. 333, 361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, a court often 
finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including 
counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89, 
104 n. 21 (1981). 
19 Discovery rarely takes place in public. Depositions are scheduled at 
times and places most convenient to those involved. Interrogatories are 
answered in private. Rules of civil procedure may require parties to file 
with the clerk of the court interrogatory answers, responses to requests 
for admissions, and deposition transcripts. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(d). 
Jurisdictions that require filing of discovery materials customarily provide 
that trial courts may order that the materials not be filed or that they be 
filed under seal. See ibid.; Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c). Federal dis-
trict courts may adopt local rules providing that the fruits of discovery are 
not to be filed except on order of the court. See, e. g., C. D. Cal. R. 6(d); 
SDN. Y. Civ. R. 19. Thus, to the extent that courthouse records could 
serve as a source of public information, access to that source customarily is 
subject to the control of the trial court. 
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Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting 
dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the 
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First 
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 
U. S., at 399 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such 
a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only 
that information obtained through use of the discovery proc-
ess. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical informa-
tion covered by the protective order as long as the informa-
tion is gained through means independent of the court's 
processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to 
disseminate information discovered in advance of trial impli-
cates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a 
far lesser extent than would restraints on desemination of in-
formation in a different context. Therefore, our consider-
ation of the provision for protective orders contained in the 
Washington Civil Rules takes into account the unique posi-
tion that such orders occupy in relation to the First 
Amendment. 
B 
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest un-
related to the suppression of expression. Procunier, 416 
U. S., at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to 
litigation to obtain information "relevant to the subject mat-
ter involved" that they believe will be helpful in the prepara-
tion and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed 
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole 
purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settle-
ment, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pre-
trial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is necessary for 
the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders 
conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that 
pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a 
significant potential for abuse. 20 This abuse is not limited to 
20 See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments 
to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176 
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matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously 
implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. 21 
The Rules do not distinguish between public and private in-
formation. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litiga-
tion, as relevant information in the hands of third parties may 
be subject to discovery. 
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtain-
incidentally or purposefully-information that not only is ir-
relevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputa-
tion and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial 
interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf. 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176--177 (1979); Gumbel v. 
Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 145-146 (1888). As stated by Judge 
Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 
403, 407-408 (CA2 1963), "[ w ]hether or not the Rule itself au-
thorizes [a particular protective order] . . . we have no ques-
tion as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent 
'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to 
prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices.'" (citing Gumbel 
v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can at-
tend the coerced production of information under a state's 
(1979), the Court observed: "[T]here have been repeated expressions of 
concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this 
Court have joined the chorus. But until and unless there are major 
changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on 
what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent 
abuse." !d., at 176, 177 (citations omitted); see also id., at 179 (POWELL, 
J., concurring). But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the 
inadequate oversight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any respect 
lessen the importance of discovery in civil litigation and the government's 
substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the discovery process. 
21 Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488-491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its ex-
press purposes the protection of a "party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." Although the 
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests 
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and 
language of the Rule. 
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discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization 
of protective orders. 22 
c 
We also find that the provision for protective orders in the 
Washington rules requires, in itself, no heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad 
discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order 
is appropriate and what degree of protection is required. 
The legislature of the State of Washington, following the ex-
ample of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, has determined that such discretion is nec-
essary, and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is 
in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and 
interests of parties affected by discovery. 23 The unique char-
acter of the discovery process requires that the trial court 
have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders. 
v 
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably 
may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have 
noted, the trial court's order allowing discovery was ex-
tremely broad. It compelled respondents-among other 
things-to identify all persons who had made donations over 
22 The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the impor-
tance of ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to the 
courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose them-
selves to unwanted publicity, individuals may well forego the pursuit of 
their just claims. The judicial system will thus have made the utilization 
of its remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or unwilling to 
use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valuable as that of speech it-
self." 654 P. 2d, at 689. Cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
429-431 (1963). 
23 In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for 
a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and 
could lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals, as this case illustrates. 
See, e. g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. 
Supp. 866 (ED Pa. 1981). 
' 
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a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Founda-
tion, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order 
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of • · 
financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington found 
that dissemination of this information would "result in annoy-
ance, embarrassment and even oppression." 654 P. 2d, at 
690. It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the 
highest court in the state found no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court's decision to issue a protective order persuant to a 
constitutional state law. We hold that the protective order 
issued in this case does not offend the First Amendment. It 
was entered by the trial court upon a showing that consti-
tuted good cause as required by Rule 26(c). Also, it is lim-
ited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, a~d does not re-
strict dissemination if the information is obtained from other 
sources. 24 
The judgment accordingly is 
Affirmed 
24 It is apparent that substantial government interests were implicated. 
Respondents, in requesting the protective order, relied upon the rights of 
privacy and religious association. Both the trial court and the Supreme 
Court of Washington also emphasized that the right of persons to resort to 
the courts for redress of grievances would have been 'chilled.' See, supra, 
~f--n·--~· 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litiga-
tion have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in aQ-
vance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discov-
ery process. 
I 
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious 
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer 
than 1,000 members , most of whom live in the State ofWash-
ington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the 
ability to communicate with the dead through a medium. 
Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium. 
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla 
Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and 
the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the 
newspapers during the years 1973, 1978 and 1979. The five 
articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the 
manner in which he operated the Foundation. They de-
scribed seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid 
him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends. 
The articles also stated that Rhinehart. had sold magical 
"stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. One article 
referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, for sodomy. 
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an 
"extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla 
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State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated 
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave 
away between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One 
article described a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their 
gowns and bikinis and sang .... " App. 25a. The two arti-
cles that appeared in 1979 referred to a purported connection 
between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular 
television program, "The Incredible Hulk." 
II 
Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior 
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against theSe-
attle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of 
the articles and the spouses of the authors. Five female 
members of the Foundation who had participated in the pres-
entation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 1 
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements 
that were "fictional and untrue," and that the defendants-
petitioners here-knew, or should have known, they were 
false. According to the complaint, the articles "did and were 
calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and 
ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, reli-
gious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession 
as a spiritual leader." App. 8a. With respect to the Foun-
dation, the complaint also states: "[T]he articles have, or may 
have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the 
membership and public and thereby diminished the financial 
ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes." 
App. 9a.' The complaint alleges that the articles misrepre-
sented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely implied 
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all 
their clothes and wantonly danced naked .... " App. 6a. 
1 The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs par-
ticipated in the "chorus line" described in the 1978 articles. The record 
also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs was mentioned 
by name in the articles. 
82-1721-0PINION 
SEATTLE TIMES CO. v. RHINEHART 3 
The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the al-
leged defamation and invasions of privacy. 2 
Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allega-
tions of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. 3 
Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They 
deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents per-
taining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Founda-
tion, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and 
the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number 
of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's in-
come tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to dis-
close certain financial information, 4 the identity of the Foun-
dation's donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its 
members during that period. 
Petitioners rJed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37 
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their sup-
2 Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles 
caused a decline in membership of the Foundation, respondents' answers to 
petitioners interrogatories raised this issue. Iri response to petitioners re-
quest that respondents' explain the damages they are seeking, respond-
ents' claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in · 
Hawaii and Washington "from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a] 
concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503. 
3 Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were sub-
stantially true and accurate, that they were privileged under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of limitations had run as to 
the 1973 articles, that the individual respondents had consented to any in-
vasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy when performing before 1,100 prisoners. 
• Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence. 
He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his 
safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks 
of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling 
Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion. 
5 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A party, upon 
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may 
apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in 
the county where the action is pending, for an order compelling 
discovery .... " 
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porting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the princi-
pal issue as to discovery was respondents "refusal[] to permit 
any effective inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the 
source of their donations, their financial transactions, uses of 
wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general." 
Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion arguing in 
particular that compelled production of the identities of the 
Foundation's donors and members would violate the First 
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, free-
dom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents 
also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from 
disseminating any information gained through discovery. 
Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention 
to continue publishing articles about respondents and this liti-
gation, and their intent to use information gained through 
discovery in future articles. 
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the mo-
tion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors 
who made contributions during the five years preceding the 
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The 
court also required respondents to divulge enough member-
ship information to substantiate any claims of diminished 
membership. Relying on In re Halkin, 598 F. 2d 176 
(CADC 1979),6 the court refused to issue a protective order. 
6 The Balkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to 
Balkin, the only federal court of appeals to consider the question directly 
had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court's au-
thority to restrict dissemination of information produced during pretrial 
discovery. See International Paper Products v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 
407-408 (CA21963). Balkin considered the issue at length. Characteriz-
ing a protective order as a "paradigmatic prior restraint," Balkin held that 
such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court 
should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satis-
fied that ''the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and seri-
ous; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there 
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which in-
trudes less directly on expression." /d., at 191. 
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It stated that the facts alleged by respondents in support of 
their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant 
a finding of "good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct. 
C. R. 26(c). 7 The court stated, however, that the denial of 
respondents' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents'] 
right to move for a protective order in respect to specifically 
described discovery materials and a factual showing of good 
cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materi-
als." Record 16. 
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which 
they renewed their motion for a protective order. They sub-
mitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support 
their request. The affidavits detailed a series of letters and 
telephone calls defaming the Foundation, its members, and 
Rhinehart-including several that threatened physical harm 
to those associated with the Foundation. The affiants also 
described incidents at the Foundation's headquarters involv-
ing attacks, threats, and assaults directed at Foundation 
7 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c) provides: 
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the ac-
tion is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the 
court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more 
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery 
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation 
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of 
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that 
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be 
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one 
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after 
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or 
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not 
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties 
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed 
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court .... " 
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many states. 
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members by anonymous individuals and groups. In general, 
the affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists 
would adversely affect Foundation membership and income 
and would subject its members to additional harassment and 
reprisals. 
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a pro-
tective order covering all information obtained through the 
discovery process that pertained to "the financial affairs of 
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian 
Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names 
and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, 
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." App. 65a. The 
order prohibited petitioners from publishing, disseminating, 
or using the information in any way except where necessary 
to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did 
not apply to information gained by means other than the dis-
covery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial 
court recognized that the protective order would restrict pe-
titioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery, 
but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to 
8 The relevant portions of the protective order state: 
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted with respect to in-
formation gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery 
processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names 
and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, 
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, 
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs. 
"3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not dis-
seminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through 
discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering 
party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a 
defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of 
the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dis-
semination. This protective order has no application except to information 
gained by the defendants through the use of the discovery processes." 
App. 65a. 
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avoid the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on 
"a party's willingness to bring his case to court." Record 63. 
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production 
order and petitioners appealed from the protective order. 
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d 
673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court 
reasoned: 
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensi-
bly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of 
free expression,' we are convinced that the interest of 
the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is 
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification. 
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sus-
tain a rule like Rule 26(c) which authorizes a trial court 
to protect the confidentiality of information given for 
purposes of litigation." I d., at 690. 9 
The court noted that "(t]he information to be discovered con-
cerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his 
organization, in which he and his associates had a recog-
nizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these 
matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoy-
ance, embarrassment and even oppression." Ibid. There-
fore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its 
discretion in issuing the protective order. 10 
9 Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a 
protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment 
rights , the court also stated: 
"A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to 
give infonnation which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to them-
selves, in order to secure a government benefit or perfonn an obligation to 
that government, those receiving that infonnation waive the right to use it 
for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of gov-
ernment which exacted the infonnation. " 654 P. 2d, at 681. 
'
0 The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective 
order shields respondents from "abuse of the discovery privilege," re-
spondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not 
consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision. 
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The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its 
holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re Halkin, 598 
F. 2d 176 (1979), 11 and applies a different standard from that 
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San 
Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981). 12 We granted certiorari 
to resolve the conflict. 13 We affirm. 
III 
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discov-
ery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Pro-
cedure 179 (1977). 14 Rule 26(b)(l) provides that a party "may 
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion." It further provides that discovery is not limited to 
matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the informa-
11 See note 6 supra. 
12 In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit consid-
ered and rejected Balkin's approach to the constitutionality of protective 
orders. . Although the San Juan court held that protective orders may im-
plicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that such interests 
are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The court stated: 
"In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such limitations in a 
standard of 'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' to the 
First Amendment concerns at stake ... .'' 662 F. 2d, at 116. 
13 The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is consistent with the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International 
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (1963). 
1'See Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P. 2d 
1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when 
the language of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the 
same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guid-
ance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 
499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington rule that provides for the 
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually 
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Com-
pare Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b) 
and (c). 
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tion sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 
26(b)(1); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d 
758, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); cf. C. Wright & A. Miller, 8 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970). 16 
The rules do not differentiate between information that is 
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests at-
tach. Under the rules, the only express limitations are that 
the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to 
the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules 
often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both liti-
gants and third parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a 
request for discovery, the Court may issue an order directing 
compliance that is enforceable by the Court's contempt pow-
ers. Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37(b). 17 
16 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b)(l), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b)(l) in effect at the time, provides in full: 
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subjec·t matter involved in the pending 
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking dis-
covery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the exist-
ence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of per-
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for 
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence." 
16 Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or 
written examination. The litigant can compel the third party to be de-
posed and to produce tangible evidence at the deposition by serving the 
third party with a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45. Rule 45(b)(1) authorizes 
a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible evidence "if it is 
unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 45 also provides: "Failure by any per-
son without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be 
deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued." Wash. 
Super. Ct. C. R. 45(f). 
17 In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court 
to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for ex-
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Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict 
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the ef-
fect of restricting expression. They contend that civil dis-
covery is not different from other sources of information, and 
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First 
Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this 
case to disseminate any information gained through discov-
ery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not 
thought to be present here, some information may be re-
strained. They submit, however, that: 
''When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it 
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture 
are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover, 
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before is-
suing such an order a court must determine that there 
are no alternatives which intrude less directly on expres-
sion." Petitioners' Brief 10. 
We think the rule urged by petitioners would impose an un-
warranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a trial 
court to oversee the discovery process. 
IV 
It is, of course, clear that information obtained through 
civil discovery authorized by modern rules of civil procedure 
would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected 
speech identified by decisions of this Court. In this case, as 
petitioners argue, there certainly is a public interest in know-
ing more about respondents. This interest may well include 
most-and possibly all-of what has been discovered as a re-
sult of the court's order under Rule 26(b)(l). It does not nec-
essarily follow, however, that a litigant has an unrestrained 
right to disseminate information that has been obtained 
ample, regarding designated facts as established for purposes of the action. 
Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A). 
82-1721-0PINION 
SEATTLE TIMES CO. v. RHINEHART 11 
through pretrial discovery. For even though the broad 
sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all re-
straints on free expression, this Court has observed that 
"freedom of speech . . . does not comprehend the right to 
speak on any subject at any time." American Communica-
tions Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 394-395 (1950). 
The critical question that this case presents is whether a 
litigant's freedom comprehends the right to disseminate in-
formation that he has obtained pursuant to a court order that 
both granted him access to that information and placed re-
straints on the way in which the information might be used. 
In addressing that question it is necessary to conisder 
whether the "practice in question [furthers] an important or 
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppres-
sion of expression" and whether "the limitation of First 
Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary ores-
sential to the protection of the particular governmental inter-
est involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 
(1974); see BrO'IffYI, .v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354-355 (1980); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976). 
A 
At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the 
impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective 
order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all 
civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish 
to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery 
processes. As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted 
by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are a mat-
ter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment 
right of access to information made available only for pur-
poses of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 1&-17 
(1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it 
the unrestrained right to gather information."). Thus, con-
tinued court control over the discovered information does not 
raise the same spectre of government censorship that such 
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control might suggest in other situations. See In re Balkin, 
598 F. 2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, J. dis~e]lting). 18 
Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not 
public components of a civil trial. 19 Such proceedings were 
not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they 
are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice. 
See id., at 396 (BURGER, C. J., concurring); Marcus, Myth 
and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the information that surfaces during 
pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially re-
lated, to the underlying cause qf action. Therefore, re-
straints placed OJ?. discovered, but not yet admitted, informa-
tion are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of 
information. 
18 Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at 
the courthouse door," In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be 
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on 
several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communica-
tions of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a crimi-
nal defendant. See Nebraska Press v. Stuart, 427 U. S., 539, 563 (1976; 
id., at 601 and n. 27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Oklahoma Press Publish-
ing Co. v. District Court, 430 U. S. 308, 310-311 (1977); Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U. S. 333, 361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, a court often 
finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including 
counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89, 
104 n. 21 (1981). 
19 Discovery rarely takes place in public. Depositions are scheduled at 
times and places most convenient to those involved. Interrogatories are 
answered in private. Rules of civil procedure may require parties to file 
with the clerk of the court interrogatory answers, responses to requests 
for admissions, and deposition transcripts. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(d). 
Jurisdictions that require filing of discovery materials customarily provide 
that trial courts may order that the materials not be filed or that they be 
filed under seal. See ibid.; Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c). Federal dis-
trict courts may adopt local rules providing that the fruits of discovery are 
not to be filed except on order of the court. See, e. g., C. D. Cal. R. 6(d); 
S. D. N. Y. Civ. R. 19. Thus, to the extent that courthouse records could 
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Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting 
dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the 
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First 
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 
U. S., at 399 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such 
a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only 
that information. obtained through use of the discovery proc-
ess. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical informa-
tion covered by the protective order as long as the informa-
tion is gained through means independent of the court's 
processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to 
disseminate information discovered in advance of trial impli-
cates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a 
far lesser extent than would restraints on desemination of in-
formation in a different context. Therefore, our consider-
ation of the provision for protective orders contained in the 
Washington Civil Rules takes into account the unique posi-
tion that such orders occupy in relation to the First 
Amendment. 
B 
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest un-
related to the suppression of expression. Procunier, 416 
U. S., at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to 
litigation to obtain information "relevant to the subject mat-
ter involved" that they believe will be helpful in the prepara-
tion and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed 
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole 
purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settle-
ment, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pre-
trial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(l), it is necessary for 
the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders 
conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that 
pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a 
serve as a source of public information, access to that source customarily is 
subject to the control of the trial court. 
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significant potential for abuse. 00 This abuse is not limited to 
matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously 
implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. 21 
The Rules do not distinguish between public and private in-
formation. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litiga-
tion, as relevant information in the hands of third parties may 
be subject to discovery. 
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtain-
incidentally or purposefully-information that not only is ir-
relevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputa-
tion and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial 
interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf. 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176-177 (1979); Gumbel v. 
Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 145--146 (1888). As stated by Judge 
Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 
403, 407-408 (CA21963), "[w]hether or not the Rule itself au-
thorizes [a particular protective order] ... we have no ques-
tion as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent 
'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to 
31 See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments 
to FeQ. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176 
(1979), the Court observed: "[T]here have been repeated expressions of 
concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this 
Court have joined the chorus. But until and unless there are major 
changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on 
what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent 
abuse." Id., at 176, 177 (citations omitted); see also id., at 179 (POWELL, 
J., concurring). But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the 
inadequate oversight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any respect 
lessen the importance of discovery in civil litigation and the government's 
substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the discovery process. 
21 Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488-491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its ex-
press purposes the protection of a "party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." Although the 
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests 
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and 
language of the Rule. 
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prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices.'" (citing Gumbel 
v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can at-
tend the coerced production of information under a state's 
discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization 
of protective orders. 22 c 
We also find that the provision for protective orders in the 
Washington rules requires, in itself, no heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad 
discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order 
is appropriate and what degree of protection is required. 
The legislature of the State of Washington, following the ex-
ample of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, has determined that such discretion is nec-
essary, and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is 
in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and 
interests of parties affected by discovery. 23 The unique char-
acter of the discovery process requires that the trial court 
have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders. 
v 
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably 
may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have 
22 The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the impor-
tance of ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to the 
courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose them-
selves to unwanted publicity, individuals may well forego the pursuit of 
their just claims. The judicial system will thus have made the utilization 
of its remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or unwilling to 
use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valuable as that of speech it-
self." 654 P. 2d, at 689. Cf. California Motor Transport Co . v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
429-431 (1963). 
22 In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for 
a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and 
could lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals, as this case illustrates. 
See, e. g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. 
Supp. 866 (ED Pa. 1981). 
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noted, the trial court's order allowing discovery was ex-
tremely broad. It compelled respondents-among other 
things-to identify all persons who had made donations over 
a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Founda-
tion, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order 
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of 
financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington f~und 
that dissemination of this information would "result in annoy-
ance, embarrassment and even oppression." 654 P. 2d, at 
690. It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the 
highest court in the state found no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court's decision to issue a protective order persuant to a 
constitutional state law. We therefore hold that where, as 
in this case, a protective order is entered on a showing of 
good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context 
of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemi-
nation of the information if gained from other sources, it does 
not offend the First Amendment. 24 
The judgment accordingly is 
Affirmed 
" It is apparent that substantial government interests were implicated. 
Respondents, in requesting the protective order, relied upon the rights of 
privacy and religious association. Both the trial court and the Supreme 
Court of Washington also emphasized that the right of persons to resort to 
the courts for redress of grievances would have been 'chilled.' See, supra, 
n. 22. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litiga-
tion have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in ad-
vance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discov-
ery process. 
I 
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious 
group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer 
than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State of Wash-
ington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the 
ability to communicate with the dead through a medium. 
Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium. 
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla 
Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and 
the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the 
newspapers during the years 1973, 1978 and 1979. The five 
articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the 
manner in which he operated the Foundation. They de-
scribed seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid 
him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends. 
The articles also stated that Rhinehart. had sold magical 
"stones" that had been "expelled" from his body. One article 
referred to Rhinehart's conviction, later vacated, for sodomy. 
The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an 
"extravaganza" sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla 
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State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated 
1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave 
away between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes~ One 
article described a "chorus line of girls [who] shed their 
gowns and bikinis and sang .... " App. 25a. The two arti-
cles that appeared in 1979 referred to a purported connection 
between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular 
television program, "The Incredible Hulk." 
II 
Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior 
Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Se-
attle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of 
the articles and the spouses of the authors. Five female 
members of the Foundation who had participated in the pres-
entation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. 1 
The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements 
that were "fictional and untrue," and that the defendants-
petitioners here-knew, or should have known, they were 
false. According to the complaint, the articles "did and were 
calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and 
ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, reli-
gious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession 
as a spiritual leader." App. 8a. With respect to the Foun-
dation, the complaint also states: "[T]he articles have, or may 
have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the 
membership and public and thereby diminished the financial 
ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes." 
App. 9a: The complaint alleges that the articles misrepre-
sented the role of the Foundation's "choir" and falsely implied 
that female members of the Foundation had "stripped off all 
their clothes and wantonly danced naked .... " App. 6a. 
1 The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs par-
ticipated in the "chorus line" described in the 1978 articles. The record 
also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs was mentioned 
by name in the articles. 
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The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the al-
leged defamation and invasions of privacy. 2 
Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allega-
tions of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. 3 
Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They 
deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents per-
taining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Founda-
tion, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and 
the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number 
of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart's in-
come tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to dis-
close certain financial information, 4 the identity of the Foun-
dation's donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its 
members during that period. 
Petitioners filed a motion under the State's Civil Rule 37 
requesting an order compelling discovery. 5 In their sup-
' Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles 
caused a decline in membership of the Foundation, respondents' answers to 
petitioners interrogatories raised this issue. In response to petitioners re-
quest that respondents' explain the damages they are seeking, respond-
ents' claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in · 
Hawaii and Washington "from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a] 
concurrent drop in contributions." Record 503. 
3 Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were sub-
stantially true and accurate, that they were privileged under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the statute of limitations had run as to 
the 1973 articles , that the individual respondents had consented to any in-
vasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy when performing before 1,100 prisoners. 
' Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence. 
He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his 
safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks 
of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling 
Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion. 
6 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37 provides in relevant part: "A party, upon 
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may 
apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in 
the county where the action is pending, for an order compelling 
discovery .... " 
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porting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the princi-
pal issue as to discovery was respondents "refusal[] to permit 
any effective inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the 
source of their donations, their financial transactions, uses of 
wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general." 
Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion arguing in 
particular that compelled production of the identities of the 
Foundation's donors and members would violate the First 
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, free-
dom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents 
also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from 
disseminating any information gained through discovery. 
Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention 
to continue publishing articles about respondents and this liti-
gation, and their intent to use information gained through 
discovery in future articles. 
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the mo-
tion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors 
who made contributions during the five years preceding the 
date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The 
court also required respondents to divulge enough member-
ship information to substantiate any claims of diminished 
membership. Relying on In re Balkin, 598 F. 2d 176 
(CADC 1979), 6 the court refused to issue a protective order. 
6 The Balkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to 
Balkin, the only federal court of appeals to consider the question directly 
had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court's au-
thority to restrict dissemination of information produced during pretrial 
discovery. See International Paper Products v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 
407-408 (CA21963). Balkin considered the issue at length. Characteriz-
ing a protective order as a "paradigmatic prior restraint," Balkin held that 
such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court 
should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satis-
fied that "the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and seri-
ous; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there 
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which in-
trudes less directly on expression." Id., at 191. 
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It stated that the facts· alleged by respondents in support of 
their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant 
a finding of "good cause" as required by Wash. Super. Ct. 
C. R. 26(c).7 The court stated, however, that the denial of 
respondents' motion was "without prejudice to [respondents'] 
right to move for a protective order in respect to specifically 
described discovery materials and a factual showing of good 
cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materi-
als." Record 16. 
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which 
they renewed their motion for a protective order. They sub-
mitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support 
their request; The affidavits detailed a series of letters and 
telephone calls defaming the Foundation, its members, and 
Rhinehart-including several that threatened physical harm 
to those associated with the Foundation. The affiants also 
described incidents at the Foundation's headquarters involv-
ing attacks, threats, and assaults directed at Foundation 
7 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c) provides: 
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the ac-
tion is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the 
court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more 
of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery 
may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation 
of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of 
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that 
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be 
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one 
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after 
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or 
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not 
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties 
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed 
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court .... " 
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many states. 
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members by anonymous individuals and groups. In general, 
the affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists 
would adversely affect Foundation membership and income 
and would subject its members to additional harassment and 
reprisals. 
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a pro-
tective order covering all information obtained through the 
discovery process that pertained to "the financial affairs of 
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian 
Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names 
and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, 
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs." App. 65a. The 
order prohibited petitioners from publishing, disseminating, 
or using the information in any way except where necessary 
to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did 
not apply to information gained by means other than the dis-
covery process. 8 In an accompanying opinion, the trial 
court recognized that the protective order would restrict pe-
titioners' right to publish information obtained by discovery, 
but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to 
8 The relevant portions of the protective order state: 
"2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order is granted with respect to in-
formation gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery 
processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names 
and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, 
and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, 
or donors to any of the various plaintiffs. 
"3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not dis-
seminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through 
discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering 
party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a 
defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of 
the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dis-
semination. This protective order has no application except to information 
gained by the defendants through the use of the discovery processes." 
App. 65a. 
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avoid the "chilling effect" that dissemination would have on 
"a party's willingness to bring his case to court." Record 63. 
Respondents appealed from the trial court's production 
order and petitioners appealed from the protective order. 
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 654 P. 2d 
673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court 
reasoned: 
"Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensi-
bly, at least, within the definition of a 'prior restraint of 
free expression,' we are convinced that the interest of 
the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is 
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' of justification. 
The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sus-
tain a rule like Rule 26(c) which authorizes a trial court 
to protect the confidentiality of information given for 
purposes of litigation." I d., at 690. 9 
The court noted that "[t]he information to be discovered con-
cerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his 
organization, in which he and his associates had a recog-
nizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these 
matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoy-
ance, embarrassment and even oppression." Ibid. There-
fore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its 
discretion in issuing the protective order. 10 
9 Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed arguendo that a 
protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment 
rights, the court also stated: 
"A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to 
give information which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to them-
selves, in order to secure a government benefit or perform an obligation to 
that government, those receiving that information waive the right to use it 
for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of gov-
ernment which exacted the information." 654 P. 2d, at 681. 
10 The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective 
order shields respondents from "abuse of the discovery privilege," re-
spondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not 
consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's decision. 
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The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its 
holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In re H alkin, 598 
F. 2d 176 (1979), 11 and applies a different standard from that 
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San 
Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981). 12 We granted certiorari 
to resolve the conflict. 13 We affirm. 
III 
Most states, including Washington, have adopted discov-
ery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Pro-
cedure 179 (1977). 14 Rule 26(b)(1) provides that a party "may 
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion." It further provides that discovery is not limited to 
matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the informa-
11 See note 6 supra. 
12 In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit consid-
ered and rejected Balkin's approach to the constitutionality of protective 
orders. . Although the San Juan court held that protective orders may im-
plicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that such interests 
are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The court stated: 
"In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such limitations in a 
standard of 'good cause' that incorporates a 'heightened sensitivity' to the 
First Amendment concerns at stake .... " 662 F. 2d, at 116. 
13 The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is consistent with the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International 
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (1963). 
"See Bushman v. New Holland Division, 88 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P. 2d 
1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when 
the language of a Washington rule and its federal counterpart are the 
same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the federal rule for guid-
ance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 
499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington rule that provides for the 
scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually 
identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Com-
pare Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b) 
and (c). 
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tion sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence." Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 
26(b)(1); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d 
758, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); cf. C. Wright & A. Miller, 8 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2008 (1970). 15 
The rules do not differentiate between information that is 
private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests at-
tach. Under the rules, the only express limitations are that 
the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to 
the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the rules 
often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both liti-
gants and third parties. 16 If a litigant fails to comply with a 
request for discovery, the Court may issue an order directing 
compliance that is enforceable by the Court's contempt pow-
ers. Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 37(b). 17 
15 Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(b)(1), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b)(l) in effect at the time, provides in full: 
"In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking dis-
covery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the exist-
ence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of per-
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for 
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence." 
16 Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or 
written examination. The litigant can compel the third party to be de-
posed and to produce tangible evidence at the deposition by serving the 
third party with a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45. Rule 45(b)(l) authorizes 
a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible evidence "if it is 
unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 45 also provides: "Failure by any per-
son without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be 
deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued." Wash. 
Super. Ct. C. R. 45(f). 
17 In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court 
to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for ex-
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Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict 
limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the ef-
fect of restricting expression. They contend that civil dis-
covery is not different from other sources of information, and 
therefore the information is "protected speech" for First 
Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this 
case to disseminate any information gained through discov-
ery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not 
thought to be present here, some information may be re-
strained. They submit, however, that: 
"When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it 
may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture 
are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover, 
must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before is-
suing such an order a court must determine that there 
are no alternatives which intrude less directly on expres-
sion." Petitioners' Brief 10. 
We think the rule urged by petitioners would impose an un-
warranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a trial 
court to oversee the discovery process. 
IV 
It is, of course, clear that information obtained through 
civil discovery authorized by modern rules of civil procedure 
would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected 
speech identified by decisions of this Court. In this case, as 
petitioners argue, there certainly is a public interest in know-
ing more about respondents. This interest may well include 
most-and possibly all-of what has been discovered as a re-
sult of the court's order under Rule 26(b)(l). It does not nec-
essarily follow, however, that a litigant has an unrestrained 
right to disseminate information that has been obtained 
ample, regarding designated facts as established for purposes of the action. 
Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A). 
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through pretrial discovery. For even though the broad 
sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all re-
straints on free expression, this Court has observed that 
"freedom of speech . . . does not comprehend the right to 
speak on any subject at any time." American Communica-
tions Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 394--395 (1950). 
The critical question that this case presents is whether a 
litigant's freedom comprehends the right to disseminate in-
formation that he has obtained pursuant to a court order that 
both granted him access to that information and placed re-
straints on the way in which the information might be used. 
In addressing that question it is necessary to conisder 
whether the "practice in question [furthers] an important or 
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppres-
sion of expression" and whether "the limitation of First 
Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary ores-
sential to the protection of the particular governmental inter-
est involved." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 
(1974); see Brown .v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354--355 (1980); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976). 
A 
At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the 
impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective 
order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all 
civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish 
to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court's discovery 
processes. As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted 
by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are a mat-
ter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment 
right of access to information made available only for pur-
poses of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16--17 
(1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it 
the unrestrained right to gather information."). Thus, con-
tinued court control over the discovered information does not 
raise the same spectre of government censorship that such 
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control might suggest in other situations. See In re Balkin, 
598 F. 2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, J. dis~e.nting). 18 
Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not 
public components of a civil trial. 19 Such proceedings were 
not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they 
are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice. 
See id., at 396 (BURGER, C. J., concurring); Marcus, Myth 
and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the information that surfaces during 
pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially re-
lated, to the underlying cause qf action. Therefore, re-
straints placed o~ discovered, but not yet admitted, informa-
tion are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of 
information. 
18 Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at 
the courthouse door," In re Halkin, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be 
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on 
several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communica-
tions of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a crimi-
nal defendant. See Nebraska Press v. Stuart, 427 U. S., 539, 563 (1976; 
id., at 601 and n. 27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Oklahoma Press Publish-
ing Co. v. District Court, 430 U. S. 308, 310-311 (1977); Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U. S. 333, 361 (1966). "In the conduct of a case, a court often 
finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including 
counsel, witnesses, and jurors." Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89, 
104 n. 21 (1981). 
19 Discovery rarely takes place in public. Depositions are scheduled at 
times and places most convenient to those involved. Interrogatories are 
answered in private. Rules of civil procedure may require parties to file 
with the clerk of the court interrogatory answers, responses to requests 
for admissions, and deposition transcripts. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(d). 
Jurisdictions that require filing of discovery materials customarily provide 
that trial courts may order that the materials not be filed or that they be 
filed under seal. See ibid.; Wash. Super. Ct. C. R. 26(c). Federal dis-
trict courts may adopt local rules providing that the fruits of discovery are 
not to be filed except on order of the court. See, e. g., C. D. Cal. R. 6(d); 
S. D. N. Y. Civ. R. 19. Thus, to the extent that courthouse records could 
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Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting 
dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the 
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First 
Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 
U. S., at 399 (POWELL, J. concurring). As in this case, such 
a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only 
that information obtained through use of the discovery proc-
ess. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical informa-
tion covered by the protective order as long as the informa-
tion is gained through means independent of the court's 
processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party's ability to 
disseminate information discovered in advance of trial impli-
cates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a 
far lesser extent than would restraints on desemination of in-
formation in a different context. Therefore, our consider-
ation of the provision for protective orders contained in the 
Washington Civil Rules takes into account the unique posi-
tion that such orders occupy in relation to the First 
Amendment. 
B 
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest un-
related to the suppression of expression. Procunier, 416 
U. S., at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to 
litigation to obtain information "relevant to the subject mat-
ter involved" that they believe will be helpful in the prepara-
tion and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed 
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole 
purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settle-
ment, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pre-
trial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(l), it is necessary for 
the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders 
conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that 
pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a 
serve as a source of public information, access to that source customarily is 
subject to the control of the trial court. 
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significant potential for abuse. 20 This abuse is not limited to 
matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously 
implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. 21 
The Rules do not distinguish between public and private in-
formation. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litiga-
tion, as relevant information in the hands of third parties may 
be subject to discovery. 
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtain-
incidentally or purposefully-information that not only is ir-
relevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputa-
tion and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial 
interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf. 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176-177 (1979); Gumbel v. 
Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 14~146 (1888). As stated by Judge 
Friendly in International Products Co. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 
403, 407-408 (CA2 1963), "[ w ]hether or not the Rule itself au-
thorizes [a particular protective order] ... we have no ques-
tion as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the inherent 
'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to 
20 See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments 
to Fec;l. Rule Civ. Proc. 26. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176 
(1979), the Court observed: "[T]here have been repeated expressions of 
concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this 
Court have joined the chorus. But until and unless there are major 
changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on 
what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent 
abuse." !d., at 176, 177 (citations omitted); see also id., at 179 (POWELL, 
J., concurring). But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the 
inadequate oversight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any respect 
lessen the importance of discovery in civil litigation and the government's 
substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the discovery process. 
21 Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488-491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its ex-
press purposes the protection of a "party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense." Although the 
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests 
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and 
language of the Rule. 
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prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices.'" (citing Gumbel 
v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can at-
tend the coerced production of information under a state's 
discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization 
of protective orders. 22 c 
We also find that the provision for protective orders in the 
Washington rules requires, in itself, no heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad 
discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order 
is appropriate and what degree of protection is required. 
The legislature of the State of Washington, following the ex-
ample of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, has determined that such discretion is nec-
essary, and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is 
in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and 
interests of parties affected by discovery. 23 The unique char-
acter of the discovery process requires that the trial court 
have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders. 
v 
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably 
may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have 
22 The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the impor-
tance of ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to the 
courts: "[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose them-
selves to unwanted publicity, individuals may well forego the pursuit of 
their just claims. The judicial system will thus have made the utilization 
of its remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or unwilling to 
use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valuable as that of speech it-
self." 654 P. 2d, at 689. Cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
429-431 (1963). 
23 In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for 
a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and 
could lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals, as this case illustrates. 
See, e. g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. 
Supp. 866 (ED Pa. 1981). 
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noted, the trial court's order allowing discovery was ex-
tremely broad. It compelled respondents-among other 
things-to identify all persons who had made donations over 
a five-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Founda-
tion, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order 
would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of 
financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington found 
that dissemination of this information would "result in annoy-
ance, embarrassment and even oppression." 654 P. 2d, at 
690. It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the 
highest court in the state found no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court's decision to issue a protective order persuant to a 
constitutional state law. We therefore hold that where, as 
in this case, a protective order is entered on a showing of 
good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context 
of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemi-
nation of the information if gained from other sources, it does 
not offend the First Amendment. 24 
The judgment accordingly is 
Affirmed 
24 It is apparent that substantial government interests were implicated. 
Respondents, in requesting the protective order, relied upon the rights of 
privacy and religious association. Both the trial court and the Supreme 
Court of Washington also emphasized that the right of persons to resort to 
the courts for redress of grievances would have been 'chilled.' See, supra, 
n. 22. 
